


# FORMATION

OF THE

## 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION

At 9-50 p.m. C.A.M.



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REFERENCE BOOK

(STUDIES 3<sup>rd</sup> B. C.

IN

# TROOP LEADING

BY

COL. I. VON VERDY DU VERNOIS


TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY

H. J. T. HILDYARD

LIEUTENANT AND ADJUTANT 71ST HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY

PARTS I. AND II.

WITH FOUR PLANS



OLD COLLECTION

Not to be taken out

LONDON


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I RECOMMEND the first two numbers of COLONEL VON VERDY'S 'Studies' to the attentive perusal of my brother officers. They supply a want which I have often felt during my service in this country—namely, a minuter tactical detail of the minor operations of war than any but the most observant and fortunately placed Staff officer is in a position to give.

I have read and re-read them very carefully, I hope with profit, certainly with great interest, and believe that practice in the sense of these 'Studies' would be a valuable preparation for manœuvres on a more extended scale.

BEAUCHAMP WALKER,

Maj.-General.

BERLIN: *June 1872.*





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
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
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
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PLAN I.





# STUDIES IN TROOP LEADING.

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## INTRODUCTION.

VARIOUS SCIENCES serve as a basis for the employment of troops in war, but the leading of them is a special art in itself.

If the necessary *matériel* for its practice is exposed to proportionately few changes, still the problems which have to be solved by this art, are of such a manifold nature, that it is impossible to confine it within definite limits. So-called practical tactics attempts to do so, but it, and strategy, appear to be those parts out of the entire sphere of military science which, with regard to their objects at least, must bear a purely scientific character.

The object may certainly be arrived at in different ways, but if we wish to derive real benefit from practical tactics, it can only be attained by preparing us to lead troops in war, or to be the organs employed for it, (officers of the General Staff, Aides-de-Camp, and Orderly officers) so far as this is possible in other ways besides practice.

The question is, not whether a man can deliver a good treatise upon any subject, but that he should understand how to act judiciously in a given case.

The scientific treatment of practical tactics produces in the first place the former result, whilst the apprentice, if he wishes to fulfil his task, must be educated for the latter.

The scientific treatment has to struggle with the evil already mentioned, that the nature of war does not allow it to be compressed into definite divisions. If this is attempted, however, the whole subject connected with the circumstances under which fighting takes place, can only be indefinitely touched upon. It is exactly these circumstances which are, in most cases, of decisive influence. Instead of upon them, however, tactics places a preponderating value upon the ground; all the arrangements are very often ordered with reference to it alone. Wood, village, or defile fights; the passage and defence of rivers, actions upon heights, mountains, and plains, are to be found there. Thus scientific treatises are formed which, like all works of a similar description, finally culminate in definite sentences, and wishing to give rules for every thing, consequently go too far.

If we observe practical tactics more closely from its own point of view, i.e., the ground and fixed rules, the following appears in its historical development and nature.

During the eighteenth century, and also partially at the beginning of our own, the doctrines regarding military operations laid infinite stress upon the elementary formations, and extremely little upon the ground (localities). In Tempelhoff's history of the seven years' war, is to be found this explanation: 'The village itself also must be cleared in such a manner, that two or more battalions may be able to march through it on one front, otherwise it is not capable of defence.'

The French wars of the Revolution brought about a violent change in this respect; all ground, which was actually passable, was manœuvred upon, and naturally the formations which were required for this purpose were improved still further in course of time.

The features of ground gained an importance which they had never had before. As now almost every new introduction,



founded on fact, as soon as it is brought to bear with special weight, gains an importance surpassing its true worth, so also in this case. There came a time when it was disputed whether the battalion should defend the mountain, or the mountain the battalion. These aberrations were certainly soon overcome, but the echoes remained if in an altered manner, and in most military dogmas the nature of the ground still plays the most prominent rôle.

A high importance can certainly not be denied it, but in most cases it is only a secondary consideration. For in the greater operations of war, the circumstances under which fighting is carried out, are almost always of more importance than matters regarding the nature of the ground ; one fights in a village, on heights, in a wood, in short, at the place where one happens to be, in quite a different manner, according to the means and ulterior aim.

This aim must not be regarded as a secondary consideration ; it must not be dismissed with the remark, that it belongs to the province of strategy. Scientific treatment has called forth a division into tactics and strategy, and laid down two separate notions, which are inseparable for the independent action of a leader. The circumstances under which he should fight, and in what manner he should then fight, cannot be separated ; the former makes the latter conditional, and he, to whom only the latter is taught, will be robbed of an element in his education without which no leader—from lieutenant to general-commanding—can be independently active with advantage.

As further regards rules, they can only be granted a limited value, for they can only be applied so far as the circumstances can be completely overseen and absolutely ruled. Thus, there can be rules, or rather principles, for the disposition of marches, so far as these dispositions keep in view the troops to which they refer ; in the same way, certain rules can be taught for the placing of outposts, or one can form views, as to which of the perceptible objects a battery must fire upon, according to the

situation of affairs. But for the conduct of an action, for leading troops on a large scale, no rules can be given, as these would be but empty words, for the circumstances can neither be foreseen nor absolutely ruled.

If rules for war are to hold good under all circumstances, let them be condensed into axioms like mathematics, that like is equal to like ; if they are to be of more consequence, let each new circumstance form a new exception.

The rule demands that a strong position should be occupied, the special state of affairs obliges it to be passed by ; battle should be given because the enemy is weaker, but the stronger falls back because his presence is needful elsewhere.

The concrete case must always decide ; the same rule is right in the one case and wrong in another.

Accurate science grounds the next precept upon the one already demonstrated, and in this way builds up a system ; practical life, and above all war, has to deal with variable, with incalculable quantities ; indeed it can only foresee the next immediate occurrence, and even this but incompletely, and can infer no second from it.

Such sentences as, '*concentrate your masses upon the enemy's weak side,*' or '*if the enemy does this we must take such and such a measure,*' are to be found too frequently in the compendiums of strategy and tactics.

Where then is the character of conflicts and war ?

The enemy will certainly not have the kindness to say how strong he is, what are his general designs, or what he is commissioned to do, and in what manner he will strive to attain his end. Much of this can be remarked in action, often in a most sensible manner, more still can be learnt after it, but most of all a long time afterwards from military history. Did not the Austrian 8th Corps overrate its antagonist after the action of Skalitz, when it thought that it had been fighting with two Prussian Corps ? Did not the same happen after the campaign on the part of the Austrian 6th Corps, as well as on that of

Wnuck's Cavalry Brigade, in reference to the action of Nachod? Were not hundreds of cases from the struggles of 1866 shown, in which the opponents, on both sides, had estimated incorrectly the strength and intentions of the enemy, until the official publications enlightened them.

The reason for such occurrences is very simple. Each of the opponents does his best to hide everything from the other, and indeed the leaders, and the cavalry patrols, cannot ride into the enemy's line of skirmishers, in order to obtain information.

If the nature of the war with which we have to deal is of such a kind that from the enemy's side all reaches us indefinitely, and of unknown magnitude, while for our own part the whole sphere of misunderstandings, of errors—all that is called fiction—comes to bear, how can rules be applied to it? In war, twice two is not always four; it can never be known whether the rule or the exception is to be taken.

Nothing therefore remains upon this uncertain ground, but to appeal so much the more to one's own resources. The pilots which will steer us the best over the numerous rocks are, clearness in what is designed, and energy in carrying out that which is aimed at. Therefore the warlike virtues lie infinitely more in character, than in knowledge.

Military science may still maintain its high importance, even tactics dealt with in a scientific manner may afford great advantages, but in this form it cannot suffice for practical training in leading troops. War, like every art, is not acquired in a reasoning, but only in a tentative manner; in order to accomplish anything ordinary, routine is of vital importance.

But how is this routine to be attained, and to what must it specially direct its attention? According to the nature of conflicts depicted above, a leader must be educated in the faculty of forming clear and prudent resolutions, in the talent of imparting these resolutions clearly and plainly to others, and in that of enabling him to direct the troops in such a manner as to carry out his intentions; in short, in qualities which are requisite in



order to enable him to make energetic resolutions, and to carry them out.

Though the formation of the character of the individual must be left to practice, yet the formation of military judgment can be perfectly well attained theoretically. There are many ways of effecting this ; after many years of practical proof, the following method appears to me the most judicious.

To produce a variety of situations by a continual exercise in specified cases, to teach the nature of war in them, and thus to form the above-mentioned qualities, through an abundance of actual resolutions and dispositions, which the pupil has to make.

This can be best attained by the so-called deductive method of teaching, which has been followed for some time in our military schools. It does not suffice equally for all branches of learning, and cannot be thoroughly utilised in an educational establishment, as it insists on severe individual study, and requires too much time. But it appears the quickest and most useful method for the study of tactics and military history. For private study this manner is also applicable, as a situation can either be created, or a given one taken, and the student exercises himself in projecting orders and directions, representing the special dispositions for the march, the length of the columns, and the time for their departure. Next, he supposes reports or orders to arrive, or the appearance of hostile divisions, and designs what steps are to be taken. Such circumstances can enter into play as fix the attention on the rules of leading, during and after an action ; but these studies are only initiatory, and must never be conclusive. War always brings forth new pictures, and though the situations appear very similar, they are hardly ever entirely so.

The problems which a leader can set himself, or which he is set, are endless, the means which stand at his disposal in the way of strength, composition, and quality, the purposes which the enemy pursues, the ground in all its aspects, and a great number

of other elements, form a wonderful kaleidoscope which accident throws together into the strangest figures.

The method proposed here does not in any way claim originality; its substance is to be found already in Valentini's 'Lesser Operations of War,' but it appears desirable to propagate it more generally. In time it must appear as a matter of course how it is not only suited to strategy and practical tactics on a large scale, but generally for military education in all its details.

As a preliminary measure, it seems necessary to turn the attention upon the education for leading troops, in the greater operations of war.

The whole of our training in time of peace, including the Autumn Manœuvres, rests essentially upon the practice of detachments, and only a few hours are devoted to the exercises of the division, which is the proper fighting body. Even our greatest manœuvres, those of one corps against another, belong still in a certain respect to the operations of detachments, as they must be based upon a general idea running through several days, and these corps can only be considered to be in very loose connection with an army. Such a kind of action, however, in the greater operations of war, is owing to the exceptional activity of an army corps. The conduct of a corps, and of its subordinate parts, is regulated quite differently, when it is isolated by several days, or when other corps of the same army can be brought to bear within a day for the general result.

Each question influences the conduct of an independent leader, in quite a different manner to that of one who is in a directly dependent condition. The officer in charge of a party patrolling, who comes across the enemy, has to conduct the skirmish from a different point of view, than if he commanded this party skirmishing in front of his Company. A division, if a part of the main body of an Army, will mostly come into the situation where it must, if necessary, carry an action through, even to its own destruction, and thereby promote the

general aim ; but on the other hand, a Division separated far from the Army will, as a rule, miss its aim altogether, if it lets itself be annihilated in the action.

At the battle of Königgrätz, Fransecky's Division could do no greater service than draw as much of the enemy's forces upon itself as possible, unconcerned if it caused its own ruin. No Division detached under such circumstances as those of General Count Stolberg, and von Knobelsdorf for the protection of Upper Silesia, could have entered upon, and carried out, such an action as Lieutenant-General von Fransecky undertook on the 3rd July for the general good.

Thus quite essential distinctions appear between the behaviour of completely independent troops, and such as are attached to larger bodies. As in the first direction, a continual training takes place in the peace manœuvres, whilst this cannot be the case in respect to the latter, so will a theoretical instruction, passing elementary circumstances, have to employ itself principally with the greater operations of war, and the dependent conditions which take place in them.

The following Studies refer, therefore, principally to situations in the greater operations of war ; they are partly taken from the exposition upon tactics in the 2nd part of the course at the Royal Military College. In this form they can be utilised for private study, only that when a disposition is made, or a consideration put forward in the text, trouble must be taken to make the disposition, or to carry out the consideration before reading further. These kinds of Studies are not fitted for reading, but they require to be worked out with compasses, paper, and pencil.

The dispositions made on separate occasions in these Studies, do not in any way claim to be correct models. They can, however, be useful without this, if the reader forms his independent view in every situation ; he will then find the opportunity of comparing and proving it with the, perhaps differing, views of the text. And it must not be overlooked, that all resolutions

spring directly from the individual character, and that a happy result can be attained in different ways.

The Studies are connected with the general situation of known circumstances in 1866 : but as from the beginning changes are made in the strength of the troops, in the dispositions, or reports, from the circumstances which have actually happened, the further development must take other directions : the facts are therefore entirely imaginary.<sup>1</sup>

There cannot, accordingly, be any question of criticism on the actual occurrences in the campaign of 1866. On account of the great number of plans of the battle-fields of 1866, which are diffused through the Army, the particulars could be taken from a detailed copy of them.

<sup>1</sup> In the first study, for example, only the general situation is based upon the actual circumstances ; but from the moment that the commander of the 2nd Division begins to make his own dispositions, these, as well as their execution, and the reports regarding the enemy, are fictitious.



## FIRST STUDY.

## THE INFANTRY DIVISION IN CONNEXION WITH THE CORPS.

*General Situation.*

THE 2nd Prussian Army, composed of the Guard, the 1st, 5th, and 6th Corps, together with a Cavalry Division, was assembled on the Neisse about the middle of June 1866. The 1st Corps was directed from thence towards the Bohemian frontier on the 20th. The Head-Quarters, the 1st Infantry Division, and the Artillery of the Corps, arrived at Liebau on the 25th of June; the 2nd Infantry Division, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, at Schömberg on the same day. On the 26th June, they halted at these places.

War had been declared a few days previously.

## THE 26th JUNE.

*Situation of the 2nd Infantry Division (Plan 1).*

The 1st Cavalry Brigade had been placed under the command of Lieutenant-General A., Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, during the time that the Corps should remain divided. The strength of his Division amounted to: 12 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 24 Guns, 1 Company of Pioneers, and 1 Sanitary Detachment. The Cavalry Brigade numbered: 8 Squadrons with 6 guns. (Appendix II. gives the *ordre de bataille* of these troops.)

On the morning of the 26th, the various bodies were in the following bivouacs.

Advanced Guard : Major-General B.,  
1st Regiment of Foot,  
1 Light Field Battery,  
4 Squadrons, 1st Hussars,  
close to the North of Bertelsdorf.

The main body South of Schömberg,  $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile from the main body of the advanced guard.

2nd Regiment of Foot,  
3 Field Batteries,  
1 Pioneer Company,  
1 Sanitary Detachment,  
to the west of the high road.  
4th Infantry Brigade,  
to the east of the high road.

$2\frac{3}{4}$  Squadrons of Hussars,  
 $\frac{1}{4}$  mile behind the main body and North of Schömberg, the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the Train ; the former on the road to Friedland, the latter on that from Liebau.

The Head-Quarters of the Division was in Schömberg, where the 2nd Battalion 4th Regiment, and 16 Hussars were quartered. One officer and 16 sabres were further detached from the Hussars for the maintenance of order with the Train.

The ground was known to the troops ; the Division had been in that neighbourhood as early as the beginning of June, before the commencement of hostilities. At that time the frontier had been observed on the side of the enemy by the Windischgrätz Dragoons, whose Head-Quarters was in Trautenau. No other hostile troops were between the frontier and the Elbe.

*Information possessed by the Divisional Commander regarding the enemy, his own troops, and the general design.*

When the Division arrived at Schömberg again on the 25th, the country people declared that no changes had taken place, in the occupation of the frontier by the enemy, since the

beginning of June. As regarded his own troops, the positions of the remaining bodies of the Corps at Liebau were known; beyond this, however, it was only known that the Cavalry Division of the 2nd Army had followed the march of the Corps, and bivouacked in rear of the 1st Infantry Division.

Whether the other Corps had also left the line of the Neisse, or still occupied it, was not even known by the Divisional Commander; the most diverse and contradictory reports were current on this subject. Up to the evening of the 25th, he had not even received information of the task allotted to the Corps; the last order received by him was 'to bivouac at Schömberg, and push on an advanced guard towards Trautenau.'

On the morning of the 26th June, at about 1 o'clock, the following despatch from Head-Quarters arrived in Schömberg.

Head-Quarters, Liebau, 25.6; 11 $\frac{3}{4}$  P.M.

2nd Army 1st Corps, Head-Quarters Office.

Section 1a, Index No. —

'The Guard Corps will cross the frontier to-morrow, the 26th June, to the east of Braunau, and will probably come into action there. In this case the Corps will make a diversion in its favour.

'The 2nd Division must therefore obtain information, by means of officers' patrols of Cavalry, upon the roads by Weckelsdorf, and Friedland to Braunau, of the state of affairs there.'

N. N., General Commanding.

The intended operations of the Army were known at Head-Quarters, but in order to keep the secret, they were only imparted when the general movements brought another Corps into the sphere of their own troops. This order brought the first news to the Divisional Commander, that the Guard Corps had also left the line of the Neisse, and was moving on his left flank.

The following instructions were at once verbally delivered, by a divisional aide-de-camp, to the 4th Regiment, whose Head-

Quarters was in the town. 'Two of the Companies quartered in the town will parade at the entrance towards Friedland at 5 o'clock A.M., under the command of the Battalion Commander, ready for a reconnaissance towards Braunau. The latter will report himself to the Divisional Commander at 4.45 A.M., in order to receive further instructions. The Regiment will acquaint the Brigade with this order.'

The following written order was also sent to the Hussar Regiment by an orderly.

Head-Quarters, Schömberg, 26.6; 1.15 o'clock P.M.

1st Corps 2nd Infantry Division.

Section 1, Index No. —

'The Regiment will supply two subdivisions for a reconnaissance of the 4th Regiment upon Braunau, which will report themselves to the officer commanding the Infantry at 5 o'clock A.M. in Schömberg, at the entrance to the town on the road leading to Friedland.'

X., Major on the Staff.

The time for marching off was fixed for 5 o'clock, as it did not appear advisable to send out a small detachment to a distance, and consequently isolate it in the dark, in an unknown country, in which the enemy was supposed to be.

At 4.45 A.M., Major N. of the 4th Regiment, reported himself to Lieutenant-General A. as 'detailed for the reconnaissance upon Braunau.'

He received the following verbal instructions:

'The Guard Corps marches to-day in an easterly direction towards Braunau; it is possible that it may come upon the enemy. March with your detachment, which will be joined by two subdivisions of Hussars at the place of rendezvous, to Merckelsdorf, and push on the Hussars towards Braunau, in order to gain information of the movements of the Guard Corps. If the latter should arrive there without encountering the enemy, rejoin the Division. Should it not reach Braunau, remain at Merckels-



dorf to secure the left flank of the Division. Under any circumstances I expect frequent reports, especially if a serious engagement with the Guard should take place, as in that case I intend to march without delay, in order to join in it.'

Major N. then set out with his detachment. The Divisional Commander issued the following written order to the commanders of the several bivouacs.

Head-Quarters, Schömburg, 26.6.66; 5 o'clock A.M.

1st Corps 2nd Infantry Division.

Section 1, Index No. —

'The troops will prepare their coffee as quickly as possible, and hold themselves in readiness to march directly afterwards.'

A., Lieutenant-General Commanding Division.

The Divisional Commander was obliged to take measures into consideration, in case of a serious engagement being reported at Braunau. He determined in this case not to await orders from Head-Quarters, but to act in the spirit of the designs communicated to him previously, i.e., to undertake a diversion with his own troops. The road from Trautenau could not possibly be left open, therefore the advanced guard was obliged to remain upon it. As the main body of the Division must defile through Schömburg, in order to reach Friedland, the 2nd Regiment with a battery, and the Hussar Regiment, could form a new advanced guard upon the road to Friedland, without any time being lost, the entire 4th Infantry Brigade, with the remainder of the Artillery following as a main body.

It did not appear necessary in this case to draw up a special order regarding the march. The troops here mentioned were bivouacked or quartered respectively in a narrow space; and it was only requisite to turn them out, and to order their marching off immediately, in such a manner that they should join into the column of march in the projected order.

The necessary instructions to the advanced guard upon the Trautenau road, as well as to the newly formed one, must not

be forgotten. The only thing which appeared questionable was, whether the meal should take place early, for, should there be an action in the vicinity of Braunau, on account of the great distance, it could not be foreseen whether the troops would be able to cook on that day at all. But in theory, early meals are injurious, and not every stomach is inclined to take its chief meal in the morning. Cooking it would take some time, and if a report should arrive from the reconnoitring party of an action at Braunau, it would have to be interrupted. Therefore it is only advisable to have the meal early when there is no chance of being disturbed, and when considerable exertions are in prospect.

It may be observed, that the two subdivisions of Hussars would have sufficed to obtain information of what was going on at Braunau, without Infantry, as the mountainous ground there is not of such a nature as to have confined the Cavalry to the roads. Indeed, such an investigation of it had been made on the preceding day, and nothing was discovered of the enemy. As, however, the instructions from Head-Quarters referred especially to that district, the Division was obliged to pay more attention to its safety in that direction than could be done through Cavalry alone; and with this view the two companies were despatched. Should the Guard Corps reach the vicinity of Braunau, the left flank would be sufficiently secured by its presence, and the detachment could then return to the Division. During the course of the day, the following reports arrived from the reconnoitring party, first at 11.15 o'clock.

*Report from the Reconnoitring party of Major N.*

Merkelsdorf, 26.6.66 ; 10.45 A.M.

‘I have occupied Merkelsdorf with one company, and advanced the other in support of the two subdivisions of Hussars, which are pushing on towards Braunau. Nothing is to be learnt either of the Guard or of the enemy at Friedland.’

N., Major.

Again at 2.15 o'clock.

*Report of Major N.'s Reconnoitring Party.*

Merkelsdorf, 26.6.66 ; 1.45 P.M.

'As far as Dittersbach nothing to be found of our own, or of the enemy's troops.'

N., Major.

Further at 3 o'clock.

*Report of Major N.'s Reconnoitring Detachment.*

Merkelsdorf, 26.6.66 ; 2.30 P.M.

'From the officer's post on the heights south of Merkelsdorf, about 2 Battalions are to be seen marching on the road from Deutsch-Wernersdorf. It cannot be distinguished whether they are friend or foe.'

N., Major.

The advanced guard upon the Trautenau road reported simultaneously.

*Report of Outposts at Bertelsdorf.*

26.6.66 ; 2 o'clock P.M.

'Stationary patrols, on the heights between Bertelsdorf and Adersbach, report that at 2 o'clock a party of Infantry and Cavalry approached them, and fell back again after delivering a few shots.'

P., Major.

Immediate ; submitted to the Division.

Bivouac east of Bertelsdorf.

B., Major-General Commanding Brigade.

Recd. 2 hr. 28 min., P.M.

Desp. 2 „ 32 „

By these two last pieces of information, there was a probability that the reported detachments belonged to one another, but in spite of the shots referred to, it was not certain whether it was friend or foe which had been observed in this neighbourhood.

*Reports of the Reconnoitring Party and Outposts.* 17

Reports coming in about 3.30 o'clock, from the Hussars who had advanced towards Braunau, cleared up this point. They ran thus :

*Report of the Reconnoitring Detachment of Major N.*

Merkelsdorf, 26.6.66 ; 3.15 P.M.

' According to the report of the Hussars who have just returned from the direction of Braunau, the Guard Division is bivouacked south of the town, the 1st Division at Weckelsdorf. In consequence of this I am about to march my detachment back.'

N., Major.

At 4 o'clock Major N. personally reported the arrival of his detachment in Schömberg.

Further news came from the Advanced Guard during the afternoon, at about 4.30 o'clock.

*Second Report of the Outposts at Bertelsdorf.*

26.6.66 ; 3.30 P.M.

' One subdivision of Infantry and one of Hussars had been sent to reconnoitre on the road by way of Albendorf, over the Bohemian frontier, in the direction of Petersdorf. The Infantry remained at Albendorf in support. Lieutenant N. has reconnoitred with the Hussars beyond Albendorf, as far as the Mill of Petersdorf, and found the ground passable behind the Custom House, which had been supposed to be impracticable. Encountering the fire of hostile cavalry, Windischgrätz Dragoons, about 6 sabres strong, on the heights of the Mill, as well as to the north of the wooded heights, he answered with his advanced party, and then drew off in accordance with my order, without fighting.'

N., Major.

Immediate, to the Division.

Bivouac eastward of Bertelsdorf.

B., Major-General Commanding Brigade.

Recd. 4 hr. 2 min., P.M.

Desp. 4 ,, 10 ,,



Further, about 5 o'clock :

*Third Report of the Outposts at Bertelsdorf.*

26.6.66 ; 4 o'clock P.M.

'According to the statement of Prussian Custom House officers on the frontier, infantry has lately arrived in Trautenau, and the cavalry there been reinforced. There is a very bad road before Trautenau, which could easily be blocked up. Communication with the 1st Division at Liebau is restored.'

N., Major.

Immediate, forwarded to the Division.

Bivouac east of Bertelsdorf.

B., Major-General Commanding Brigade.

Recd. 4.30 P.M.

Desp. 4.35 „

At 5 o'clock, therefore, it was known with certainty in the Divisional Head-Quarters that the Guard Corps was on the left flank, its nearest division being about 7 miles off, and that parties of the Windischgrätz Dragoons were in front, before Trautenau. But, on the other hand, it remained uncertain whether Trautenau was occupied by infantry, and, supposing this to be the case, whether it was only an advanced post, or whether heavy masses were established in rear of it.

Shortly after 5 o'clock P.M., the orders from Head-Quarters for the following day arrived ; their substance was as follows :—

'To-morrow, the 27th June, at 4 o'clock A.M., the 1st Infantry Division, and the Artillery of the Corps, will march with the main body from Liebau, by Golden-Oels, with a flank detachment by Schatzlar, and the 2nd Infantry Division, with the Cavalry Brigade, from Schömberg, upon Parschnitz.

The Corps will be united there, and halt for two hours ; the 1st Infantry Brigade (1st Infantry Division) alone, intended for the advanced Guard, will march straight on to Trautenau, and occupy the town. The march will then be continued, in one column in the direction of Arnau, the 2nd Infantry Division,

*Orders of the Commander of the Corps for June 27. 19*

and the 2nd Infantry Brigade, together with the Artillery of the Corps, forming the main body of the Corps.'

The concluding passage ran thus:—

'It is of the utmost importance that the Corps should stand in a concentrated position at Trautenau, on the left bank of the Aupa, as soon as possible, with both flanks protected against the sudden approach of hostile forces.

'The General Commanding will be with the 1st Infantry Division.'

Here ended the entire information of the Divisional Commander. He had no idea of the operations of the Army, and could as little oversee the strength and intentions of the enemy confronting him; one thing alone was certain, that the enemy was there, and at no great distance.

This is the position in which even a leader of such high rank as a Divisional Commander, generally finds himself in war. A more extensive view only falls to his lot exceptionally, when it appears desirable to acquaint him further than is generally done with the movements of the other portions of the Army. On the other hand, he knows in the present case what will be demanded of him on the following day. In the first place a junction is to be effected at Parschnitz, with the other division of the Corps. Any opposition encountered on the way must, therefore, be overcome by an united effort of his whole force. It is known, also, that the troops on the right have a like aim, only the necessary acquaintance with the intentions and direction of march of the Guard Corps on the left, is still wanting. This information is absolutely necessary, in order to be able to make judicious dispositions for all the possible contingencies on the left flank. The subordinate leaders also must be informed of this, lest the unexpected appearance of columns marching on the flank should cause them to halt or to take useless measures. Especially as regards the Train, one may be certain that, if it encounters anything unexpected, it will be thrown into confusion. It is therefore most urgently to be re-

commended, that bodies of troops which are not closely connected together, but which are near, or behind one another, should remain in uninterrupted and constant communication about anything of importance.

It will be shown further on, how intelligence was received on the morning of the 27th, regarding the nearest column of the Guard Corps.

#### ARRANGEMENTS OF THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER FOR THE 27th JUNE.

On the arrival of this disposition, it became incumbent upon the Divisional Commander to issue to the troops orders for the next day.

The points to be kept in view in these orders, were :—

1. To march in one column to Parschnitz, as the mountains did not allow of breaking up into several columns.
2. To overcome every hostile opposition up to that point.
3. To insert the several bodies in the column of march, in the succession in which it was purposed to use them, in order to attain this end.
4. To inform the troops concerning the contiguous columns.
5. To make dispositions for the maintenance of communications with them.
6. To provide for the departure of the Train later, so as not to be hindered by it in case of a retreat through a defile in the mountains.

In accordance with the above, the orders regarding the march were issued at 6 P.M.; viz :—

(1), Advanced Guard ; (2), 2nd Regiment ; (3), 4th Infantry Brigade ; (4), Hussar Regiment ; (5), Field Artillery ; (6), Pioneer Company ; (7), Sanitary Detachment ; (8), Reserve Cavalry ; (9), Train, &c.

## *Divisional Order for June 27.*

21

Head-Quarters, Schömburg, 26.6.66 ; 6 o'clock P.M.<sup>1</sup>

1st Corps 2nd Infantry Division.

Section 1, No. —.

### *Distribution of the Troops for 27th June.*

Advanced Guard, (Maj.  
Gen. B.):  
1st Regiment.  
1 Light Battery.  
Hussar Regiment (exclu-  
sive of detached par-  
ties).  
Pioneer Company.  
1 Section of Sanitary De-  
tachment.  
Main Body :  
2nd Infantry Regiment.  
3 Field Batteries.  
4th Infantry Brigade.  
1 Section Sanitary De-  
tachment.  
Field Hospital No. 2.  
Cavalry Brigade.

### *Divisional Order for 27th June.*

Hostile Cavalry watches the frontier on this side of Trautenau. The Corps will cross it to-morrow, the 27th June, and unite at Parschnitz.

The Guard Corps is at Braunau, and Weckelsdorf.

The 1st Infantry Division will march from Liebau by Golden-Oels, at 4 o'clock A.M.

The 2nd Infantry Division will set out, together with the Advanced Guard, at 4 o'clock on the road to Trautenau. It must maintain communication with the 1st Division, and attack the enemy whenever he shows himself.

The Main Body will follow at 4.10 o'clock, as per margin.

The Cavalry Brigade at 5.15 o'clock.

The Train will remain to the north of Schömburg until further orders.

The Divisional Commander will be with the Advanced Guard.

A., Lieutenant-General Commanding Division.

## COMMENTS UPON THE DIVISIONAL ORDER.

### *1. The Partition of the Troops.*

In the first place, the division of the troops must be remarked, which differs essentially from that laid down hitherto for such cases, in writings on the duties of the Staff.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This order was written upon half margin paper, with the partition of troops on the left side.

<sup>2</sup> We may here remark, that we have gone too far in the strictly scientific limitation of military knowledge necessary for a leader. Thus, a great number of things have

The principal difference to be observed is, that a strong column, with such an aim in view, is not divided into advanced guard, main body, and reserve, but only into advanced guard and main body.

It is evident that whilst marching against the enemy, the various bodies of troops cannot advance in immediate succession, one close behind the other, as then an accident happening to the head would throw the whole into confusion. An advanced guard must therefore be formed, which, with large bodies composed of the several arms, possesses sufficient cohesion and independence to enable it in case of falling in with the enemy, to give time by its action for the other portions of the column to come up.

Lest the appearance of any small party of the enemy should cause the whole to form up, and in order that this, when necessary, may be effected undisturbed, the mass of the troops follows at a certain distance from the advanced guard. A clear space, therefore, between the latter and the rest of the troops, cannot be dispensed with. It is a question, however, whether a further division among the other troops, *i.e.*, a further separation such as usually takes place by partition into main body and reserve, is also necessary.

The nature of war renders a reserve indispensable to every leader in action, up to the very moment when he must employ it. Whatever joins directly in the fighting is, even in the most favourable case, only in a very limited manner in the hands of the Commander, and generally is entirely out of his control; yet a leader has a decisive influence only so far as he keeps

been handed down traditionally, as staff duties, which are rather common property than a speciality of the staff.

The art of command does not begin with bodies of troops where the staff comes generally into consideration, such as the Division or Corps; it must be exercised with skill by every leader, even by the most inferior in rank.

It is in itself so difficult, that too much trouble cannot be taken to acquire it, nor to exercise it constantly when acquired, and instruction in it must therefore begin from the moment of the young officer's first education in the leading of troops.



powerful masses of troops at his disposal, or as he understands how to form them for this purpose according to the various moments of an action. Battle, therefore, must not be given without a reserve, but why the separation of a reserve should be necessary on the march is difficult to imagine; indeed, it is not necessary, and a fighting reserve even need only be formed just before the commencement of the action.

Military nomenclature has gone too far here. Let us only consider what the nature of a reserve comprises. *All troops, so far as they have not yet come into action, are reserves of the leader.*

Hitherto it has been settled in the general proportion, one quarter of the whole force, advanced guard; one half main body; one quarter, reserve; only varying in a decimal degree. When an action begins, it cannot be foreseen whether the advanced guard alone will suffice to carry it through, or whether the whole force, to the last man, must be brought to bear. The advanced guard commences the action, and the whole of the remainder of the troops are its reserves, from which as many are drawn as is necessary. Why then another partition? Again, is a long interval necessary between these masses of troops? It is certainly not advantageous for action, when a portion arrives half an hour later than it is required. This, however, is the case if, for example, a corps on the march separates a reserve, and lets it follow a mile in rear of the main body.

On the march there must certainly be intervals, lest checks in front should be imparted at once to the whole, but by no means so considerable as 1,000 or 2,500 paces; even less intervals than those laid down would suffice for the various bodies of troops. Besides, it must be considered *that these intervals are there in order to be lost under circumstances*, and that when this takes place they can only be properly made up in course of time.

*Thus, the separation of a reserve on the march appears utterly*

*useless*; everything useless is for us dangerous, and danger undoubtedly lies in the usual division mentioned.

We arrive now at the second point, in which the above divisional order differs essentially from the way in which troops were divided up to 1866, and even after. In the present case the advanced guard is formed from one regiment of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and the second Regiment of this Brigade is at the head of the main body, whilst, according to the earlier principles, it ought to have remained as reserve in rear of the Division.

What are the consequences of the latter proceeding? Let us observe closer.

The advanced guard comes into action, and it appears that it must be reinforced. The next entire force at the Divisional Commander's disposal is the brigade of the main body. It is only in the rarest cases that definite instructions can be given to it, for the immediate question is the direct support of the advanced guard. The Commander either sends the entire Brigade to the front at once, or he reinforces the troops already engaged by portions of it, as a regiment, or a single battalion.

In the first case, six battalions, besides the advanced guard, are at once out of his control; in the second, he breaks up the 2nd Brigade, and in the first line the Brigadier who commands the advanced guard receives troops under his command which are totally unknown to him.

Our greatest failing is the tendency of our leaders, so praiseworthy in the abstract, to carry out an action independently. Disorder is introduced by indulgence in this direction, and higher supervision becomes an impossibility. On the contrary, every exertion must be made to maintain, as long as possible, the original connexion of the troops, as organised in time of peace, or as it is called, their *ordre de bataille*. The order of march generally adopted works against this necessary object, in a decidedly discomposing manner.

It may be further added that, taking into consideration the

relatively considerable losses which must occur in a short space of time, where breech-loading arms are opposed to one another, a proportionately greater value must be placed upon strong reserves. Now by a partition into advanced guard, main body, and reserve, and from the necessity of bringing these bodies into action as united as possible, a leader is led to employ the whole of the main body too soon, and to keep the reserve alone in hand, amounting only to about one fourth of his force.

Experience shows besides, that a reserve formed in this manner very easily slips out of the hands of the Divisional Commander, and he has then none at all at his disposition. The Commander will be with the main body of his troops, with his attention directed to the front, where the advanced guard is fighting, if he is not with it himself. The regiment in reserve is separated from him and withdrawn from his sight, as well as from that of the enemy; it longs intensely to take part in the conflict, certainly in a stronger degree than the other troops, for its brigadier, and its brigade comrades are fighting in front. Only the slightest incitement is required, and, if in any way possible, it presses to the front.

The Brigadier commanding the advanced guard, who has only one of his regiments at his disposition, is in much the same situation; as the action waxes hot and difficult, he will certainly think, 'If I had only the other regiment of my brigade here!' and there is but a step between the thought and the attempt to bring it about, by some means or another.

Thus the thoughts of the part of the brigade fighting at the head of the column, are in unison with that in reserve, and very frequently these separated bodies unite, against the will of the officer in chief command.

It is useless to say, 'this must not happen.' These are occurrences proceeding from human nature, and must be taken into consideration, for in battle human nature takes precedence over the forms which individuals frame for general practice. Actual experience supports this.

In the action of Gitschin Lieutenant-General Von Tümpling placed the two Grenadier Battalions of the 12th Regiment in the reserve of his Division. The other regiment of the brigade, under the Brigadier, was fighting on the steep and wooded heights of Priwiszin. Suddenly the two battalions of the 12th Regiment in reserve, joined in the action close by Klein-Ginolitz. It is beside the question to ask how this happened, in any case it was against the will and intentions of the Divisional Commander, and it required the whole energy of the leader, and the rare discipline of the regiment, to withdraw it from the action. Exactly the same thing occurred with Fransecky's division in the contest round the Swiep Wald at Königgrätz, the very division which had to sustain such extremely hard fighting.

Therefore it does not appear advisable to allow such an artificial separation of the brigade, especially at the moment of action. This can be attained by establishing the rule, that the regiment which forms a brigade with the advanced guard, should always be at the head of the main body. Such a formation is applicable to the connexion of greater or smaller bodies of troops, in an analogous manner.

By this means, the advantage is gained of the first support of the engaged advanced guard, being from the body which in its organisation is the most closely bound to it, and the brigadier leads his entire brigade into action, whilst the Divisional Commander has a united body of the same strength at his disposition, as a reserve.

There is yet another advantage in the above formation ; when a new advanced guard is suddenly formed, as for example, when a new direction has to be taken up without delay, it is not necessary to break into the second brigade.

As regards the distribution of the Cavalry, the Hussar Regiment was almost entirely destined for the advanced guard, although the movement was to take place, at first, upon a mountain road, on which the whole of the regiment could not be brought to bear. But this mountainous defile opens out at

Parschnitz, and up to that point patrols from the advanced guard had kept the ground constantly under observation, so that a vigorous opposition this side of the issue from the pass was improbable. When the plain of Parschnitz was reached, communication must be established with the 1st Infantry Division, Trautenau reconnoitered, and the valley of the Aupa examined in a southerly direction, and this probably in the presence of parties of the Windischgrätz Dragoons. If the Hussars had then to be called up from the rear of the Division, there would be some difficulty, as they must pass by the column on the same road, and at all events this would entail a considerable loss of time. In case even of an action taking place in the mountains, contrary to expectation, through an advance of the enemy, the one regiment would hardly interfere with the manœuvres of the Infantry, if the greater part of it followed in rear of the advanced guard. But in the present case, to attach the Cavalry Brigade to the advanced guard would cause this interference, as its space in the line of march would delay the arrival of the main body by about half an hour. Under these circumstances the Cavalry Brigade was placed in rear of the whole column.

The Hussar Regiment was short of one subdivision ; one half of which, under its officer, was told off to maintain order amongst the Train and baggage of the Division, and the other half for orderly duty with the main body. For the first object the Division had no other means at hand, and those existing for the latter did not suffice. Moreover with the main body on the march it is frequently necessary to be informed quickly about some appearance on the flank, therefore at least a few horsemen must always be kept in hand for this purpose. As the situation in the present case was a very simple one, 16 horses had to suffice ; as a rule it is well to employ a whole subdivision for this purpose, and under certain circumstances even considerably more, if, for example, the Division forms the extreme flank column of an army on open ground.



The parties detached in this manner should be relieved at certain intervals, about every three days, as they usually become too quickly worn out on account of the little control over them during their duty.

Of the Artillery one Light Battery was attached to the advanced guard, the remainder massed in rear of the leading Regiment of the main body. The Artillery being the arm which is able to inflict damage upon the enemy at the greatest distance, the greater portion of it must be brought to bear before the mass of the Infantry comes into action. It should consequently never be placed too far back in the column of march, it belongs rather to the front. Under some circumstances several Batteries even may follow the advanced guard. In the case before us this was not justifiable; for hardly more than 6 guns could be brought into operation in the narrow mountain pass, and the action of a stronger Artillery could only be possible after crossing the Aupa. Because of this possibility, it could not be left too far behind, and therefore the 3 Batteries of the main body were placed behind the 2nd Regiment and the 2nd Infantry Brigade, in order not to disturb any organised unit. By this means at least, the whole of the Artillery could be brought into operation as soon as 6 Battalions were formed up.

There is another special advantage to be gained by keeping the 3 Batteries of the main body together. These are frequently divided and shut in behind the various Regiments, which must be designated as a decided mistake. In situations in the greater operations of war single Batteries cannot manœuvre independently, as they frequently do, and must continue to do, in the lesser manœuvres of detachments. Where 18,000 Infantry strive to obtain a certain end, the Artillery belonging to it must not improvise actions at its own discretion, by its Batteries acting singly, but must contribute with all its power to attain the aim in view. But this is only possible when the Batteries do not move independently, according to their own ideas, but

obey one will. The employment of Batteries in mass is the rule in extensive operations of war, their separate employment is only the exception. This must be the more maintained as a principle, because in practice the exception is frequently necessary.

It may further be remarked that it was a light Battery which was attached to the advanced guard. Different views exist as to whether it should be a light or a heavy Battery. In any case the Artillery of the advanced guard comes into action first, and has to remain there the longest; and therefore the one which every leader would prefer for the advanced guard is undoubtedly that which carries most ammunition with it, and that is the light Battery.

It appears quite superfluous to tell off a party especially to escort the Batteries whilst upon the march, as the Artillery is then in direct communication with the other arms, bodies of which are marching both before and after it. Should a Company or a Battalion, however, be detached for this purpose, it is certain that the action of these bodies will be lost to their Corps in the combat, and yet they will afford no protection, as they would not be in a condition to follow the rapidly advancing guns.

The rest of the points relating to the partition of the troops require no detailed explanation. The Pioneer Company belongs to the advanced guard, as a matter of course; it is also clear that the Sanitary Detachment, divided into two sections, should follow, one half the advanced guard, the other the main body, and that if an action is in view, a Field Hospital should be brought up to the troops.

## *2. The purport of the Order.*

The verbal order of the senior officer given directly to those concerned, is the surest means of imparting orders, more particularly because it offers an opportunity for explaining and

clearing up any misunderstanding. The transmission of verbal orders, by means of aides-de-camp, orderly officers, &c., is also practicable, but only in the case of short and positive orders, as 'the Brigade will march immediately by X and Y.' If any further circumstances are to be touched upon, relating to the general design, or to other columns, &c., it is undoubtedly preferable to impart the orders in writing.

In the case before us, the Division camping in separate bodies, had a depth of about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles from the main body of the advanced guard to the rear, and written orders were therefore necessary. The Division could certainly be got under arms, and the several parts be set in motion successively, by the orderly officers, but then none of the leaders would know what they had to prepare for, and the troops would be kept for a long time under arms without any object, before the last bodies could be set in motion. Such a proceeding is to be recommended only when no other expedient remains; for example, if on the 26th June, on account of an engagement of the Guard Corps at Braunau, instead of the halt ordered, the sudden march of the main body of the 2nd Infantry Division to that place had been necessary. This could have been done so much the sooner, as the previous advanced guard was to remain towards Trautenau, and the immediate dispositions would have related only to the troops, which were bivouacking together south of Schömberg.

In this kind of order it is requisite *that the subordinate leaders should be informed of all that the Commander knows of the enemy, so far as it relates to the aim in view.* All the threads unite in the hands of the Divisional General; each of the Commanders under him can only have a partial view of the general state of affairs. Since with such a considerable body of troops, the Commander cannot be present with all his leaders, it is not possible for him personally to direct the necessary details. By means of such general information the leaders are enabled to make judicious dispositions, they will be able to give their most

careful and undivided attention to the direction from which the enemy is expected : and can also make the necessary dispositions in detail at the right time, without fatiguing the troops inopportunely.

*An intimation of the aim in view should also be placed in the order,* but care must be taken not to go too far in this direction. It is undoubtedly very interesting for the troops to learn how their better-informed Commander regards the general situation, but this leader has to consider every eventuality, and to submit such a detailed statement to those commanding under him would only confuse them, as they are hardly ever in a position to discern which of these eventualities has actually come to pass. Let us see, moreover, under what circumstances the orders are received by them as a rule. In the present case the proceedings of the Corps for several days were dictated from Head-Quarters, as it was a question of a passage through the mountains, and the Corps of the Army each separated by a day's march, and directed upon a limited number of roads, were forced to march on an extensive front, and it was consequently impossible to regulate their movements from day to day. On account of this, the Corps was fortunate enough to be able to give out early its orders for the following day, but this was a rare exception. As a general rule the Commander-in-Chief can only issue his orders after the reports of the several Corps about the events of the day have been received by him ; during the night these are received by the Corps which are not in the immediate vicinity of his Head-Quarters, and by the last divisions, viz. the Brigades and Regiments, in their due course, not until the following morning early. The Commanders have to make their dispositions whilst half asleep, by the help of bad lights, and with maps which are difficult to read ; therefore every word in such an order which is not absolutely necessary is objectionable. Voluminous orders take too much time to read, and still more to understand properly, and the criterion of a good order is its simplicity and clearness ; one word struck out ought to render it



unintelligible. Should this not be the case, that word is superfluous, and therefore useless and pernicious.

Each Commander must consider well how much of the instructions he has received need be imparted to his troops, and what is unnecessary. In the above case, for example, the Divisional Commander must know what his Commanding General proposes to do after Parschnitz is reached. His Division might arrive at that place before the General commanding the Corps, who was marching with the other Division. What should then be done? If the Corps be destined to remain there, it would not be necessary to tire his troops by waiting for hours, but the bivouacs could be established, and their Train brought up. If, on the other hand, the march were to be continued, and the Division had to furnish the advanced guard, its several bodies must be formed up in a different way to what would be necessary, were it to belong later to the main body of the Corps.

Accordingly it was laid down in the order of the Commanding General that the Divisions would unite at Parschnitz, in order to continue the march upon Arnau in one column; and further, 'The 2nd Division will join the main body of the Corps, during the march, halting first at Arnau for two hours.' This information was necessary in its full extent for the Divisional Commander, but for him alone. As soon as Parschnitz should be reached, he must certainly be there, and must personally give the order for the rendezvous to the successive bodies as they arrived, and form them simultaneously to suit the further advance. The separated portions of the 1st Infantry Brigade, of the Hussar Regiment, and of the Sanitary Detachment, could be brought together there, and the Artillery call in its detached Light Battery.

It was sufficient, therefore, to communicate in the divisional orders, that the Division would form a junction at Parschnitz, with the other portions of the Corps.

The troops learnt at the same time by this that anything



appearing during the march on their right flank would belong to the 1st Division, and was therefore friendly. The further information regarding the neighbouring columns has been already imparted.

At the same time it was necessary to say what was to be done in case of falling in with the enemy. The circumstances here were very simple, for he could only be expected upon the road which the advanced guard followed. Consequently, it only remained to be added, that the latter was to attack without further orders, as probably the divisional commander would not be with it at the moment, which might cause a delay.

The formation of troops for the march can be imparted to them in different ways. Either, as in the above case, through a 'Partition of troops for the —th' added to the order, or by including the instructions referring to it in the text of the order.

The former submits an abstract picture of the complete order of march, which can easily be comprehended, but for this purpose the sheet upon which it is written must be placed before the eyes of the person for whom it is intended. Often this is not done, indeed with the lesser bodies only exceptionally. Consequently, under all circumstances where the order is dictated to the aides-de-camp, and entered in their note-books, it is better to enter the changes which are to take place in the partition of the troops, in the body of the order; whilst orders which are to be transmitted to a greater distance, with sufficient time to be sent through the office, should contain a graphic statement of the distribution of the troops in the margin.

For example, had the order in question been dictated to the aides-de-camp, who had been called to Schömberg at a given time, it would have run as follows :—

*Divisional Order for the 27th June.*

'Hostile Cavalry watches the frontier on this side of Trautenu. The Corps will cross to-morrow, the 27th June, and unite at Parschnitz. The Guard Corps is at Braunau.

'The 1st Infantry Division will march from Liebau, by Golden-Oels, at 4 o'clock A.M.

'The advanced guard of the 2nd Infantry Division, to which will be attached the remainder of the Hussar Regiment, the Pioneer Company, and 1 Section of the Sanitary Detachment will start at 4 o'clock on the road to Trautenau.

'Major-General B. will maintain the communication with the 1st Division; the enemy is to be attacked promptly wherever he appears.

'The main body of the Division will march at 4.10 o'clock A.M., the 2nd Regiment leading, then the Artillery, followed by the 2nd Infantry Brigade, the rest of the Sanitary Detachment, and Field Hospital No. 2.

'The Cavalry Brigade will follow at 5.15 o'clock. The Train will remain north of Schömburg until further orders.

'The officer commanding the Division will be with the Advanced Guard.'

A., Lieutenant-General Commanding Division.

Head-Quarters, Schömburg,  
26.6.66; 6 P.M.

In these orders no special commander was detailed for the main body, as it appeared unnecessary to do so. The sequence of the several portions of the main body is fixed according to the object of the march; should an action ensue the divisional commander must direct these bodies separately.

Should, however, a special commander be named for a body, —as here for the advanced guard—it is incumbent upon him to form his troops in the manner in which he proposes to employ them.

Special attention must be devoted to the times for marching off; unnecessary excitement, as a rule, causes it to be forgotten that so large a force as a division, even if divided into several parts, cannot be set in motion at once, and the troops are only tired by being assembled too early. It is impossible to estimate

beforehand what hardships are in prospect for the day, and therefore all the greater precaution should be taken to avoid unnecessary fatigue.

In the case before us, the following calculation served as a basis for determining the times for marching off. By a superficial estimate, the length of the advanced guard in column of march was about 2,600 paces; the distance from its bivouac to that of the main body about 2,500 paces. Were the main body, therefore, to break up its bivouac at the same time as the advanced guard, the head of its column would come into collision with the rear portions of the advanced guard whilst still in their bivouacs, and therefore must wait about a minute before it could follow immediately in rear of them; but it is desirable to keep an interval between them of about 1,000 paces, and consequently the main body is required to march off about ten minutes later than the advanced guard, although it is a mile in rear of it.

The column of the main body is about 5,000 paces long, so that its rearmost portion would not leave the bivouac until 50 minutes after its head.

The distance of this bivouac from that of the Cavalry Brigade was 2,500 paces. The latter, therefore, would not have to march off until 25 minutes after the head of the main body, in order to be able to join in immediately in rear of the latter, by marching at a walk. After that the Cavalry would follow the Infantry for a distance of six miles, and would therefore for three hours move only at a walk: it would be better then to give them a longer rest in the bivouac, as they could easily make up the time, and an occasional trot is preferable to a constant walk.

As further regards the main body, it is to be remarked that the time laid down for marching off (4.10 A.M.) naturally related only to the 2nd Regiment, which had been ordered to lead; the Artillery, which was close by the high road, need not be set in motion until 4.20, the 3rd Regiment at 4.35, and the 4th Regi-

ment at 4.45. *It is a matter the leaders concerned should keep in view, and get their troops under arms accordingly.* Such a proceeding, however, can only refer to troops already assembled, as here to those in one bivouac. If the troops have to meet at a rendezvous from cantonments, the commander of a Brigade or of a Regiment will assemble the force under his command at the time laid down.

With regard to the Train of a Division, it is to be remarked that the led horses follow immediately in rear of the troops to which they belong. The strictest care ought to be taken that these are not turned into pack-horses, but are ready to be mounted in case of need.

The pack-horses, baggage-carts, field-forges, regimental staff waggons, and vehicles of the superior Staff, follow in rear of the Division.

The Train of the Division is formed out of the remaining vehicles belonging to the troops (medicine-carts, ammunition and officers' baggage-waggons, ambulances, and any others attached to the columns).

In the present case it did not seem advisable that this Train should follow immediately.

A mountain pass about 6 miles long had to be traversed, and it was not yet known whether the enemy might not be found on the other side. If an unsuccessful action should necessitate a retreat, with the Train close behind, a catastrophe might easily occur, from the difficulty of turning the vehicles on the mountain roads. When sufficient ground should be gained upon the other side of the defile, it would be time enough to bring the Train up, and in this case an escort would not be necessary. No danger was to be apprehended from the flanks, and the advance of the Division sufficiently covered the front. The men attached from the Infantry for the waggons, and the detachment of 1 officer and 16 Hussars fully sufficed to maintain order.

In conclusion, it should always be intimated where the divisional commander will be, so that all orders may reach him.

In the case before us he has chosen his place with the advanced guard, as his dispositions depend upon what the latter may meet with. His presence there is not absolutely necessary, for if it should come upon the enemy, the commander of the advanced guard is there for the purpose of taking the steps which are immediately necessary. As a rule, therefore, the Commander belongs to the mass of his troops, and consequently to the main body.

*Nothing should be communicated in written orders regarding a possible retreat.* This species of order falls into too many hands, and the troops ought not to be told that their leader is already occupying himself with thoughts of retreat, at the moment that every endeavour must be made to gain the victory. If directions regarding retreat must be given, it should be done verbally; in the present case this was not necessary, for if forced to retreat before Parschnitz, no one could think of executing it otherwise than by the one road at hand, by which the advance had been made.

THE 27th JUNE.

*Information concerning the Guard Corps, and the consequent Dispositions.*

At one o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the following despatch was delivered to the Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division by an orderly officer of the Guard Corps, who had come from Liebau :—

Head-Quarters, Deutsch-Wernersdorf,  
26.6.66; 7 P.M.

Guard Corps, 1st Infantry Division of the Guard.

Section I, Index No. —.

‘To the General Commanding 1st Corps at Liebau.

‘The Division is under orders to march to-morrow morning from Dittersbach and Deutsch-Wernersdorf, on the Trautenau road, by Adersbach, Qualisch, and Petersdorf, to Parschnitz,



and from thence to turn south into the valley of the Aupa. The Division will begin its march when the troops of the 1st Corps have left the road free; it will await that period at Qualisch, at the same time being ready, in case of opposition, to support the 1st Corps at Trautenau.

‘In order to enable the Division to judge the time for marching off, it is requested that the General Commanding will report when Albendorf will probably be passed by his troops.’

X., Lieutenant-General Commanding Division.

Preussisch Liebau, 26.6.66; 11.15 P.M.

Head-Quarters, Liebau, 26.6.66; 11.45 P.M.

‘Immediate.

‘The 1st Infantry Division of the Guard is informed that the 2nd Infantry Division at Schömberg, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, will march at 4 A.M. 27th June, and advance by Albendorf. These columns will halt at Parschnitz for about 2 hours, and await the arrival of the remaining parts of the Corps, which have been directed to proceed there from Liebau. The time of arrival at Parschnitz will depend entirely upon the eventual opposition of the enemy, but will not in any case take place before 8 o’clock.’

‘Y., General Commanding.

‘To the 2nd Infantry Division at Schömberg for its information; then back to the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard at Deutsch-Wernersdorf.’

The Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division added in the proper place:—

‘Received and made a note of,

‘A., Lieutenant-General Commanding  
2nd Infantry Division.’

Head-Quarters, Schömberg, 27.6.66; 12.45 A.M.

Whereupon the orderly officer set out for the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard.

*Dispositions on the Movements of the Guard Corps.* 39

As this officer had to pass Schömberg—the Head-Quarters of the 2nd Infantry Division—on his way from Liebau to Deutsch-Wernersdorf, this communication could, as an exceptional case, be imparted to Lieutenant-General A. in the above manner. As a rule, however, in the field, information by means of a circular is to be avoided, though it is frequently employed in peace time, when it is allowable. It is preferable to prepare as many copies of every order, &c., as there are separate commands to which it must be sent, if its sure and quick arrival is to be depended upon.

And now, being informed of the movements of the portions of the Army on his left, the divisional commander felt called upon to provide the Cavalry Brigade with corresponding information, lest it should be cut off at Albendorf from its Infantry, by the Division of the Guard, on account of the late hour ordered for marching off.

The following written intimation, therefore, was sent immediately by orderly to the commander of the Cavalry:—

Head-Quarters, Schömberg, 27.6.66; 1 A.M.

1st Corps 2nd Infantry Division.

Section 1, Index No. —.

‘According to information just received, the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard at Deutsch-Wernersdorf will advance this morning by Adersbach, and will use the same road as is to be taken by this Division for its further march from Adersbach upon Parschnitz.

‘The Brigade, therefore, must be directed in such a manner that it shall reach the rear of this Division at the right time, and not be separated from it by the head of the Guard Division.’

A., Lieutenant-General Commanding Division.

To the 1st Cavalry Brigade, bivouacked  
North of Schömberg.

An immediate intimation to the rest of the forces was not

necessary, as no further dispositions had to be made by them. It would be early enough to impart the necessary information regarding the march of the Guard Division, to the leaders of the several bodies on marching off, when the divisional commander would see them.

In any case it was clear that even if the day's march was uninterrupted, the Train could not be brought on until very late.

Under these circumstances, a further order to bring on at least one ammunition waggon per Infantry Regiment for the march, appeared judicious, and the necessary instructions were issued to the Train. This order was caused by the present unusual circumstances, for being in a mountain pass, and the Guard marching in rear, it was uncertain when the Division might be able to bring up its Train. As a rule the ammunition waggons remain with the Train of the Division. It is sufficient to be able to calculate upon their arrival within a few hours, as with the high training of our Infantry in firing, and the great number of cartridges they carry, a want of ammunition will seldom occur.

Further, the circumstance that the 1st Division of the Guard sought information in Liebau, and therefore beyond Schömberg, concerning the proceedings of the 2nd Infantry Division in Schömberg on the 27th, leads to the consideration of the position of the different Head-Quarters. In general each commander should remain with the mass of his troops.

When he is acting in connexion with the Army, however, he must bear in mind that his movements depend upon the orders of superior authority, and that in the next place he must receive the intimation of their will ; the existence of telegraphic communication will influence this essentially. If, for instance, the Head-Quarters of the 1st Corps wished to order its movements in connexion with those of the Guard Corps, it should be transferred to Schömberg. But, as it was dependent upon the dispositions of the Head-Quarters of the 2nd Army, it must

remain at Liebau, as the telegraph station there could bring it into communication with these Head-Quarters in the quickest manner. In the same way the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division must not remain with his advanced guard, for however much it might be to his interest to be early informed of any movements of the enemy, still the rapid execution of an order received from Head-Quarters was of more importance.

Such an order sent by Schömburg (passing therefore the main body of the Division) would have reached him with the advanced guard, after going a mile further, and would then have to be sent back by him to Schömburg, thus passing uselessly over a double distance before the Division could be set in motion. Whatever the enemy might do, the commander of the advanced guard would be there as soon as there was danger in delay, but the Division could come as quickly to its support if its commander was in Schömburg, as if he was with the advanced guard.

The neglect of the circumstances to be considered with regard to the choice of Head-Quarters, has repeatedly proved to have caused unnecessary delay, and consequently mischief in war.

It must be remarked, moreover, that either the divisional commander, or his staff officer, should always be present at their Head-Quarters; the absence of both at the same time is not justifiable. Should any important orders, reports, or applications arrive during their absence, the divisional aides-de-camp are not in a position to deal with them, for they will usually be wanting in general information, and in knowledge of the intentions of their commander.

#### ADVANCE ON PARSCHNITZ.

Lieutenant-General A. mounted his horse at 3.30 A.M., and, accompanied by his Staff, proceeded to the advanced guard.

The detachment of Hussars in the town had been directed to march with the 2nd Regiment.

The Hussar Regiment, the Pioneer Company, as well as the section of the Sanitary Detachment, had joined the main body of the advanced guard. The whole of the troops were ready to march off. The enemy being at so great a distance, patrols of Hussars had been sent along the only road ; the Fusilier Battalion which had been on outpost duty called in its pickets, and was about 1,000 paces forward on the high road. Major-General B. had assembled all the commanding officers, and given them his orders as follows :—

‘The Division will advance as far as Parschnitz on the road to Trautenau, where it will form a junction with the 1st Infantry Division from Liebau. Major N. will take command of the Vanguard, consisting of the Fusilier Battalion, the 4th Squadron, two guns, and the Pioneer Company. The enemy must be attacked at once, whenever met with. Communication is to be maintained with the 1st Infantry Division by means of Cavalry patrols on the cross roads leading over the mountains.

‘Colonel D. will follow with two Battalions of his Regiment, at the present interval ; the Battery behind the leading Battalion, the Sanitary Detachment will be next to the Infantry, followed by the Hussar Regiment.

‘The Train will remain assembled north of the road until further orders ; reports will reach me with the Vanguard.’

Whilst the 4th Squadron and the two guns, together with the Pioneer Company, marched to join the Fusilier Battalion, the commander of the latter hastened on, and had already advanced the 12th Company 300 paces further.

A little before 4 o’clock, the several portions of the Vanguard were formed towards the front in the order in which they were to march off, and at 4 o’clock the advanced guard was set in motion.

The divisional commander caused the several parties to march past him, and waited for the main body of the Division, in order to convince himself that it was formed in the manner directed.



It is to be strongly recommended that every superior leader, when on the march, should cause his troops to defile past him at least once a day, in order to control their discipline on the march, and to obtain a general view of their appearance.

If the enemy is not in the vicinity, and the continual presence of the leader with the mass of his troops does not appear necessary, this inspection should be specially extended to the baggage and train, as otherwise irregularities of every description will be prevalent there.

The following is to be observed in the formation of the advanced guard :

The advanced party must be composed of Cavalry even in mountainous ground, though in this case the disposable strength is limited ; its proper employment should be only to secure and give information ; patrols of this arm will suffice therefore in such ground. As, however, in this case, the presence of hostile troops was known, it appeared suitable to place as much Cavalry in front as the breadth of the valley would allow to deploy, and, therefore, at most one Squadron.

A company pushed forward would serve as a support for this Cavalry ; it could get out of the way easily enough, if the latter should be thrown back by the enemy, and would suffice to check the pursuit.

On the other hand, in this kind of ground Cavalry is easily brought to a stand by hostile Infantry detachments, and it then requires its own infantry to drive them away.

If the mass of the Infantry is allowed to follow close upon the Cavalry, in case of the latter being driven back, it will be ridden down, as it would be unable to get out of the way quickly enough, and the whole be thrown into confusion.

The formation of a Vanguard was here the more necessary, as in the mountain pass it would not everywhere be possible to turn round, and the road might often be brought under fire from afar by the sudden appearance of hostile artillery on a projecting height in front. Consequently the successive portions of the

advanced guard must occupy a greater depth than would be the case in even ground which could be seen over.

It is further advisable to attach two guns, as well as the Pioneer company, to the vanguard. There will be almost always an opportunity of placing these guns; their principal object is, to force the approaching Divisions of the enemy to halt and form up while still some distance off, or to inflict losses on retreating detachments.

It should be laid down, however, that to detach guns from the battery in this way is only exceptional, the rule being to keep them together; in even ground the battery of the advanced guard should always march undivided.

The Pioneers must not be too far removed from the head of the column. A single bridge destroyed on the high road would bring the whole Division to a stand. Its restoration could not be effected too quickly, and therefore it would have to be immediately undertaken by the whole of the force.

The troops already mentioned, viz., 1 Battalion, 1 Squadron, 2 guns, and 1 Pioneer Company, formed the Vanguard, the composition of which would change according to circumstances. In perfectly open ground with a strong Cavalry in front, a Vanguard of all arms is frequently not required at all.

The troops of the main body of the advanced guard followed in the order in which they could be employed in case of coming upon the enemy. Should the Vanguard find an obstinate resistance, so that the main body is obliged to take a part, the Artillery must endeavour, as much as possible, to prepare the attack, but it cannot march at the head of a new force, and therefore it is placed behind the leading Battalion.

In conclusion, it will be interesting to look at the length of the united column of march of the Division, as well as to consider the time it would take to form up, and be ready for action.

LENGTH OF THE COLUMN OF MARCH (See Plan No. 3).

I. ADVANCED GUARD.

	Paces.	Paces.
1 Infantry Regiment with led horses, 1 ammunition waggon, and distances in rear . . .	1,060	
1 Cavalry Regiment with the exception of 1 subdivision . . . . .	800	
1 Light Battery . . . . .	460	
1 Company of Pioneers . . . . .	140	
Section of the Sanitary Detachment . . . . .	110	
	<hr/>	2,570
Add the intervals between the several portions of the advanced guard (see Plan) . . . . .		1,500
Distance between the Advanced Guard and main body . . . . .		1,000

2. MAIN BODY OF THE DIVISION.

(a) *Troops.*

1 Infantry Regiment (as above) . . . . .	1,060	
3 Batteries, including Artillery Staff . . . . .	1,420	
1 Infantry Brigade . . . . .	2,190	
Section of the Sanitary Detachment . . . . .	100	
	<hr/>	4,770

(b) *Field Hospital, pack-horses, and vehicles which have to follow in rear of the Division.*

Belonging to the Divisional Staff . . . . .	70	
Belonging to the 2 Infantry Brigades . . . . .	360	
Belonging to 1 Cavalry Regiment . . . . .	60	
Belonging to Artillery . . . . .	10	
Belonging to 1 Field Hospital . . . . .	140	
	<hr/>	640
Total . . . . .		<hr/> 10,480

Consequently the column of march of an Infantry Division is somewhat over  $4\frac{3}{4}$  miles long. An order sent from the front to the rear, passing by the side of the column, would require half an hour to reach its destination, while one sent from the rear to the front would take more than double the time.

*Should the division have to form upon an alignment with the Vanguard, the rearmost body must pass over nearly 10,000 paces, and the whole division cannot be assembled there under about  $1\frac{3}{4}$  hours.*

To complete the description regarding the length of the Division on the march, the Train must also be reckoned. This amounted to :—

	Paces.
For 2 Infantry Brigades (exclusive of 1 ammunition	
waggon per regiment) . . . . .	940
Cavalry Regiment . . . . .	30
Company of Pioneers . . . . .	30
Sanitary Detachment. . . . .	30
Miscellaneous . . . . .	120
Total. . . . .	1,150

And reckoning a distance of 2,500 paces between the rear of the Division and the head of the train, in the case where the latter follows immediately, the united length of the columns of march of an Infantry Division amounts to 14,130 paces, and occupies therefore nearly  $7\frac{1}{4}$  miles.

In our example the Cavalry Brigade with its Mounted Battery must also be taken into consideration.

	Paces.	Paces.
The distance occupied by the actual Brigade		
was . . . . .	1,720	
Length of Mounted Battery . . . . .	500	
		2,220
Pack-horses and vehicles immediately in rear . . . . .		130
The waggons, &c. with the Train . . . . .		70
Total . . . . .		2,420

Consequently the column of the 1st Corps marching from Schömberg upon Parschnitz would occupy a space of 12,830 paces, and in case of the train being ordered to keep with the Division, 16,550 paces. These distances are only approximate, for such calculations suppose the troops to remain closed up, and to be up to their full strength, neither of which is the case in reality, and in calculating the march of a Division, which takes  $1\frac{3}{4}$  hours, an error of five minutes either way does not signify. The normal distances only serve as a basis for a moderately correct description, and they fully answer this purpose.<sup>1</sup>

On the arrival of the main body, the divisional commander took advantage of the opportunity to inform the several leaders concerning the march of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard. After satisfying himself that the column was formed in the prescribed order, and that nothing was to be remarked concerning the discipline on the march, he repaired to the advanced guard.

The latter on marching off had sent a patrol of 3 men to the 1st Infantry Division, with this written intimation.

Bertelsdorf, 27.6.66 ; 4 o'clock A.M.

Advanced Guard of the 2nd Infantry Division.

'The Advanced Guard left Bertelsdorf at 4 o'clock, and marches on the high road from Schömberg to Parschnitz.'

B., Major-General Commanding Brigade.

When the head arrived at Petersdorf, the Division made a short halt, during which the column remained in its formation upon the road.

From here a second patrol was sent to the valley of Golden-Oels in the direction of Bernersdorf, by the road leading over the mountain. The following written communication was given to it, for the 1st Infantry Division :

<sup>1</sup> The Infantry marched in columns of sections, the Cavalry in threes, the Artillery in file.



Petersdorf, 27.6.66 ; 5.30 A.M.

Advanced Guard of the 2nd Infantry Division.

'The head of the advanced guard has reached Petersdorf. Nothing is to be seen as yet of the enemy.'

B., Major-General Commanding Brigade.

On the other hand, one non-commissioned officer and six dragoons arrived at 6.15 o'clock, and gave a note to Lieutenant-General A., the contents of which were as follows :

Before Bernersdorf, 27.6.66 ; 5.25 A.M.

1st Infantry Division.

'The Division commenced the march upon Parschnitz at 4 o'clock. A bridge on the high road having been destroyed about a thousand paces from Bernsdorf, occasioned a delay. On the other side of this bridge the head of the advanced guard was attacked by a subdivision of Windischgrätz Dragoons, which was repulsed with loss. The Division has just reached Bernsdorf ; Cavalry patrols of the enemy watch the march from the heights.'

N., Captain on the General Staff attached  
to 1st Infantry Division.

The receipt, with the time noted, was given to the commander of the patrol by a divisional aide-de-camp, and the remark, 'nothing new in this direction,' added.

At Welhota, the subdivision of Hussars, which was leading, came upon hostile Dragoons, who fell back precipitately in the direction of Trautenau, on the approach of the rest of the 4th Squadron.

*The head of the Infantry of the advanced guard debouched from the mountains east of Parschnitz at 6.30 o'clock, the main body had reached the south extreme of Petersdorf, the rear of the Cavalry Brigade was at this time in the middle of Bertelsdorf.*

A few of the enemy's horsemen appeared abreast of the western extremity of Parschnitz, otherwise there was nothing

remarkable to be seen ; no movements of troops were visible on the Liebau road.

COMMENTS UPON THE ADVANCE TO PAR SchnITZ.

Communication with the neighbouring columns can generally only be maintained by Cavalry, even in mountainous ground ; it is naturally restricted to the roads, and cannot be expected to return to the exact time ; but this is not of consequence if the other column does not neglect to send out patrols also, for these patrols, under the circumstances of the ground, are not intended to obtain information for the benefit of those who send them, but rather to convey it to the leader to whom they are sent. These patrols may be of little strength, only more horsemen must be employed when the enemy is actually in the vicinity. Upon these grounds, the 1st Infantry Division sent a non-commissioned officer with six sabres, for the head of its column had already come into contact with the enemy's Cavalry.

The communications of such patrols are not without value. For example, the information about the destroyed bridge showed that the 2nd Division would probably arrive at Parschnitz before the 1st Division, and that it must take measures for its own security. Again, the attack of the subdivision of Windischgrätz Dragoons on the head of the 1st Division, showed that the enemy's Cavalry was upon that road, and therefore the Division on debouching from the Parschnitz defile must send on stronger patrols to communicate with the 1st Division. Lastly, if a range of hills lies between two columns, it can never be calculated with certainty that a combat engaged in the one valley will be heard in the other (vide 3rd and 5th Divisions in the action of Jicin).

If, however, they are in communication, a detachment of the unengaged column from over the hills can be of great use to the other column, especially if it be directed upon the enemy's rear.

A minute examination of the ground, such as so often takes

place, being adopted in the greater operations of war from the lesser peace manœuvres, is not here feasible. Were this done, the Division would take the whole day to reach Parschnitz. It was not possible that a mass of troops sufficient to be dangerous to a complete Division, could be ensconced in the neighbouring ground, and if a smaller body were to venture upon it, its existence would be threatened.

Flanking parties of Infantry could not skirt the march of the column, for even were they to start with the advanced guard, they would soon fall far to the rear, on account of having to move up and down roadless hills. Such a protection of the flank can only be effected by detached columns marching in parallel valleys when such are to be found, unless the slopes of the valley are exceptionally favourable. If this be not the case, and cross valleys open into the road, from which the enemy might advance, parties should be pushed forward upon these, which will eventually regain the rear of the column:

#### RENDEZVOUS AT PARSCHNITZ (See Plan No. 4).

As we have already seen, the head of the Infantry of the Advanced Guard reached the bridge over the Aupa before Parschnitz at 6.30 A.M. The divisional commander repaired from thence to the plains lying towards the north, in order to obtain a better view of the ground.

This district was of a completely different character. The march during the last  $4\frac{3}{4}$  miles had been through a narrow mountain valley, generally with steep sides formed of rocks. Now the valley not only opened into a large basin, but also the surrounding heights fell in gentle slopes, rising to less considerable peaks. Only in a few disconnected places they rose abruptly from the valley.

At about 3,500 paces from the issue of the defile, where the junction of the white roads from Schömberg and Liebau could be plainly seen, the sides of the basin appeared to narrow again into a defile, behind the opening of which the blue outlines of

mountains could be seen in the distance ; these only reached to half the height of the sides forming the defile, which led to the conclusion that a plain lay beyond. The straggling town of Parschnitz stretched along the foot of the left side of the basin up the defile ; in its gardens several large stone buildings and some factory chimneys were visible. To the south of the village the rise of the mountains was comparatively gradual, but about a mile off, a higher ridge, thickly wooded, which bordered the distant view, lay in the way of a possible march over them. Its extreme points descended steeply towards the west end of Parschnitz, as well as into the valley of Raussnitz. The latter, which could be seen for some way, bore the character of a defile like the ground already passed.

Looking further to the right, could be seen the village of Wolta, stretching up the mountain on either side of a ravine, where the Liebau road descended a projecting branch of the mountain into the valley. The heights, extending from this village to the high road, contained several wooded summits, whose elevation appeared the less considerable from contrasting with the vast masses of the Riesengebirges, although so far off, whose snow-capped peaks were a considerable height above the horizon.

It was at once clear to the divisional commander, that the rendezvous ordered at Parschnitz could not be carried out without special measures being taken for security.

Nothing was to be feared from Wolta, as the effect of the march of the 1st Infantry Division, and especially of its right flank detachment, directed by Schätzlar, must soon be perceptible in that vicinity. In the direction of Trautenau, however, the defile to the west of Parschnitz must be occupied until the arrival of the portion of the 1st Division, which formed the advanced guard of the Corps, and especial attention be paid to the heights south of Parschnitz, as well as to the valley of Raussnitz. Hitherto the enemy could only be expected from the front, but this was entirely changed upon debouching from the

mountains. If large masses of the enemy were in the neighbourhood, they could only appear in the direction from Königshof upon Trautenau, or from Josephstadt by Eypel, upon Raussnitz, as well as in the ground lying between; *i.e.*, on the left flank of the column, during its further advance.

For a moment Lieutenant-General A. was dubious whether, on the non-arrival of the 1st Infantry Division, it would not be better for him to march to Trautenau, and take possession of the junction of roads there, as well as of the passage over the Aupa. But by the concluding paragraph of the disposition of the Corps, it was of importance to the General commanding that the Corps should be concentrated on the left bank of the Aupa, and therefore he must give up the idea.

The troops continued in the meantime to march along the high road. Lieutenant-General A. despatched an order to the 1st Cavalry Brigade, that as soon as it should have passed Albendorf, an intimation to that effect was to be sent to the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard.

Before Parschnitz, 27.6.66; 6.45 A.M.

‘As soon as the Brigade has passed Albendorf, it will report to the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard, which is marching by Adersbach and Qualisch that the road is clear for it.’

X., Major on the General Staff attached  
to 2nd Division.

To the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

He then proceeded to Major-General B., whom he joined at 6.50 o'clock, on the northern skirts of Parschnitz, where the road from Wolta enters.

This General also had taken account of the changes in the ground from his position.

Directly after crossing the bridge over the Aupa, he had given the commander of the Vanguard the following instructions:—

‘Detach a company and half a subdivision of Hussars as a covering party towards Eypel, to the south extreme of Parschnitz



in the Raussnitz valley. The Hussars will examine the valley to beyond Raussnitz. On the arrival of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard, the detachment will return to the Division. Send besides one officer with half a subdivision of Hussars to the Liebau high road, to obtain information of the 1st Infantry Division. The officer is to be informed that the enemy's Cavalry was upon this road only a short time ago.'

Small Cavalry patrols had already been sent in both directions, but only to a short distance; the 2nd Subdivision of the 4th Squadron examined the high ground south of Parschnitz.

The commander of the Vanguard told off the 11th Company of his Battalion (Fusilier Battalion 1st Regiment) for the Raussnitz valley, and took the requisite Cavalry detachments from the 4th Squadron, which had been placed under him, especially from the 3rd subdivision, which had supplied the patrols detached before, and which had not yet returned. The remaining two subdivisions (4th and 1st) advanced outside the northern skirts of the village, with only a few horsemen on the village road, which the remaining portions of the Vanguard occupied.

Major-General B. then addressed himself to Colonel D.

'The Division will halt here. Send a Battalion to cover it on the heights to the south of Parschnitz, the subdivision of Hussars already there will be placed under the orders of the Battalion commander.'

Colonel D. ordered the 2nd Battalion which was leading the main body of the Advanced Guard to ascend the heights by one of the roads turning south from Parschnitz, and to cover the Division by taking up a position towards the wooded ridge, as well as by pushing forward Cavalry patrols.

Lastly, Major-General B. sent an order to the battery commander, to unite his battery with the Vanguard, and directions to the Hussar Regiment in rear, not to follow the village road, but to trot on to the north of Parschnitz, and follow the two subdivisions of the 4th Squadron which had been sent towards Trautenau.

With the exception of the last, the orders were partly carried out, and partly in the course of execution, as the divisional commander joined Major-General B., and received from him the following report :—

‘I have pushed forward one Company, and half a subdivision of Hussars into the Raussnitz valley, to cover the front towards Eypel, until the arrival of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard.

‘The 1st Battalion and one subdivision of Hussars have also been detached to the heights south of Parschnitz, to cover the rendezvous of the Division, and half a subdivision of Hussars has been sent upon the Liebau road, to the 1st Infantry Division.’

Lieutenant-General A. expressed himself satisfied with these preliminary orders, but added the following :—

‘The general commanding purposes, after having rested here, to advance by Trautenau further in the direction of Arnau with the whole Corps.

‘The Division will then cover the flank on the right bank of the Aupa; the troops can be disposed accordingly.

‘Let Colonel D. occupy the defile to the west of Parschnitz with the two Battalions of the advanced guard still present in the valley, the Light Battery and 1st Squadron, and examine the ground.

‘Establish personally the covering with the rest of your troops on the height south of Parschnitz. I will send the other Regiment of your Brigade after you, as well as a battery.’

The Brigadier gave Colonel D. the necessary instructions, and the following troops were placed at his disposal :—

3 Companies of the Fusilier Battalion.

1st Battalion of his Regiment.

2 Subdivisions of Hussars, and the 1st Light Battery.

The 2 $\frac{1}{4}$  Squadrons under the commander of the regiment, the Pioneer Company and the Section of the Sanitary Detachment, were directed by Major-General B. to the 2nd Bat-

talion 1st Regiment (hill No. 290), by a road leading southward from the village, whilst the 2nd Subdivision of the 4th Squadron, which had already been sent there, advanced towards the centre of the wooded ridge.

These orders were given at 7 o'clock, at which time the 12th Company 1st Regiment which was leading, had reached the western extremity of Parschnitz, and the two subdivisions 4th Squadron had already traversed the short defile which was about 700 paces to the front. The leading Battalions of the main body of the Division which approached the extremity of the Schömberg defile were plainly visible.

The requisite orders had still to be given by Lieutenant-General A. to the main body, and the troops to be directed to the places fixed for their halt as they arrived. This he commissioned his staff-officer to do :

'Ride back to the bridge over the Aupa, and direct the 2nd Infantry Regiment to the heights south of Parschnitz, where it will place itself under the orders of its Brigadier. The leading Battery will join it.

'Direct the remaining Divisions to the places of rendezvous north of Parschnitz, viz :

'The 4th Infantry Brigade west of the road leading from Wolta to Parschnitz.

'The Artillery, Baggage, Field Hospital, and Cavalry Brigade to the east of the same, the former on the right flank.'

The staff officer arrived at the bridge at 7.8 o'clock, just in time, as the head of the 2nd Regiment marched on to it; its direction was immediately changed to the left.

At 7.20 the Artillery arrived at the bridge, the 2nd Light Battery, which was leading, followed the 2nd Regiment, the two heavy batteries remained outside the village, and took the direction of the hill projecting from Wolta over the Liebau road, where they drew up by batteries, in rear of one another, fronting to the west.

At 7.35 the head of the 4th Infantry Brigade debouched ; it

reached the crossway connecting the two high roads to the west of the Wolta-Parschnitz road at 7.55.

The right wing, the 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment, halted at a 100 paces from the Liebau road, the remaining Battalions of the Regiment marched to the left in rendezvous formation (column of double companies on the centre). Each Battalion piled arms directly it arrived, took off packs, and moved to the front, as otherwise space would have been wanting for the rear Battalions, on account of the limited extent of the place.

The 4th Regiment formed a second line; it marched into the place assigned to it at 8.15, and the Cavalry Brigade at 8.35; the latter formed in line of columns of Squadrons by Regiments, the battery in rear drawn up in line. In the meantime, at 7.18, the following report had been received by the divisional commander from Colonel D. who was in front, on the Trautenau road:—

‘The bridge over the Aupa at Trautenau is barricaded and occupied by the enemy. The Hussars advancing towards it were fired upon.’

The answer given was:—

‘The detachment will keep the enemy in view, and confine itself to the occupation of the farms situated in the defile to the west of Parschnitz.’

The patrol sent to the 1st Infantry Division returned at 8.20; its officer reported as follows:—

‘I met the Division north of Golden-Oels, where the destruction of a large bridge had stopped its march. In consequence of this, his Excellency the general commanding, to whom I reported myself, has halted the Division there, but it will march again at 8.30 o’clock.

‘Nothing was seen of the enemy’s Cavalry, but by the statement of an inhabitant of Golden-Oels, from thirty to fifty Austrian Dragoons who came from the direction of Bernersdorf, went by Gubersdorf, shortly before 7 o’clock, in some haste into the mountains in a westerly direction.’

The patrol was then instructed to rejoin its squadron to the west of Parschnitz.

The troops had marched in under the eye of Lieutenant-General A., who noticed several irregularities. In one Regiment the shoulder-straps were rolled up, instead of being buttoned, in several Battalions, in consequence of the great heat, the stocks had been taken off, whilst in others, this had only been done by individuals here and there. From three to four men had frequently been detached to the baggage carts of the Fusilier Battalions, and the men of the latter had mostly relieved themselves of the weight of their packs by placing them on the carts. The two ammunition waggons accompanying the regiments of the 4th Infantry Brigade, marched with the heavy batteries, and most of the led horses of the Cavalry had the appearance of pack-horses.

All these irregularities were checked on the spot, and noted by a divisional aide-de-camp, in order to inform the whole Division of them subsequently by memorandum. In the meantime Lieutenant-General A. had forbidden single individuals to enter the village, with the exception of the water-carrying parties, which were to be assembled together and marched by officers. The 4th Infantry Division placed the necessary posts to insure this order being carried out, as well as a flanking party at the intersection of the Wolta and Liebau roads, on the latter of which no one was to pass.

The divisional commander then went to Colonel D's detachment, in order to reconnoitre the forelying ground, in case of a subsequent advance.

It may be of interest to observe closer the dispositions of the several detached parties. Colonel D. reached the western extremity of the group of houses situated in the defile, about 1,000 paces before Trautenau, with the 12th Company which was leading, at 7.10, and occupied them. The two subdivisions of Hussars which had already gone forward towards Trautenau found the Aupa bridge barricaded, and were fired upon. The



report concerning this had been sent to the division commander, as already recounted. As the ground up to the bridge could be seen from the farmhouses, the Hussars were brought back behind them.

Colonel D. now detached the 10th Company 1,500 paces to the right, to the heights lying towards the north, with half a subdivision of Hussars, for the purpose of patrolling towards Hummelhof, whilst the 9th Company remained in reserve behind the farmhouses. The 1st Battalion, the Battery and the 1½ Subdivisions Hussars, still remained halted on the western outskirts of Parschnitz; one half Subdivision of Infantry waded the Aupa, and took up a position on the south-western peak of the steep wooded ridge as a left flanking party.

The steep sides of the valley made the employment of Cavalry appear impracticable. Each of the two companies on the first line kept a Subdivision under arms, and rested under their protection without taking their knapsacks off.

Major-General B. set out at 7 o'clock from the northern outskirts of Parschnitz, for the most central peak of the wooded ridge, situated towards the south, where he arrived six minutes later; the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment remained on the unwooded peak (290); the subdivision of the 4th Squadron examined the wood, and reported to the General that there was no trace of the enemy on the other side. On enquiry the wood was said to be about 400 paces broad. The slope of the mountain had seemed far steeper from a distance than it was found to be upon riding up to it.

The last portion however was more difficult of ascent, although practicable even for Artillery. Only the side of the ridge sloping down to the Aupa could not be approached, as it appeared to be too steep even for Infantry, except in loose order.

The brigadier went to the other side in order to reconnoitre the ground, both with regard to measures of security to be ordered, and with a view to the advance.

The wooded ridge was divided, in a marked manner, by a

ravine which stretched from Raussnitz to the farms on the Liebau road, from the high ground which lay further to the front. Its junction with the high ground took place about 500 paces south-west of the general's position (hill 504); from thence the ravine fell, with a steep incline in both directions, to the Aupa.

On the other side of the connecting saddle rose a new ridge, which ran in a westerly direction to the south end of Kriblitz, and had two peaks overtopping the general's position on this side. In a south-westerly direction the view was confined to about 1,000 paces. The ground to the west and south on the contrary was considerably lower, and allowed of a clear view for about 3,000 paces. In the first direction was the deeply cut Kriblitz ravine, behind which the group of Hopfen and Galgenberg, as well as a part of Trautenau, were plainly distinguishable. The ground up to this ravine appeared to incline towards the Aupa with a tolerably even slope, which suddenly declined with a most precipitous edge, to the valley. In a southerly direction on the contrary, the ground appeared generally to fall, but on account of a mass of small hillocks and patches of wood, it bore a very hilly and covered nature. A great number of farmhouses (outbuildings of the southern parts of Alt-Rognitz and of Rudersdorf) were visible on the distant line of the horizon.

In this southern portion of ground no communications were visible, whereas in the western portion the great road from Raussnitz to Trautenau led over the saddle in front, to Kriblitz.

Under these circumstances it was sufficient to place a small detachment at the point then occupied by the General. A post pushed forward to the heights on the other side of the saddle, would discover the approach of large masses of troops early enough to enable the main force to occupy in time the southern edge of the wood.

The ground was not so favourable for covering the flank of

the Corps during a further advance. As from Trautenau the Corps must follow the road to Pilnikau, the direction of Hohenbruck alone seemed available for this purpose, and there the march of the flanking column across country would encounter considerable difficulties. Hardly any course therefore was left, but to use the road leading from Raussnitz upon Kriblitz for the greater part of the troops, and especially the Artillery, and then to see if there was not a road uniting it with Hohenbruck. This could be settled at once by a reconnaissance. A part of the Cavalry must skirt the march, and follow the direct way to Hohenbruck.

The 2nd Subdivision of the 4th Squadron, was already moving towards the heights to the east of Kriblitz.

Major-General B. after obtaining the desired information, sent his aide-de-camp back to fetch up the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, and a subdivision of Hussars, and to instruct the remaining troops to march to the northern edge of the wooded ridge and halt there.

The 2nd Battalion arrived with the general at 7.30. The 5th Company was posted on the Raussnitz road, and pushed forward a picket to the heights on the other side; the rest of the Battalion piled arms behind hill 504. The subdivision brought up from the 3rd Squadron was pushed forward to examine the ground between Alt-Rognitz and Raussnitz; this subdivision as well as the 2nd Subdivision of the 4th Squadron were simultaneously directed to reconnoitre the road leading to Hohenbruck.

Major-General B. then repaired to the main body of his detachment, whose rearmost division arrived at the rendezvous ordered at 7.40. The troops here were —

- 2nd Infantry Regiment,
- 2½ Squadrons Hussars,
- 2nd Light Battery,
- 1 Company Pioneers,
- 1 Section Sanitary Detachment.

The third party instantaneously detached from the Division, was the 11th Company of the 1st Regiment and a half subdivision of Hussars, into the valley of the Aupa leading to Raussnitz. The Company established itself in the garden of the southernmost farmhouse, and sent a half company forward as a picket.

This posted, besides the sentry over the arms, a double sentry on the high road, and a second on the right slope of the valley, from whence the valley itself could be seen to a great distance, and communication be subsequently established with the 2nd Regiment. The half subdivision of Hussars, with the exception of the men retained for orderly duty, advanced towards Raussnitz.

This was the situation of the main body and detached portions of the Division when, as already stated, the divisional commander went forward on the Trautenau road at 8.35. As he arrived at the western extremity of Parschnitz (at 8.40) an Hussar officer reached him with a report from Major-General B.:—

‘A strong column of the enemy, composed of all arms, is marching on the high road from Königinhof upon Trautenau. Its head was about 1,500 paces south of Hohenbruck at 8.10.’

#### REFLECTIONS ON THE RENDEZVOUS AT PARSCHNITZ.

If we consider the arrival of the Division at the rendezvous, in a connected manner, it will be seen that :—

At 6.30 the head of the advanced guard reached the bridge over the Aupa and entered the ground fixed for the halt, but had to continue marching forty minutes longer (until 7.10) in order to pass over the place to be employed by the Division for the rendezvous, and to gain so much ground to the front as to enable it to cover it.

At 7.30 the troops taken from the column of march to serve as flanking parties, reached the places assigned them.

At 8.35 the last Division of the united column arrived. The

column had consequently taken an hour and twenty-five minutes, between 7.10 and 8.35, in marching up. If the Cavalry Brigade be deducted, which is only disposed here as an exceptional measure, the Division would still take one hour and two minutes to form up. In this case, however, it is presumed that the advanced guard and main body have maintained a certain interval, and consequently the main body did not form up on a level with the advanced guard, but before reaching it.

Should the Division however be formed up on the spot where its head halts, these figures are essentially changed ; they are then as follows :—

The length of the column, including the Cavalry Brigade, but without Train, being 12,830 paces, the time taken is two hours and eight minutes. Including the Train (16,550 paces) about two hours and three quarters.

With an Infantry Division therefore, without Cavalry Brigade :—

When an advanced guard is formed :

Without Train (10,400 paces) one hour and a half.

With Train (14,000 paces) two hours and twenty minutes.

Without an advanced guard (i.e. the troops in uninterrupted succession) :—

Without Train (7,900 paces) one hour and twenty minutes.

With Train (11,600 paces) nearly two hours.<sup>1</sup>

From this summary it is clear how much time the forming up of larger bodies of troops generally requires.

*Every forming up, therefore, is to be avoided when it is not absolutely necessary.*

For a short rest a simultaneous halt in column of march is all that is necessary ; but every successive forming up is a preparation. This is not required on the mere possibility of an action, but only when such is inevitable, and therefore only when the advanced guard meets with opposition to its advance. In

<sup>1</sup> The distance of the Train from the rear of the column in all these cases is taken at a mile and a quarter.



general, therefore, when the column should form up depends mostly upon the enemy, and consequently cannot be determined beforehand ; it is also dependent upon the ground and the commander's intentions. The ground should facilitate it, and it provides the position behind which it is proposed to fight, or the battle-field upon which an attack is intended.

In the latter case the troops should not be formed up too soon, as their advance in order of battle is very tiring, and takes time. If the advanced guard has taken up a moderately tenable position, it will be advantageous to remain in column of march until this point is reached. If, on the contrary, the object of the march is to be attained without an engagement if possible, the troops will only form up when forced to do so.

In the case before us, the general commanding had ordered a general rendezvous on the Aupa. When the 2nd Infantry Division reached Parschnitz, the 1st Infantry Division, which furnished the advanced guard, had not yet arrived. As the former could not continue its advance at once, no loss of time was incurred either to the whole, or the several portions, by forming up.

In addition to this, the enemy might be expected, on leaving the mountains, and it is always desirable to be ready for action, *when it can be effected without a sacrifice of time*, and in this case the more so, that a simple halt upon the narrow mountain road would not have been judicious.

Naturally, a force in the neighbourhood of the enemy must look to its security when assembled at the place of rendezvous, as well as when on the march. In flat ground which can be seen over, the advanced guard will be able to undertake this by itself, and to attain it with a very small force. Greater care must be devoted to this in proportion to the difficulties of the ground and of the general circumstances. As a rule, however, either too little or too much is done.

'Too little' passes unpunished a thousand times, but should it once happen that the troops are in consequence surprised, their

fame, and that of their leader, suffers for a long time. On account of this the other extreme is fallen into, and that again is at the troop's expense. It must never be forgotten that when they are to be given rest, it should be done as thoroughly as possible.

In the employment of Cavalry there is an especial abuse of this, both in theory and practice. In moments when a few patrols would suffice entire regiments are frequently sent to the front, and whilst the other arms are resting, the whole of the Cavalry is kept continually on the move. It is forgotten that while men can be always encouraged by fair words, and raised by ambition to renewed activity, however tired they may be, horses can be driven no further by these means; they must feed, drink, and rest. An extraordinary amount can certainly be demanded from a horse, which, having been well fed, enters the campaign in good wind, but as a rule these previous conditions are wanting, and even if they exist, the forces of the animal must not be uselessly expended.

In most cases, the smallest patrols suffice. Sure riders on good horses, possessed of the requisite boldness, can venture a great deal.

In proportion as the ground is clear, the greater number of Cavalry patrols must be sent forward; and these will then require a support of their own arm. On these grounds the flanking party of Major-General B. in the present case sent a whole subdivision both in a westerly and south-westerly direction.

If, however, strong bodies of the enemy are in the neighbourhood, and his cavalry is in its proper place, they will not allow the patrols to obtain any intelligence. On such occasions, therefore, if information regarding the opponent has to be obtained, too much Cavalry cannot be sent forward, and its economy would be a mistake.

The sending forward of Cavalry must be ruled by these points, and it must be held to be incumbent upon this arm to

watch and examine the enemy under all circumstances when still at a great distance off. It is the leader's duty to solve this problem with due economy of forces; for he who reduces his Cavalry before the first engagement, can expect nothing more from it during or after the action.

As specially concerns the measures for security, it may be seen here how they and their sphere extend in proportion to the strength of the covering force. An advanced guard can cover the front of its Division for a certain breadth, but it suffices only in the rarest cases for the protection of the flanks of an isolated Division, whether on the march or in position, and this must then be provided for by fresh troops.

Thus the van of the advanced guard was covered by a subdivision of Hussars sent up to the heights south of Parschnitz, the entire advanced guard by one Battalion and this subdivision, and the Division by four Battalions, three Squadrons, and a Battery. The stronger the covering force is, the further it can be pushed forward, and the greater its sphere of observation and of protection.

The one Battalion detached from the advanced guard was only able to provide security towards the wooded ridge, the stronger detachment which followed it enabled the flank covering to be extended far beyond it.

If, however, the enemy can only approach from one direction through a defile, forces small in proportion to the nature of the defile will suffice. The case already related regarding the Raussnitz valley exemplifies this. The advance of hostile forces through it from Josephstadt by Eypel was possible; the advanced guard had to cover itself against this, which it did by means of a company and half a subdivision of Hussars. On account of the nature of the ground this sufficed to cover the whole Division also; it was not therefore reinforced, but directed to remain until the arrival of the guard.

If all these detached parties were to be kept under arms, the repose of one half of the division would be purchased at the

expense of the other. Such a measure, however, was not the least necessary ; for by pushing forward mixed forces 1,000 or 1,500 paces in a westerly or southerly direction, the remainder of the Division was completely covered, and these parties had only to provide for their own security within narrow limits.

Accordingly, it is only the advanced double sentries and the Cavalry seeking information who do not obtain rest ; in the case before us, even reckoning the pickets, the forces for the covering of the Division were as follows :—

*Infantry.*

Belonging to the 1st Regiment, picket of the	
10th Company . . . . .	one section.
Skirmishing sub-division of the 12th Company .	subdivision.
Picket of the 1st Battalion . . . . .	one section.
Picket of the 2nd Battalion . . . . .	one section.
Picket of the 11th Company . . . . .	one section.
<hr/>	
Total . . . . .	Three subdivisions Infantry.

*Cavalry.*

Belonging to the 1st Hussars, with Colonel D.'s	
Detachment from the 4th Squadron . . . . .	half subdivision.
With Major-General B.'s Detachment from the	
4th Squadron . . . . .	one subdivision.
From the 3rd Squadron . . . . .	one subdivision.
With the 11th Company of the 1st Regiment,	
from the 4th Squadron . . . . .	half subdivision.
<hr/>	
Total . . . . .	Three subdivisions Cavalry.

In all only 250 Infantry, and from 110 to 120 sabres.

Regarding other dispositions, it remains to be mentioned that, after debouching from the Schömberg defile, the conditions which had hitherto caused a separation of the Hussar Regiment, and the Battery of the advanced guard ceased upon arriving in the

plain of Parschnitz and before Trautenau, and consequently the separated portions should reunite.

In conclusion, the following remarks may be made regarding the points found fault with by the divisional commander.

The shoulder-straps being rolled up prevents a ready recognition of the troops, which is a matter of great importance, especially in action ; it should also be easy to recognise to what regiment isolated men (stragglers, &c.) belong.

Taking the stocks off may under some circumstances be a great relief, but the regulation dress should not be deviated from at the will of individual commanders, much less at that of the men ; otherwise one Regiment would march in helmets, another in forage caps ; one would carry packs, another leave them to be brought after it. Were, however, two regiments to march together, one of which enjoyed an indulgence denied to the other, discontent, confusion and want of discipline might easily ensue. In war, therefore, when possible, regulations should be adhered to even more strictly than in peace ; and when circumstances, such as was here the case on the march, make a deviation from them advisable, it should only be effected on the order of the commander of the column. In the present case, therefore, the stocks could only have been taken off by order of the divisional commander ; but if the Division had been marching in connection with the Corps, he would not have been entitled to give this order, but only the general commanding. Nevertheless, orders regarding such indulgences should never be forgotten.

The ammunition waggons immediately they are separated from the train, belong to their regiments. It is quite impracticable to attach them, either united or singly, to the Artillery.

With regard to the loading of the regulation waggons, as well as the distribution of men to them, two memoranda, which were actually given, are quoted here.

‘ The baggage carts of the Fusilier Battalions have been so overloaded with baggage, especially with knapsacks which have been



taken off, that they were not able to keep up during two days' march. The greatest evils to the operations might arise from this ; officers commanding will cause this overplus baggage to be removed at once, and will see that nothing is placed upon these carts but what is allowed by regulation.'

And, again :—

'The general commanding has remarked again to-day that too many men are detached to the waggons of the troops. There were orderlies, armourers, and quarter-master-sergeants, none of whom belong to the waggons, but should be in the ranks. Clerks belonging to the Battalions and Regiments were also with the waggons who do not, as a rule, belong there ; should they, however, be sent to the baggage, men should not be also detached from the ranks.

'With the exception of the ammunition waggons, to which one non-commissioned officer and one lance-corporal always belong, only one man, either a clerk or a non-effective, will be detached with the vehicles, other than regulation, at most one man to every two waggons, whatever they may be loaded with.'

#### EXPULSION OF THE ENEMY FROM THE POSITION OF TRAUTENAU (8 hr. 40 min. to 11 hr. 30 min.)

##### *(a) Recital of events concerning the 2nd Infantry Division.*

We left Lieutenant-General A. at 8.40 A.M. on the western skirts of Parschnitz, just as he received the report of the enemy's advance. His first order was for the troops to get under arms again ; but the situation required further measures. Should the enemy continue his march by Trautenau, Colonel D.'s detachment, which had been pushed forward towards the town, must very soon be involved in an engagement which would affect the whole Division.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Colonel D.'s detachment west of Parschnitz consisted of 1 Battalion and 3 Companies 1st Fusilier Regiment ; 2 Subdivisions 4th Squadron Hussars, and 1st Light Battery.

The question was, whether the Division, on the possibility of an encounter, should be drawn up in a defensive position, or whether it appeared more judicious to advance it to the attack of the enemy.

The general commanding's order, which desired, firstly, the assembly of the united Corps at Parschnitz, favoured the former proceeding, whilst the circumstance of the projected advance of the Corps by Trautenau in the direction of Arnau, was in favour of the latter. From the advance of the strong hostile force just reported, this course was apparently only possible by an action for the possession of the Trautenau heights, which would offer greater difficulties the longer the enemy was given to establish himself there.

On these grounds, Lieutenant-General A. determined to advance and attack the enemy. As the arrival of the other portions of the Corps could be calculated upon with certainty within about an hour and a half, the Division would not be left to carry the action through with its own forces alone.

It now only remained to consider the most judicious manner of directing the attack. This much appeared certain, that the enemy could no longer be prevented from occupying Trautenau, for the configuration of the ground would not allow of the principal force marching by the high road towards the town, as such an advance would be flanked in the most effectual manner, from the heights on the right bank of the Aupa; should it be effected notwithstanding, the steep group of mountains rising up behind the town would form a position hardly to be forced in front.

For the same reason, an advance of the main body of the Division in a westerly direction, by the mountains, did not appear practicable, as it also would eventually lead to a front attack of this strong position.

In any case the Aupa must be crossed and the opposite side of the valley ascended. Without any engagement at Parschnitz this was only feasible where Major-General B.'s detachment had

already obtained a firm hold upon the right bank. A further advance of the force towards the road from Trautenau to Königinhof would then turn the enemy's strong front and threaten at the same time his probable line of retreat; by this means the ground to the north of Parschnitz would be evacuated, and the expected portions of the Corps would find room on it to draw up, which could not be the case while the 2nd Infantry Division remained in the plain; and moreover, the direct line of retreat by Schömberg would be maintained.

If it were resolved, however, to cross the Aupa at Parschnitz, the defile to the west of this village must be held, under all circumstances, until the arrival of the 1st Infantry Division. Colonel D.'s detachment was available for this purpose; it numbered certainly only seven Companies of Infantry, but an advance of the enemy in the plain along the Liebau high road appeared improbable, after the main body of its own Division had marched on the heights of the right bank towards Trautenau. Moreover, the defile was strong in itself; no considerable force of the enemy could be formed up to attack it before 9.30 o'clock, and shortly after 10 o'clock the direct support of Colonel D. by the 1st Infantry Division might be looked for.

In consequence of this consideration, Lieutenant-General A. determined to take the offensive, on the right bank of the Aupa, with his principal force, and gave the following instructions to Colonel D. who was with him:—

'The enemy is advancing from Königinhof upon Trautenau. I intend to pass the Aupa at Parschnitz with the Division, and move against his right flank. You will, however, maintain your position until the arrival of the 1st Division, probably at about 10 o'clock. Should the enemy evacuate Trautenau earlier, you will follow him on the high road. The Cavalry Brigade will advance to your support, and you will place yourself under the orders of its commander.'

At the same time the officer of the General Staff attached to

the Division was sent forward to the other bank of the Aupa, to reconnoitre both the enemy and the ground.

The divisional commander then turned back to the main body, which was already under arms, and there gave the following orders at 8.50, in part personally, and partly by means of the aides-de-camp :—

To the Commander of the Artillery :—

‘March with the two heavy Batteries to the heights east of Parschnitz church, and there join the 4th Brigade, placing yourself under the orders of its commander.’

To the 4th Infantry Brigade :—

‘The Brigade will march immediately to the heights by the road leading out of Parschnitz to the west of the church. The two heavy Batteries will put themselves under your orders, and are to be placed in front.’

To the 1st Cavalry Brigade :—

‘The Brigade will march at once, to support Colonel D.’s detachment which is on the high road to Trautenau, west of Parschnitz. Major-General L. will take over command of Colonel D.’s detachment, which is already provided with instructions.’

For the Train with the Division :—

‘The Train, Field Hospital excepted, will retire behind the bridges, at the Schömberg defile, and draw up there, in the meadow to the north of the road.’

To the divisional surgeon :—

‘We shall probably come into action on the opposite heights. Let the Sanitary Detachment and Field Hospital follow the troops there, and requisition the necessary waggons from the village, for the transport of the wounded. I will send you a Cavalry detachment for this purpose.’

An orderly officer was commissioned to fetch the half subdivision of the 3rd Squadron, which had been attached to the

main body of the Division, and to place it at the divisional surgeon's disposal.

After these arrangements had been made, the divisional commander repaired to Major-General B.'s detachment, hastening before the troops as they set out. Whilst riding through the southern outskirts of Parschnitz, he remarked that the Battalions of this detachment were also in motion, and were entering the wood in front. At that moment an orderly reached him with the following written report :—


Heights, south of Parschnitz,  
27th June, 8 hr. 40 min. A.M.

3rd Infantry Brigade.

'On account of the vicinity of the enemy, the Brigade is occupying the southern border of the wood in front of its present position.'

B., Major-General.

As Lieutenant-General A. arrived at the side of the wood nearest him, the last Battalion of the 3rd Brigade had entered it; simultaneously the first gun was heard from the direction of Trautenau, and the 1st Light Battery in the plain was seen to return the fire, whilst the mounted Battery advanced at full speed to its support (9.10). After riding through the wood, the divisional commander came upon the 2nd Light Battery in a sheltered position on hill 504, the 2nd Infantry Regiment was marching up close by, and one Battalion (the 2nd of the 1st Regiment) was further forward on the south-western hill (531), from which Major-General B. was just returning. The Hussars were also visible in their advanced position in the patches of wood north of Alt-Rognitz; their patrols could be seen on the heights by Kriblitz, and skirmished with the enemy's Cavalry between this village and Alt-Rognitz. Besides these, nothing could be seen of the enemy but one Battery, firing on the north west slope of the Hopfenberg, but great clouds of dust rose from behind the line of Kriblitz, which led to the supposition that troops were marching there.





On his arrival Major-General B. reported as follows :—

‘From the reports of the Hussars, it appears that the head of the enemy’s column reached Hohenbruck at 8.30 o’clock ; its rear, as I myself saw, has just entered the village : I should therefore estimate its strength at a brigade.

‘The patrols sent southwards by Alt-Rognitz were forced to fall back before the enemy’s Uhlans, the reports of whose strength varied from one to four squadrons, but up to that time they had only seen some baggage waggons on the road.

‘The enemy’s Cavalry is at present behind the clumps of wood between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz ; the Hussars which were sent out against it were received by Infantry fire from the bushes.

‘I intended to occupy the border of the wood with the Brigade, in order to secure the Division against an advance of the enemy on this bank of the Aupa.’

By this report the divisional commander was convinced that the advancing forces of the enemy were at this time still inferior to his own. This made it the more imperative to attack them immediately. It was indeed uncertain whether they formed the advanced guard of a Corps in rear ; but even should it be so, the resolution taken by Lieutenant-General A., which was based on the general situation, could not be changed on that account. He accordingly told Major-General B. that an occupation of the border of the wood would be unnecessary, as the 4th Brigade was already marching up, and he intended to advance and attack the enemy.

The latter Brigade had not arrived at that time ; the divisional commander therefore directed his attention to the ground in order to be able to arrange his further movements judiciously.

As has already been remarked, the heights (hills 531 and 554) stretching to Kriblitz, divided the ground south of the Aupa into two parts. Caution enjoined the leading of the principal

forces in the northern portion, along the right bank of the Aupa, in order not to extend them too far, and endanger the communication with the troops in the valley.

For, should the enemy prove to be superior and press forward, by Kriblitz, along the side of the valley, they might not only be separated from the 1st Infantry Division, but also forced away from their own line of retreat. On the other hand, an attack directed by the Division on this ground would lead towards the apparently very strong position behind the line of Kriblitz.

Should, however, the chief attack be transferred to the ground south of the mountains, this position would not only be turned, but the enemy possibly be forced to rapidly evacuate the heights south of Trautenau. If this were not effected at the right time, he would probably be involved in unfavourable circumstances for an action on retreating.

By such advantages the latter direction for attacking covered its own disadvantage, that the Division must be very considerably extended. For even in this case the ground north of the mountain could not be left unconsidered; and if serious resistance was encountered between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, the rearmost Battalions would probably have to come into action too soon.

Lieutenant-General A. determined notwithstanding to carry out the chief attack in this direction, as by this means, if he succeeded, the Trautenau defile would be opened in the quickest possible manner. The next point was that, although sure of his temporary superiority over the enemy, he could not foresee whether it would be maintained an hour later. As yet no further movements of troops had been reported on the road to Königinhof, and the sooner that advantage was taken of the enemy's isolation, the greater chances there would be of success. It must be added, that the danger of a premature disposal of his reserves was removed in some degree by the expected arrival of the 1st Infantry Division. The Guard Division also could be counted upon to come up into the front line, if necessary.

The General who in the meantime, had dismounted, accord-

ingly gave the following order to Major-General B, commanding the 3rd Brigade (9.23 o'clock):—

‘Attack the enemy with your four Battalions and the Battery, in the direction of Kriblitz. I will direct the 4th Brigade to the south of the heights leading to the village, against the enemy’s line of retreat. Keep your right flank on the edge of the valley during the advance, and do not relinquish it under any circumstances. I shall tell off the Hussar Regiment to clear the left flank.’

Major-General B. made his dispositions at once. The 2nd Light Battery advanced to the next prominence (366) and opened fire from it on the enemy’s Artillery on the Hopfenberg (9.30 o'clock); three Battalions gradually formed up in two lines north of the heights, the fourth followed the upper edge of the slope close to its crest, in communication with them. In the meantime the divisional general was supported in his conclusions by his Staff officer, who coming back from the heights before Kriblitz at 9.32 A.M., reported as follows:—

‘The enemy is preparing to take up a position on the heights south of Trautenau. His forces cannot be very considerable, for he has as yet brought but one battery into action, and I could only see about two battalions in its vicinity. The ravine, however, in which Kriblitz lies, is deeply cut, and on the other side, at the southern end, covered thickly with wood, so that an advance over it would offer great difficulties. On the other hand, the ground extending in front of us south of the heights offers no material impediment, and only a small force of Infantry and from two to three Squadrons of Uhlans were visible there.’

This officer was then ordered to draw up the report of the intended advance for the general commanding, which the divisional commander signed.

Heights of Parschnitz, 27.6.66; 9.35 A.M.

2nd Infantry Division.

‘A hostile column of about the strength of a Brigade has

just reached Trautenau from the direction of Königinhof. The front of its position is difficult to force. I have, therefore, crossed the Aupa at Parschnitz and am advancing against the enemy's right flank, maintaining my hold of the Liebau road.'

A., Lieutenant-General.

Meanwhile the head of the Artillery had reached the nearest border of the wood by hill 504, its commander, and Major-General C. commanding the 4th Brigade, arrived with the Lieutenant-General (9.35 o'clock), who gave them the following directions:—

'The 3rd Brigade will attack to the north of the forelying ridge,' and turning to Major-General C., 'you will continue your march to the left of it, with your Brigade and the heavy Batteries, in the direction of the open ground between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz. The Hussar Regiment which you see below there will clear your left flank.'

As this movement would take place under his own eyes, the divisional commander would have the 4th Brigade temporarily in hand as a reserve. Should it encounter the enemy, it would depend upon him to engage the whole Brigade, or to keep back a portion as a last reserve, according to circumstances.

Intimation was sent to the Hussar Regiment to join the left wing of the advancing 4th Brigade, and to clear the left of the Division, as well as to hold itself in readiness to take part in an engagement with the Brigade.

As soon as his Brigade, which was marching in two columns, reached the southern edge of the wood (hill 504), Major-General C. thought fit to draw up the two leading Battalions and form them in company columns for attack, those following remained in the march formation, but halted some time to re-establish the order which had been loosened by the heavy march, and to open out again to proper intervals, by which a certain distance was gained from the first line.

In the meantime, from the first moment of its execution, the

view taken by the divisional commander of the effect of an advance against the right flank of the enemy, was confirmed. At first the enemy's artillery on the Hopfenberg answered the fire of the 2nd Light Battery by a few rounds from its right half Battery, but after some minutes its guns limbered up, and evacuated the position. Soon clouds of dust, moving rapidly along the hollow way from the Hopfenberg to Alt-Rognitz, showed the hurried retirement of the enemy's Battalions, whilst on the hills behind this road, small columns could be seen moving in a southerly direction.

Under these circumstances, the divisional commander would have liked to hasten the march of the 4th Brigade, but he saw that it would lead to a disordered advance. Accordingly he forbore to press it, for the eagerness of the troops to meet the enemy evidently required checking rather than inciting.

At this time nearly all the Battalions were in movement, and that of the 3rd Brigade advancing along the crest of the heights, soon became involved in a musketry engagement with the enemy's Infantry, on the slope turning into the Kriblitz ravine. The divisional commander now remounted and went to hill 531, from which he could better keep in view the movements of the two Brigades.

At 9.50 o'clock the situation was as follows :<sup>1</sup>

The leading Battalions of the 4th Brigade, formed for attack, were passing the present position of the divisional commander (hill 531), on either side, followed by the heavy Batteries. The Battalion of the 3rd Brigade already mentioned was still engaged on the western slope.

Further west, the main body of this Brigade approached the northern part of Kriblitz, its leading Battalion prepared to march through the village, without a single shot having as yet been fired there.

Nothing further was to be seen of the enemy upon the Hop-

<sup>1</sup> See Plan.



fenberg, but the near border of the plantation to the south of Kriblitz appeared now to be strongly occupied by Infantry.

From the course of the action up to this time, Lieutenant-General A. inferred that the partial engagement of the enemy was only carried on to cover his retreat. He had now no further doubt of attaining his immediate aim, the opening of the Trautenau defile. There was a possibility of profiting further from the situation by causing the enemy considerable losses, if he should succeed in interrupting his flank march.

This could only be attained by the left wing, and the previous reserve must be employed, the formation of a new one being taken into consideration.

Lieutenant-General A. therefore gave the following order to Major-General C., who was still with him :—

‘March in the previous direction with the whole of your Brigade (4th), and inflict as much damage as possible upon the enemy, who appears to be retiring.

‘The 3rd Brigade will occupy Trautenau in the meanwhile.’ (9.50 o’clock).

An aide-de-camp was sent to the latter Brigade with this order :—

‘The 3rd Brigade will occupy Trautenau and the heights south of the town, to which place Colonel D.’s detachment will also be brought up.’

This officer was further instructed,

‘Immediately the enemy evacuates Trautenau the Pioneers will examine the passage over the Aupa there, and eventually re-establish it : then seek the Cavalry Brigade and direct it to follow the enemy as speedily as possible through Trautenau, or to the west of the town in the direction of Königinhof, and at the same time to reconnoitre the road to Arnau with one Squadron.’ (9.55 o’clock).

The divisional commander was still able to observe from his station the further movements of both Brigades. The heavy Batteries unlimbered before the advanced companies of the 4th

Brigade (600 paces south-west of hill 531) on either side of the little square clearing, and opened a brisk fire against the border of the Kriblitz wood, in spite of the enemy's musketry fire which reached them from it. The enemy evacuated this position very soon, on the approach of the right wing of the 4th Brigade and occupied the isolated height on the northern extremity of Alt-Rognitz (425), as well as the ground on the hollow way leading from there to Hohenbruck. The Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, which had been hitherto engaged, disappeared into the southern part of the Kriblitz ravine, whilst the main body of this Brigade was on the point of ascending the eastern slope of the Hopfenberg.

The Artillery fire next ceased almost entirely, the advanced Battalions of the 4th Brigade had already thrown out their skirmishers during the advance, and the main body was now forming up. As soon as the crest of the undulating ground (500) between Alt-Rognitz and the Kriblitz wood was reached, skirmishing fire began, without however checking the movement, and Infantry appeared, who ascended the slope upon which the Kriblitz wood was situated, whilst portions of the 3rd Brigade halted on the Hopfenberg. At 10.25 o'clock the left wing of the 4th Brigade was in possession of the small hill at the northern extremity of Alt-Rognitz (425), and its Battalions descending, began to disappear behind the undulation (502), and moreover the hanging smoke allowed no further view. The divisional commander therefore rode on towards the north end of Alt-Rognitz, whither the two heavy Batteries were already moving. On the way he was joined by his Staff officer, who had accompanied the 4th Brigade in its advance, and was informed by him as follows :

'The enemy is retiring in a southerly direction. The forelying ground has, it appears, been occupied by 2 Battalions which covered his march. There was only a short engagement of skirmishers as they fell back on Alt-Rognitz immediately upon our approach and were received by from three to four Squadrons of Dragoons, and Uhlans. The retreat of a strong column on

the high road in the direction of New Rognitz, was plainly visible but it has already gained such a start, that it can hardly be molested. I saw several dead bodies which, by their uniform, belonged to the enemy's 12th Regiment. Apparently, therefore, we are opposed by a part of the 10th Corps.'

At the same time an orderly officer brought the following report from the 3rd Brigade :—

'The enemy has evacuated Trautenau, and is falling back upon Hohenbruck. The Brigade is maintaining possession of the town, and is forming up on the heights south of it, in order to follow the enemy. The bridges over the Aupa are undamaged.'

The officer was sent back with instructions for the Brigade to await further orders on the heights south of Trautenau.

As in the meantime the enemy's Artillery fire had recommenced, and the heavy Batteries, which had reached their Infantry and unlimbered on the undulating ground in front, were loading, the general went to the small hill situated at the northern extremity of Alt-Rognitz.

Arrived there at 10.40 o'clock, the view to the west was found very limited, on account of rising ground which ran parallel with the high road. Hohenbruck and the main road were almost entirely covered by it. Towards the south there was a tolerably clear view, as the rising ground just referred to fell in terraces towards Alt-Rognitz and Rudersdorf. Watercourses running from a wooded hill situated upon these terraces (527), to the church of St. Paul and St. John, and further southward, formed two diagonal undulations on this slope. Behind the most distant one rose a considerable mountain group, whose projecting summit stood out, in the far distance, beyond Neu-Rognitz. This village could be seen half way up its slope, partly covered by woods lying in front of it ; on either side, and at the same height, connected woodlands seemed to surround the mountain.

Apparently the enemy intended to take up a position again

at Neu-Rognitz. It could plainly be seen that he was on the point of occupying the woods in front of the village, through which his rearmost Divisions of Infantry and Cavalry were just retiring. Three Batteries also could now be remarked at his disposal which were in action between the clearings in front of the village.

Of Lieutenant-General A.'s own troops the leading Battalions of the 4th Brigade were descending the hollow on this side of the slope ; its main body, which was forming up in the meadow north of the General's station, prepared to follow them. The Squadron of Hussars was to the left rear, the heavy Batteries to the right rear, upon the undulation (500). The latter pursued the enemy's rearmost troops with their fire. In a northerly direction some wooded hills close by debarred any view, so that nothing was to be seen of the 3rd Brigade.

The first disposition made by Lieutenant-General A. was at once to give the following order to Major-General C. :—

‘Call back your advanced Battalions and take up a sheltered position with the Brigade on either side of these heights (425). Secure at the same time your left flank by occupying the neighbouring farm houses.’ 10.45 o'clock.

It was clear to the divisional commander that the projected march of the Corps upon Arnau could not now be carried out, so long as the enemy held Neu-Rognitz, and it was further certain that the longer time he was allowed, the more difficult it would be to dislodge him. But on the other hand, it was plain to the divisional commander, that although the 4th Brigade was disposable to carry out an attack, the whole of the Division was not so, and that the Brigade would be destroyed in the execution of an energetic attack before the 3rd Brigade could support it.

He had the one Brigade under his eyes, but he could not see how the other was situated at that time. No serious action had hitherto been engaged in, and yet the previous events had broken

up the Division into three widely separated portions ; the leader's next care therefore must be to re-unite them.

The question then arose whether the attack should at once be further prosecuted, or the arrival of the remaining portions of the Corps, and the resolutions of the General commanding, be awaited. Temporarily the secure occupation of the Trautenau defile would suffice. The arrival of the General commanding might be looked for every moment ; it was uncertain whether, under the circumstances, he intended a further advance on the road from Königinhof, or whether he wished to establish himself, with the united Corps, on the right bank of the Aupa.

But should the 2nd Infantry Division attack the enemy, nothing would remain for the Commander-in-Chief but to lead the rest of the Corps on this road to its support. Under such circumstances it did not appear fit to anticipate the views of the General commanding, and Lieutenant-General A. determined to assemble his Division in such a manner that he could meet an attack effectually, as well as favourably utilise the ground for an eventual advance. He therefore sent the following order to Major-General B. at 10.55 :—

‘The 3rd Brigade will advance, maintaining its hold of the high road, to the hollow way leading from Alt-Rognitz to Hohenbruck, and occupy the hills to the south of it, but will not go beyond them.’

Next, to the 1st Cavalry Brigade :—

‘The enemy has fallen back upon Neu-Rognitz. The Brigade will advance to the west of the high road, and observe his movements.’

Further, to the Hussar Regiment :—

‘The Regiment will observe the enemy to the east of the high road, at the same time examining the ground towards Eypel.’

The instructions given to the 4th Brigade were gradually executed. The two advanced Battalions opening out into company columns, in order to offer a less favourable aim to the



brisk fire of the enemy's Artillery which was directed upon them, retired and occupied the wooded hill (425) and the adjoining buildings of Alt-Rognitz.

During the retirement of the Battalions the two heavy Batteries endeavoured to draw the enemy's fire from them upon themselves; the other Battalions of the Brigade formed up by Regiments on either side of the hill (11.10 o'clock).

After the Infantry had completed taking up their position here, the heavy Batteries only continued the action by a very slow fire.

In the meantime enquiries were made by the Staff officer of the Division from the nearest Battalions, whether any prisoners had been taken. Eventually some of the enemy's Infantry soldiers were produced, who had lingered behind on the retreat from the Kriblitz wood. He reported the result of their examination to the divisional commander as follows:—

'According to the statement of the prisoners, we have the 1st Brigade of the 10th Corps of the enemy before us, commanded by Colonel N. The prisoners belong to the same Regiment as the dead bodies found before, but they maintain positively that the other Regiment of the Brigade, a Regiment of Uhlans, and Artillery were also present. They could not state how many Batteries. Their Brigade had been bivouacked in a village close to the high road, since the day before yesterday, and advanced from there to Trautenau early this morning; they had hardly arrived there before the action began. The march to Trautenau lasted about an hour and a half. Apparently, therefore, the Brigade came from Praussnitz-Kaile to-day.

'They cannot state where the other Brigades of the Corps are. On the 25th they marched with a large portion of the Corps through Josephstadt, where the Brigade was directly afterwards detached. Since then they have seen nothing of their General commanding.'

These statements only confirmed in every particular the view which had been formed before; the circumstance last mentioned

might lead to the further conjecture, that the main body of the Corps must have been tolerably far removed from its 1st Brigade on that morning. For if this had not been the case, and the 1st Brigade been at the usual distance from the main body as an advanced guard, the General commanding would have probably informed himself personally of the situation of his foremost Brigade. On the other hand, it was strange that the enemy, although so manifestly inferior, should dispose himself for action again in the immediate vicinity.

These were, however, only surmises ; there was always the possibility that the General commanding had been present with the engaged Brigade, and that the prisoners had not seen him.

Various assertions were made without any decided information being obtained as to whether stronger forces of the enemy were in the neighbourhood.

In any case it was necessary to acquaint the General commanding of what had hitherto taken place.

This was done again in writing :—

Heights north of Alt-Rognitz,  
26.6.66 ; 11.15 A.M.

Second Report of the 2nd Infantry Division.

‘In consequence of the advance of the Division on the right bank of the Aupa, the enemy has given up the position of Trautenau after a slight action, and has posted himself again at Neu-Rognitz.

‘Hitherto he has shown the 1st Brigade of the 10th Corps, 3 Batteries and several Squadrons, which have apparently been at Praussnitz-Kaile since the 25th ; nothing has as yet been learnt of the other troops.

‘I shall unite the Division between Alt-Rognitz and Hohenbruck, holding the road to Königinhof, and await further orders.’

Lieut.-General A. directed his staff officer to go to the 3rd Brigade and reconnoitre the ground by the high road, with a view both to attack and defence, and to see what could be observed there of the enemy.

Lieut.-General A. then turned to the divisional surgeon who came up at that moment, to make the following report :—

‘As yet only the losses of the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment in the attack of the Kriblitz wood are worth mentioning, a temporary place established there for dressing wounds is still sufficient ; the small number of wounded men of the 4th Brigade have been directed temporarily to the same place.

‘Twenty-one waggons have been requisitioned in Parschnitz up to the present time, and are marching here, together with the Field Hospital.’

The General answered :—

‘I cannot yet foresee whether the action will take greater dimensions. Have the hospital and waggons therefore drawn up behind the Kriblitz wood.’

Further instructions were interrupted by a report, brought by a Hussar non-commissioned officer, from Major-General B. :—

‘His Excellency the General commanding has just arrived with the 3rd Brigade.’

The Divisional Commander with his Staff rode at once down the western slope of the hill, and then at a gallop followed the hollow way leading to Hohenbruck, in order to join the Commander of the Corps.

This was at 11.30 o'clock, at the same time the advanced portions of the 3rd Brigade could be seen occupying the woods south of the hollow way. The Division therefore was in a position to give effect to any order of the Commander of the Corps.

*(b.) Considerations on the advance of the Division, up to the occupation of the position at Trautenau.*

I. REGARDING THE PROPORTION OF TIME OCCUPIED.

At 8.40 o'clock the news of the enemy's advance reached the divisional commander. Although he gave his orders immediately, the whole of the Division was not drawn up on an alignment with the advanced guard until 9.50 o'clock, more than an hour

later, as the mountainous ground retarded the movement. It is evident from these figures how necessary it is to reconnoitre the ground in front to a great distance, even for a united Division, when an extended view cannot be obtained from the position itself.

No appreciable hindrance to the advance was prepared by the enemy. At 11.50 o'clock the Division was concentrated on the line from Hohenbruck to Alt-Rognitz, and in possession of the ground necessary for the debouching of the Corps.

After the Division had completed its extension, Colonel D.'s detachment and the main body of the 3rd Brigade had about 4,000 paces, the 4th Brigade 3,000 paces, to pass over. Only Major-General B.'s four Battalions, and the two leading Battalions of the 4th Brigade performed a part of this march in order of battle. Indirect ways, however, as well as countermarches, could not be avoided, on account of the course of the action and the leading of the Commander-in-Chief.

In practice the views of the parade-ground for the movements of bodies of troops in extended order, must be renounced ; upon parade, a Brigade takes less than forty minutes to pass over a distance of 4,000 paces ; as soon, however, as the ground loses the character of the parade this is no longer the case. The necessary time then increases in proportion to the difficulties of the ground and to the strength of the force extended. The advance of separated bodies then requires half as much time again, indeed, double as much as when upon quite level ground. In the present case most of the Battalions were still in column of march, and the situation required that the several portions of the first line should not maintain the same alignment. But had the united Division advanced at once, with the Brigades drawn up in the rear of each other, a considerably greater time might be reckoned upon as required for passing over the same ground.

Only picture an advance of extended masses in such a ground as here represented. Here, a Battalion in column of double companies comes upon a steep height or a plantation,

and has to fall behind the others ; there, a deep-cut ravine obliges a part of the Brigade to go round ; upon an evenly sloped decline there is firm ground which offers a free advance, whilst at the bottom, where the water has run off, progress can only be made with difficulty.

The leading of the Commander must then come to the assistance ; often he must conduct the whole for a time by a different course to that required by the main direction to be taken, or he must make Battalions which are too far advanced step short, and frequently even halt them. Add to this the movements for the purpose of withdrawing the troops from the enemy's view, and especially from artillery fire.

If the leader does not regard these considerations, and has in view only the rapid advance of the most favourably situated Battalions, in the praiseworthy impulse to reach the enemy, the Battalions of different Regiments are thrown together pell mell in one place, whilst there are gaps in another. Instead of a well ordered Brigade ready for any employment, there is a mass deprived of cohesion and consequently difficult to lead. Superior leading must regard these matters, though considerable losses of time of this description are unavoidable with Brigades and Divisions formed for action.

A more special value must be placed upon these matters, if it is a question of a retreat with troops in such formation.

## 2. THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER.

Lieut.-General A., when the Division marched to the rendezvous at Parschnitz, and he received the report that the bridge over the Aupa at Trautenau was barricaded and occupied, did not see occasion to undertake the seizure of the town at once. When, however, he learnt of the advance of a hostile column of all arms, on the road from Königinhof to Trautenau, he broke up his troops directly, and made dispositions for the immediate occupation of this important point.

If these two resolutions are compared, an inconsequence appears



to lie in them. For if the General attributed such a high degree of importance to the occupation of Trautenau, it would have been far simpler to continue the march as far as the town, and seize the ground there for debouching, than to lose valuable time, during which the enemy might lead reinforcements into the position.

As we know, the General hesitated for a moment whether to go beyond the instructions received from the Corps, or to follow them strictly, by which it was important in the first place to assemble the Corps at the extremity of the mountain defile, on the left bank of the Aupa. He determined to do the latter, and completed the march of the Division to the place of rendezvous.

It appears doubtful whether the divisional commander acted rightly by such a proceeding; his Division had for the time no further independent task, the one which had been allotted to it was already performed, for it had arrived at the rendezvous at Parschnitz.

Let us look again at the instructions from the Corps; it was expressly mentioned there:—

‘It is of the utmost importance that the Corps should stand in a concentrated position at Parschnitz, on the left bank of the Aupa, as soon as possible, with both flanks protected against the sudden approach of hostile forces.’

The Division had contributed all in its power to carry out this intention; it was in its place. Its Commander could incur no reproach by waiting at Parschnitz for the arrival of the other Division, and for further orders from the General commanding.

The instructions referred to, however, contained some weighty notifications regarding the further intentions of the Commander-in-Chief; they ran thus: ‘The Corps will be united at Parschnitz, and halt for two hours; the 1st Infantry Brigade (1st Infantry Division) alone, intended for the advanced guard, will march straight on to Trautenau and occupy the town. The march will then be continued in one column in the direction of Arnau.’

But the 1st Infantry Brigade which was to occupy Trautenau was not now forthcoming; the whole right column had been retarded in its march by a bridge on the highway having been destroyed, as was known by the report received (p. 48), and therefore the task allotted to a portion of it could not be carried out.

The occupation of Trautenau, however, as well as a further march beyond the town, in the direction of Arnau, was intended by the General commanding, and Lieutenant-General A. knew this to be the case.

If, consequently, when his Division arrived at Parschnitz, in the absence of the 1st Division, he had occupied Trautenau in its place, he would have been acting contrary to the purport of the order given, though according to the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief.

Thus in war different measures may often be taken without allowing it to be said that the one is right and the other wrong. It happens much oftener that, as here, there is no objection to the one decision, but the other would perhaps be the most profitable.

Had it been expressed in the instructions from Head-Quarters, that the column which should debouch first from Parschnitz was to occupy Trautenau, every doubt would have been removed. This, however, was not done; moreover the body upon which this task was to devolve was definitely pointed out; all the other dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief were based upon it, and what was conclusive for the decision of Lieutenant-General A. was, that nothing had altered in the general situation of affairs since these instructions were issued.

It had been known for some days that Trautenau was occupied; and that it had not since been much reinforced, was concluded from the fact that the heads of the column were not received by a single shot.

If, therefore, under these circumstances, Lieutenant-General A. did not occupy Trautenau, he could hardly be blamed for his omission.

The situation took another form, however, when the advance of strong hostile forces of all arms upon Trautenau was established, and there became a prospect of the maintenance of this strong position by them, instead of by a post of observation.

It was clear that, even if the enemy should not advance beyond Trautenau, the Division in face of it, with its head only 1,300 paces distant, could no longer remain inactive at Parschnitz.

There were then two ways open for the Division's further procedure, both of which could be taken with tolerably equal justice.

It could take up a defensive position *à cheval* of the Aupa, on either side of the defile to the west of Parschnitz, and in this manner cover the debouching of the rest of the Corps; or advance, attack the enemy, and endeavour to occupy Trautenau.

By the former proceeding the expressed will of the commander would be fulfilled, and no censure could be incurred; the latter would be the bolder course and would still be in perfect accordance with the known intentions of the commander of the Corps. It must be again pointed out that the Corps wanted to march beyond Trautenau, in the direction of Arnau; the occupation of the town must therefore be effected. The longer the enemy was given to establish himself there, the more difficult this would be to attain. Moreover, the circumstances under which the General commanding had given his original orders, were now changed.

Instead of finding only a post of observation at Trautenau, it was now certain that the powerful opposition of a large body of troops would be encountered. *Under such circumstances the leader should take into consideration, whether a deviation from the order given, is in the interest of the known intention of his superior or not.* In the case before us, such a deviation appears in no way unjustifiable. The reflections of the General upon which

bank the projected attack should be conducted, have already been mentioned in their proper place.

The passage of the Aupa at Parschnitz, the advance upon the right bank keeping the main road covered, could be conducted by a force of only 7 Companies, 9 Squadrons, and 12 guns, as the appearance of the 1st Infantry Division was in prospect. Had this not been the case, and Lieutenant-General A. looked only to his own forces for carrying out the action, he would never have removed the mass of his troops so far from the main road, as was done under the present circumstances.

On the right bank of the Aupa the execution of the action took an apparently unusual course, for the two Brigades of the as yet isolated Division were successively placed by the side of one another, and the extreme breadth of front of the Division amounted to 3,000 paces.<sup>1</sup>

For the carrying out of an action this extent is too great, and only special circumstances can exert such an influence, that the danger connected with it is not actually manifested.

In our actions during 1866, as well as in those of the campaign of 1870-71, still greater extensions of divisions than this can be pointed out, and it cannot be maintained that they have always been the result of faulty leading. In the campaign of 1866 the superiority of the breech-loader with which our infantry was armed, allowed exceptionally of such a proceeding. In 1870-71 it was also justified during the period after the submission of the Imperial Army, when the newly-formed forces of the Republic were only in loose formations, instituted under the pressure of the moment, whose intrinsic value was so inferior to the troops of the German Infantry. But both the periods quoted lie out of the ordinary; they were not the rule in the first part of the campaign of 1870, neither can they be regarded as such in future wars. The occurrences rather which always come to light

<sup>1</sup> In disposing troops for action, the drawing up at the beginning of the two Brigades of an isolated Division by the side of one another, is only exceptionally practicable, but may more frequently take place with Divisions not acting alone.

with tolerably evenly balanced opponents, armed equally well, must be held to. These rest chiefly upon the destructive effect of the breech-loading arm.

On the offensive with a front attack, one must be prepared to suffer enormous losses in a short space of time. A few instants decide upon the bravery of Companies and Battalions, and second and third lines are necessary as reserves to fill up the rapidly forming gaps.

Independent fire well directed, is calculated to scatter any column. Should it be composed of stout material, and the loss not too enormous, the men will join the advancing support in partially loose order; if not possessed of the requisite intrinsic power, they will fall altogether out of the first line.

A front attack upon lines of Infantry in a good position has now-a-days little chance of success, unless it is sufficiently prepared and supported by Artillery; indeed, a considerable superiority gives no guarantee for success.

Whenever it is practicable, the enemy's flank should be threatened in combination with the front attack; and it must never be forgotten that the dissolution of the troops, menaced by great losses, can only be prevented by the depth of the position.

The effect of musketry, however, offers an extraordinary power to the defensive. The more troops that can be extended for this purpose, the more effect is produced by their inherent strength.

But if only proportionally small reserves are necessary for lines formed in this manner, still the danger for the flanks must not be overlooked. The longer the line, the greater the danger; when neither the ground nor adjoining troops afford the necessary protection, the defensive force must itself form reserves in rear of its flanks.

In the campaign of 1866, the cases in which our long lines of Infantry had to fall back were mostly caused by a flank attack, or even by the simple threatening of a flank, when no further reserves were available.



Thus the advanced guard of the 5th Corps at Nachod had to fall back when its right flank was turned in the Wenzelsberg wood by only one battalion, whilst the effect of its fire shattered considerably superior forces of the enemy attacking in front. This retreat then drew the centre of the long line into the same plight. Only when the centre and right flank, after having been reinforced by the arrival of some Companies, were united in a narrow space and the flanks secured, they succeeded in throwing back the attack of the superior foe to the edge of the plateau.

The eight Battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division with dismembered portions of the advanced guard, fighting between Alt-Rognitz and Hohenbruck, were not so fortunate.

Extended in a long line of about 3,500 paces, the simple threatening of the left flank which was not supported by any reserves, gave the impulse of retreat, which was successively imparted to the other portions, and lastly to the right flank.

Though the front attacks which followed were repulsed with the utmost steadiness, the further retreat did not bring these Battalions together, but led them at first in different directions still further apart, and the unprotected flanks found no support.

We cannot reckon upon a flank attack by an enemy's Brigade being so brilliantly warded off as was the case with the left flank of General Tümpling's Division at Gitschin and in various other actions. It must not either be expected that the popular shock tactics of the Austrians in 1866 will be again opposed to us, and give single Battalions the opportunity of causing the retreat of considerably superior forces.

We are therefore left to depend upon manœuvring in action in a higher degree than ever. In many cases, however, this is not possible. There are circumstances which require the front attack of a position, as may be the case in large actions with single Corps. It will then be necessary to let strong reserves follow the first line, to fill up the numerous losses, and this in itself will cause a less extent of front and a greater depth. The defence on the other hand allows proportionately small reserves

to suffice, and can consequently occupy a greater extent of front.

It must be clearly understood that, by the defensive is only meant the moment when the direction of the enemy's attack is declared, for long extended lines cannot manœuvre, or move over great distances. Which forms appear best suited to satisfy the requirements of the offensive and defensive will be considered later.

For the case before us it need only be mentioned that, *for a Division taking the offensive, whose Artillery passes to the front to prepare the attack, an extension of about 2,000 paces appears the maximum*, in order to give the attack sufficient power through competent Reserves. More than this not only makes the leading of the united mass hardly feasible, but sufficient concentrated force will be wanting to give the necessary impulse at the decisive point.

*An extension beyond these bounds does not appear to be suitable for carrying through an action whose dimensions cannot be foreseen, but which as yet only allows of manœuvring.*

But in order to be able to manœuvre, the first condition is that the whole force should be separated into organised, connected subdivisions. The subordinate leaders receive their special tasks independently, and the Commander-in-Chief takes care that the working together of the several parts is kept to the general aim.

We come now to the situation before us. The manner of the advance against the enemy's position at Trautenau bore the character of a manœuvre; whether such is to be employed or not, must always depend upon the circumstances of the case.

In general it should be remembered that the exercises in time of peace frequently lead to manœuvring, for the most effectual means of leading, viz. its moral effect, cannot be expressed in them, whilst in practice the decision of arms is always sought in the first line.

In the case before us, it could be seen that the enemy had arrived from the direction of Königinhof, and it was therefore probable that the high road to that town would also be his line of retreat.

After the divisional commander had decided not to allow the enemy any time to establish himself at Trautenau, but to attack him, he had two things to choose between. Either he must advance with the main body against the line formed by the Kriblitz ravine, or he must cover himself towards this position, and attempt to act upon the line of retreat by a turning movement. In the first case, he must proceed to a direct attack of the position behind the Kriblitz line, which was not easy to force.

The ground, however, would limit this engagement to the space between the Aupa and the heights to the east of Kriblitz (534), about 1,800 paces, and the strength of the Division was quite sufficient to enable it to undertake this attack, and carry it out with energy. Should it nevertheless be repulsed, there would be no fear for its retreat.

In the second case, the extension must be very considerable. Sufficient forces were not at hand to attack the front energetically, and to employ any surplus in other movements. In extending further, and operating with the left flank against the line of retreat, there was the danger of being broken through by an attack of the enemy on the centre, or, if this was directed against the right flank, of losing the communication with the other Division. Should, however, the movement succeed, it would undoubtedly lead, in the quickest manner, to the attainment of the aim in view, viz., the seizure of the issue of the Trautenau defile.

The divisional commander decided, however, to manœuvre in spite of the danger here explained. A justification of this can only be found in the fact that, according to his idea, the enemy's forces were considerably inferior to his own. Had he not held such a conviction, prudence would have advised the direct attack of the Kriblitz position.

The danger in this manœuvre could be better averted by placing the 4th Brigade, 6 Battalions strong, in the centre, instead of the 4 Battalions of the 3rd. *Only it must not be overlooked that the directions of attack of greater bodies are for the most part the results of the directions of their advance.*

Were the arrival of the 4th Brigade awaited in order to place it in the centre, precious time must be lost ; if it were desirable to avoid this, and the 3rd Brigade, which was upon the spot, set out at once south of the mountain, as an advanced left wing, the enemy would evacuate Trautenau sooner, and the chances of damaging him during his retreat would be less.

But if the 3rd Brigade in the centre were sent, in the first place, against the Kriblitz ravine, it might be hoped by this less dangerous direction to retain the enemy engaged in his position, when the attack upon his left flank would be the more decisive. This disposition would have the following advantage, that whilst the 4th Brigade followed in the left rear as a flank echelon, its 6 Battalions would offer an available reserve. If fresh columns of the enemy were seen approaching, or if he were found stronger in front than had been at first supposed, the movement could not be further carried out, and a concentration for action could be made easier on the engaged centre than if the left flank had formed an echelon to the front originally, and consequently first come into contact with the enemy.

As soon as the enemy retired in consequence of the flanking movement, the General did not delay to advance the 4th Brigade which had been considered as a reserve. The attempt to damage the enemy, during his flank march, must at least be made. Under these circumstances, the whole Division would have got out of hand, had not the 3rd Brigade, immediately after the seizure of the heights south of Trautenau, received the order to assemble and to remain there. Thus, at any rate, a new reserve was very soon created.

As the enemy withdrew himself in time from the flanking movement, the attempt of the 4th Brigade only resulted in the

former continuing to retire until he arrived before Neu-Rognitz. Lieutenant-General A. did not carry on the attack, for he thought he had fulfilled the intentions of the commander of the Corps in so far as he was aware of them, and he did not know whether entering a more considerable action, which would lead the Corps out of its assigned direction, was in accordance with the further views of the General commanding, whose arrival he was expecting every moment.

He preferred, therefore, in the first place, to bring his troops into such a condition that they would be ready for any employment. The several portions of the Division were drawn closer to one another, so that they only occupied a breadth of front of 2,000 paces.

This is one of the most essential points in generalship. In practice, after attaining any important object, there is either a headlong pursuit, or a sort of apathy in which everyone remains upon the spot where he happens to be, and, in the excitement of what he has just accomplished, thinks more about that than of what remains yet to be done.

A leader has generally to restrain the first-mentioned impulse, as the divisional General did here, with the two Fusilier Battalions of the 4th Brigade, and if the latter be the case he must not allow himself to be infected by that apathy. He must cause a speedy re-formation, *for he cannot foresee what work lies before him, and in any case troops should be so far disposed as to be ready to meet any demand.*

### 3. CONDUCT OF THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER.

#### (a) *As regards his leading in the Action.*

As has been shown above, during about three hours the divisional commander had comparatively few dispositions to make, but these were of great importance. He guarded with great care against mixing in any details; his orders went always to the Brigades, to the leader of the detachment on the Liebau



road, to the commanders of the divisional Cavalry and Artillery, and had in view only what affected these leaders with their entire forces. Their execution was left absolutely to the commanders concerned, and only in one case was an intended, and in another an already undertaken, movement checked.

The first case occurred when Major-General B. wished to occupy the border of the long straggling wood, in order to protect the Division, and Lieutenant-General A. had in the meantime determined to take the offensive ; and the second on the advance of the 4th Brigade beyond Alt-Rognitz, when the divisional commander arriving there was convinced that the general situation did not call for a continuation of the action.

By such conduct alone is it possible to maintain a superintendence over the whole, and yet give due independence for a successful leading to the several commanders. *Such conduct, however, has in war great difficulties.* Let us remember, first of all, how interest is involuntarily attracted by those events which lie nearest to the perception, since actions passing before the eye make the strongest impression. To this is added the feeling, that the leader can assist that portion of his troops which is engaged and in danger, with help and advice, and that in his mind's eye he should see even the most inconsiderable body of the troops under him, as if he were leading it himself. This temptation is often very strong, and it is not everyone who can resist it ; *yet it must not be given way to.*

Though it was remarked that the divisional commander had to give comparatively few orders during the two hours, these dispositions did not relate alone to what was actually visible, but were closely connected with the situation of the whole Corps ; in order to maintain this supervision over the general situation, which is by no means easy, all unnecessary details must be got rid of.

The higher the rank of the leader, the more important for the whole force under him is each of his decisions ; large masses of troops require considerable time for their movement and evolu-

tions ; once directed in a certain course they can only be turned with difficulty in other directions, and not at all when in contact with the enemy.

The resolutions to be taken in action, and the dispositions regarding them, are so important, that they demand the full faculties of the leader in the very highest degree ; they can proceed from him alone, and his duty consists in them. If, however, he allows himself to be carried away to enter into details, he disperses his energies, and cannot possibly devote them to this task in their full extent.

Moreover, such an interference is seldom useful, for the dispositions of the subordinate leaders are thwarted by it. Every commander, however, has the right, so long as he does not commit conspicuous errors, to carry out his duty according to his own ideas, and this can frequently be done in different ways ; each chooses that which agrees most closely with his character and education. He has been placed in the position he holds in the confidence that he will fulfil the duties of it ; should he not justify this trust, he must be removed.

*The duty of a commander is to impart the necessary orders clearly to his subordinate leaders, and to watch over their execution ; he must only interfere when dispositions are made which endanger the attainment of the aim in view.*

An officer commanding a Regiment, for instance, is there to conduct it, and not to lead a Battalion or a Company. Should he immediately place himself at the head of the first Company which reaches the enemy, he may certainly perform most brilliant deeds with it, but it may be affirmed positively that very soon he will not know where to find the other parts of his Regiment, and that as a whole it will have slipped completely out of his hands ; what happens to a Company however, matters less to the divisional commander, than that the Regiment as a manageable whole is directed according to his intentions.

This is different in critical moments, when it is well that the men should be given a heightened *élan*, As soon, therefore, as

the last disposition regarding the leading of the whole has been made, the commander may hasten to the most advanced Battalions, where the danger is to be overcome, and there strike enthusiasm into every breast by his brilliant example.

These glittering moments occur more frequently with leaders of subdivisions or companies ; the higher a leader is placed, the more seldom do they fall to him, and only very exceptional situations ought to prompt the General commanding to such deeds. In practice the duties are not at all the same for every leader. With the greater bodies of troops they are chiefly as follows : *the leader makes his decisions with regard to the general circumstances, he imparts the orders relating to them to his subordinate commanders, he watches over the execution of these orders, and only interferes where his intentions have been exceeded or not attained.*

This sounds very simple, but it is in reality extremely difficult ; the difficulty is increased by there being such a variety of situations, that theory can only give general injunctions but no rules, and the exercises in peace time only render the training of an individual possible, if he himself devotes most careful consideration to it. The necessity of paying attention to these injunctions is not so prominent in the exercises ; that the leader thinks more of an appropriate conduct of his troops, than of his own training in matters of war, proceeds from human nature and the circumstances of his position. To many a leader the fear of criticism is of more importance than the enemy, and frequently a false movement in detail is redressed at the expense of his placing himself in the skirmishing fire. In this respect the conduct of a leader cannot be too carefully attended to, and it would be advisable if the commanders of Regiments and Brigades practised directing their troops from the rear, as must actually happen before the enemy.

*(b.) Choice of the Commander's Position.*

The choice of the spot from which he shall direct his troops, is of especial value to every commander, but here again in practice there are different claims upon different leaders.

The divisional commander who conducts the action, has other things to consider than the brigadier under his orders, who leads his Regiments to the attack.

A judiciously chosen position gives the leader an effectual remedy against the injurious desire to interfere in details. It is advisable therefore upon these grounds alone, that the General commanding should not be too near the first line; but it is still necessary that he should overlook it, and the enemy's also, as much as possible, but in doing this he must not lose his control over the reserves.

Accordingly Lieutenant-General A., after making the primary dispositions at Parschnitz, repaired to his most advanced Battalions, in order to gain, with his own eyes, a just idea of the ground and the movements of the enemy which were visible from thence. He neared, at the same time, that portion of his troops which had for some time been observing the enemy, and by personal communication with its commander he could receive explanations of all those points which the reports had hitherto left doubtful. It must be admitted that reports, however good they may be in themselves, cannot give the leader the same degree of information as he can obtain by personal observation. Moreover the advance and evolution of the greater bodies of troops allows him easily the necessary time for it.

In the present case, the divisional commander did not have to ride about much to make this reconnaissance. In going to the centre hill of the wooded ridge which was the easiest to reach, and in whose vicinity Major-General B. was sure to be found, he hit upon the most favourable point from which to make his observations, and from the information he obtained there he conducted the next movements. These led the troops forward, and into

the ground which was divided by the Kriblitz heights; the General accompanied the advance on these heights, since he could best observe from thence the separated portions of his Division, until he reached a point on hill 531, which offered him for the moment a sufficient view.

He could see from it the valley of the Aupa, and keep both the 3rd and 4th Brigades in view; *he was therefore able to control the execution of the movements ordered, keep his reserves in hand, sufficiently observe the enemy as far as the ground allowed anywhere, and could be easily found by his troops.*

Here only the following points were required in observing the enemy. Does he advance to take the offensive with great masses? Does he attempt to maintain his position, or does he avoid the attack? Certainly the details of his movements are of value, but as a rule, are only to be seen by the most advanced troops in action. The commander's position in the situation given, is not sufficient for the further question, Are new columns of the enemy approaching? In practice this can only very exceptionally be known early; here the situation of the enemy's line of retreat would have allowed it, perhaps, if the attention of the divisional Cavalry had been directed to it.

On account of the great distance at which an action begins, it is doubly hard to choose a position for the general which lies near enough to observe the enemy without exposing himself, and at the same time to keep his own reserves constantly in view, yet these two conditions must not be left disregarded; consideration for the one drives the commander to the front, whilst the other keeps him further to the rear.

*It is, however, impossible for a General to conduct an action judiciously, unless he is most clearly informed of the chief movements of the enemy's action.* This comes more into consideration in leading a Division than an Army, for the stronger the forces to be moved the more time there is for reflection. Reports, when such are received, come only from the several parts of the field of battle, where an advance of a few hostile Bat-



talions is taken to be a general attack of the enemy ; as a rule also reports from the first engaged line, of what is remarked of the enemy, are only made at the commencement of an action, whilst later on these ask for support. *Consequently the first line should always be observed by the divisional commander himself.* As soon, therefore, as the movements of the enemy were no longer to be seen from hill 531, Lieutenant-General A. repaired to Alt-Rognitz, right up to the first line of his troops, in order to inform himself of the ground, and the position of the enemy.

When a leader pays this attention to the enemy, as a rule the further condition of *keeping his own fighting line continually in view*, is fulfilled as a matter of course ; the constant observation of his Reserves is a more difficult matter. One would suppose that the force of command, military discipline, would be able to keep these in their place according to the will of the Commander-in-Chief ; but misunderstandings and accidents are even worse enemies to the precise execution of orders in war than a want of discipline, which an energetic leader possesses plenty of means for managing.

There are three parties to the indirect giving of an order ; the officer commanding gives his order to the bearer, the former may express himself indistinctly, omit a conclusion which he considers self-evident, or even give a wrong name ; the bearer may not hear aright, or may comprehend the order wrongly ; in his haste to ride off he only takes in for the moment the bare expression, and a couple of minutes after he has galloped away it takes a different form in his memory ; or even if he still retains its meaning, he expresses it in his own way, and thereby gives to the whole another sense ; lastly there is the possibility of a wrong understanding, or of a false conclusion by the officer to whom the order is directed, not to mention that its transmission requires time, and in the interval the circumstances may have changed.

At the battle of Ligny, for example, when the Reserves of the

1st and 2nd Prussian Corps were expended, the order was sent to the 3rd Corps :—To send two Infantry Brigades by Sombreff, and to place them in support of the centre. The Corps only despatched one Brigade, the 12th, 'to place itself the other side of Sombreff,' and this Brigade received the order 'to advance by Sombreff, to place itself at this village, in order to maintain the communication with the 2nd Corps' (4 o'clock P.M.).

Had the two Brigades of the 3rd Corps arrived at the place designated by the Commander-in-Chief, probably the French would not have succeeded in breaking through at Ligny, where, as it happened, they were only opposed by Cavalry.

Another example from the same period is not less interesting.

When Lieutenant-General von Thielemann on the 18th June was not able to commence his march from Wavre to Couture, which he had been ordered to perform, on account of the road being stopped, he determined to dispose his Corps on the high road behind Wavre. The 9th Brigade, which was still the other side of the defile, was directed, after passing through it, to occupy Wavre with two Battalions, and to form a Reserve with the rest upon the high road. When this Reserve was required later on it was not to be found.

The report of the 3rd Corps upon this affair was as follows :—

'General von Borck (commanding 9th Brigade) after moving through the town was induced by a number of small accidents to march with the rest of his Brigade to Couture, under the impression that the Corps had in the meantime gone there, and that he must join its rear in accordance with a former order. Thus 6 Battalions, 1 Battery, and 2 Squadrons, left the Corps in a manner which no one expected ; for the retreat of the Brigade led through the centre of the position, and an officer sent from it was expressly told that the General might march a short way down the road, and post himself in reserve. It was not discovered until late that a mistake must have occurred in the placing of the Brigade, but it was never imagined that it had marched to Couture, and so no one was sent there to bring it back.'

The Brigade explained this 'number of small accidents' in the following manner :—

'About noon the news arrived that the enemy had forced back the 2nd Corps towards Wavre, and would retreat through the defile covered by the 9th Brigade, which was in front of it. The Battalions were placed accordingly.

'When the Rear Guard of the 2nd Corps was nearly abreast of the 9th Brigade, the written order arrived (issued by the commander of the 3rd Corps) that directions had come to march to Couture by St. Lambert, leaving 2 Battalions and 1 Squadron of the 9th Brigade to occupy Wavre and protect the passage of the Dyle.

'The departure of the remainder was but just ordered, and they were hardly in motion when a new order arrived to cover the left flank of the Rear Guard of the 2nd Corps till its retirement was completed. The necessary dispositions were made. With the retreat of the 2nd Corps resulted that of the 6 Battalions on the left, by the side of the town, in order to cause no stoppage of the defile with the 2nd Corps.

'After the troops of the 9th Brigade reached the Brussels road on the bend round the town, and took post there, the order arrived to continue the march on that road ; the order previously received to go to Couture was then carried out, and the Brigade arrived there late in the evening.'

In both cases it will be seen that the Reserves which the commander did not have immediately under his eye, or which at least he could not continually control, vanished completely.

This must always be considered therefore by a leader in the choice of his position ; in the case before us from the commencement of the action Lieutenant-General A. only changed his position once in an hour and a half.

It is not always that with any amount of pains a place can be found from which the whole of the engaged line is visible. The leader then belongs to the point from which at least the most important part of the field of battle can be seen, and sends

thence to the other portions of it officers who can be depended upon, who observe and obtain information for him.

*(c.) The manner of imparting Orders, and the superintendence of their execution.*

The imparting of orders has already been touched upon in these reflections; but the superintendence of their execution remains inseparable from it.

In the first place stands the clearness of the order given; the more precisely this is done, the less chance there is of its being misunderstood; but it must be remarked again, that the imparting of orders is not so easy; this art must be learnt and practised, for it is a question of preventing, as far as possible, misunderstandings and accidents.

Written orders have great advantages, but in action they should only be employed with large masses, such as the leading of Corps by the Commander-in-Chief; but the shorter the distance between commander and subordinate, and the more the former is involved in the working of the action, the quicker the orders should reach their destination, and this can generally only be attained by their being given verbally.

It is well to provide written orders with an envelope, for the pencil writing often becomes indiscernible by being in the hand or breast-pocket. Should the orders be of special importance, and the body of troops concerned be so far off that the execution of the order cannot be confirmed by the leader's own observation, it is as well always to send a second man with the bearer. If the country through which the order has to pass be insecure on account of the enemy's patrols, a duplicate, or even a third copy, may be sent, when practicable, by other roads.

With regard to the transmission of verbal orders by orderlies, &c., it has been a long time established in some of the Corps that the bearer repeats the order aloud before riding off, and this rule cannot be too strongly recommended.

As regards the superintendence of the execution of the order,

there is no difficulty as long as the commander keeps his troops under his eye ; but it is different when this is not the case. It cannot be a matter of certainty then, though ordered ever so stringently, that reports will be sent at the right time and in sufficient numbers by the troops engaged ; their whole attention is, as a rule, absorbed by the scene of action which is unfolding before them, and it is seldom that their superiors are thought of unless actually on the spot. As experience has established this as a fact, the evil consequences which may spring from it must be obviated as far as possible.

Either there is time after the order has been issued to send officers to see whether the movement directed is properly executed, or when the distances are great, permanent officers should be attached to the several bodies of troops, for the purpose of reporting.

For example, on the 3rd July 1866, on the Prussian side, before receiving reports from the 1st Army of the presence of strong hostile forces on the Bistritz, reconnaissances in force by the 2nd Army were ordered towards the Aupa.

An officer of the General Staff was sent from the Commander-in-Chief's Head-Quarters from Miletin to Königinhof, to be present at this reconnaissance on the following day.

When, on the morning of the 3rd July, the order arrived at the Head-Quarters of the 2nd Army, to join in the expected action of the 1st Army upon the right bank of the Elbe at once and with all available forces, the following officers were despatched from the commander of the 2nd Army's Staff: one to each of the 4 Corps of the 2nd Army, and on breaking up from Königinhof an officer of the General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief's Head-Quarters, to report that the 2nd Army had commenced its march in accordance with the order received, and another officer to the nearest Division of the 1st Army (Fransecky), as the right wing of the 2nd Army must seek its junction there.

On arriving upon the heights of Choteboreck, whence the



Guard Corps, and the march of the 5th Corps could be seen, an officer was again sent both to the 1st and 6th Corps to discover if these Corps were actually in motion, and where their heads were.

Just as these rode off, the 6th Corps was seen opening the action to the left front.

During the Campaign of 1870-71 also, the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the commanders of the several Army Corps, placed a special value upon being informed in this manner in sufficient time, and frequently, about the events happening during an action, at the places where the commander concerned could not himself be present.

Thus, on the 16th August, at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, 3 officers of the General Staff were sent from the Commander-in-Chief's Head-Quarters at Herny, to the advancing 3rd Corps on the afternoon of the 15th, on the possibility of an encounter. In the battle of Gravelotte and St. Privat, 2 officers were attached to the 2nd Army in the same manner, at Beaumont, some to the 3rd and to the Meuse Army, and at Sedan again to the latter and to the 5th Corps, which was attacking round the other flank. At Gravelotte, 2 officers from the distant 3rd Army appeared upon the battle-field in the afternoon, and returned that night after its termination.

All these officers of the General Staff sent continual reports during the engagement on the course of the battle, and only returned on its conclusion, after they had made themselves acquainted with the positions of the various forces, and obtained information of their commander's intentions for the following day.

The bearers of orders, as well as communications regarding the course of the action, were quite independent from these officers.

*(d.) Reports.*

What has been said regarding the delivery of orders, refers equally to that of reports.

It is further to be recommended that the reports sent away during the day to a commander, or any specified person, should be always numbered.

The receiver can thus easily perceive whether all those sent have come to hand, or if any have been lost.

This was not regarded in the reports of the reconnoitring detachment sent away on the 26th June ; but because in that case no harm resulted, is no reason for disregarding this precaution.

In general the advanced troops cannot report too often, but the matter must be carefully weighed.

As a rule, the service of spies is impracticable in presence of the enemy, and it therefore is incumbent upon the troops to furnish the officer commanding in chief with that abundant information regarding the enemy which is so indispensable to him, and, under some circumstances, about their own movements as well.

It must therefore be regarded as a fault, that the Division neglected to inform the commander of the Corps when its reconnoitring detachment reported the arrival of the Guard Corps in Braunau on the 26th June.

The first question, in the case before us, regards the communications which Lieutenant-General A. had to make during the action to his superior, who was not on the spot. The relation showed that this was done twice ; the first report referred to the advance of the enemy, and the determination to meet him on the right bank of the Aupa ; the second reported the occupation of Trautenau.

Though the contents of these reports gave sufficient intelligence about the situation, still too little was done by the Division in this respect.

Imagine the position of the General commanding : with what suspense must he have looked for further information, after the arrival of the first intimation that half of his Corps was in face of the enemy. Immediately he arrived with the 1st Division upon the field of battle, the further conduct of the action would

devolve upon him, and therefore he could not be informed too early of its successive details; moreover, were the 2nd Division thrown back into the defile before the 1st was able to debouch from it, different measures must be taken betimes than those necessary if ground was being gained. In the latter case a reinforcement in Cavalry and Artillery could be rapidly brought up, and the column which was still on the march doubled to the front; the first case, however, forbade this.

For the rest, it would have been judicious in the General commanding to hasten himself to the field of battle as soon as he heard the cannon, or at least to have sent on an officer of the General Staff.

*Further, it must appear advisable in situations like this, where there are no extraordinary circumstances, to send reports of the state of the action to the superior officer who is not on the spot, at regular intervals, perhaps every half hour.*

#### 4. THE OFFICER OF THE GENERAL STAFF BELONGING TO THE DIVISION.

The officer of the General Staff is at hand to assist the divisional General. This officer has to exempt his General from the detail of communicating orders, and in action he is specially destined to assist him in a knowledge of the situation and of the ground, in order that the latter may be able to make his dispositions judiciously. This can only be attained by absenting himself temporarily from his commander, who cannot be everywhere at once, and should change his place as seldom as possible; but he must not go away oftener, nor remain absent longer, than appears absolutely necessary. Moreover, he should never absent himself on his own responsibility; *the Staff officer's place is at the side of his General, whom he should only leave on obtaining his order, or permission, to do so.*

Occasions for this come often enough; even when the engaged line of a Division is not immoderately extended, its commander from his station in rear can, as a rule, only observe the

general features of the course of the action. He can see where the action is at a standstill, where it advances or retires, but he frequently does not know the reason why in one place no progress is being made, while in another the troops are even beginning to give way. Yet if he wishes to go everywhere personally, he must give up at once his superintendence over the whole.

Or the ground, in front of his position, hides the movements of a portion of his troops, and of the enemy ; the reports arriving do not suffice to give a clear idea of them, yet the General must not leave his place, as he must keep the greater portion of his troops in view.

Further, even for the reconnoitring of ground, especially when on the offensive, there is not time enough for one individual to take a view of the proportionately great extent of ground necessary for a Division : moreover, the troops arriving must be provided with orders, and still they cannot be judiciously disposed without, at least, an idea of the ground.

In all these cases the leader of greater bodies of troops requires an officer upon whose judgment he can rely, who can go to the different places instead of himself, and there observe for him ; and for this purpose the officer of the General Staff is principally destined. The latter can only fulfil his task if he has been specially trained for the duties of it. Moreover, apart from this, it is also his business to look to everything by which he may be able to lighten his commander's duties, and assist him in their performance.

The Staff officer must understand therefore, in action, not only how to take in the situation of the bodies of troops to which he is attached, with regard to the general state of the engagement, but he must be able to judge rightly its several periods, as well as the features of the ground, and this requires very thorough training. The greatest difficulty he incurs with a Division is, that a correct judgment can only be formed by his maintaining a constant view of the whole state of affairs,

whereas his duty often takes him from the spot from which alone he is able to obtain it.

This officer, therefore, on returning to his commander, after having been despatched anywhere, must always immediately endeavour to obtain information of everything that has occurred during his absence.

In the example before us, the Staff officer was first sent at 8.50 o'clock by his divisional commander, who was occupied giving his orders at Parschnitz, to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy, whose approach was reported, as well as the ground on the right bank of the Aupa, for the attack of the Division.

At 9.32 o'clock, about three-quarters of an hour later, he returned to his commander on hill 504, after having in the meantime ridden as far as the most advanced party of Hussars, who were on the flank towards Kriblitz. As a complete view could no longer be obtained from this hill of what happened in front of the advancing 4th Brigade, he was sent to it at 10 o'clock. He returned to Lieutenant-General A. about 10.25 o'clock with his report, and left again at 11.20 o'clock, as the ground before the 3rd Brigade, which the General could not see from his new point of observation, had to be reconnoitred for the purpose of a possible continuation of the action. When the divisional commander rode off from here, he had not returned.

In the interval from 8.50 to 11.20 o'clock—2 hours and 20 minutes—Major X. was present with the Staff of the Division 83 minutes, whilst he was absent from it 67 minutes; and in all he passed over about  $7\frac{1}{4}$  miles. It was necessary to despatch him on these several occasions, for each required a specially trained officer, and the Division only possessed one available Staff officer; for this reason it is very difficult under such circumstances to be informed of all the phases of an action.

His duties are quite as comprehensive when the Division is not engaged. We can only specially consider here one period of his proceedings, viz., that of his first despatch from Parschnitz



at 8.50 o'clock, until his return to the divisional commander on hill 504 at 9.32.

On his departure he knew, by Lieut.-General A.'s communication to Col. D., that the Division was to pass the Aupa at Parschnitz and advance to the attack of the approaching enemy by the right bank; and that Col. D.'s detachment with the Cavalry Brigade was in the meantime to cover the Liebau road.

His instructions were to reconnoitre the enemy and the ground, with a view to the attack of the Division. For this purpose he only had a limited time, for when the troops were once on the right bank, their attack must be rapidly pushed, on account of the general situation. The most detailed and perfect reconnaissance is worthless if its result is not known at the right time.

Under these circumstances it is necessary to reach a point as far advanced as possible, which offers a wide view to the front; in the ground before us this could only be found on the other side of the wooded ridge. The officer must then communicate with the most advanced leaders, in order to learn what they had seen in the meantime. Major-General B. had already ridden further to the front, to hill 531; the Staff officer joined him there, observed with him for some minutes the enemy's movements, and then hastened along the Kriblitz heights to the flanking subdivision of the 4th Squadron before the village, whose leader gave him some details and pointed out the spot from which his observations could be best made.

In consequence of what the Hussar officer had told him, he was convinced that the enemy could not be very strong, and also that his march did not extend beyond Trautenau, but that he occupied the position there. At the same time he made himself acquainted with the nature of the Kriblitz position, and decided that its direct attack must offer greater difficulties than if the advance were made by the south of it.

He could now go to the Hussar Regiment upon the left flank, in order to ascertain personally what could be observed from thence; and he looked about to see if the Cavalry patrols had

not made any prisoners, in order to find what troops of the enemy were in front, of which hitherto no one had any idea.

On the first contact with the enemy, it must be certified whether the information hitherto collected regarding his composition is correct, as an early knowledge of this is of special value to the leader of an army.

Here it was found that no prisoners had as yet been brought in : and there was no time to further extend the reconnaissance ; moreover, at any rate, the chief object of the latter might be considered as attained.

Major X. hastened back, therefore, to his divisional commander, whom he found, at 9.32 o'clock, on hill 504. In his absence of 42 minutes the Staff officer had traversed about 7,000 paces, and stopped at several places for the purpose of observing and consulting. On his arrival, it appeared that the report brought from Major-General B. had already given later intelligence regarding the enemy than he himself had been able to bring ; his report therefore was principally valuable as a confirmation of it, especially as far as it regarded the ground.

Perhaps the Staff officer might have been despatched earlier in this case, but it must not be overlooked that the Division had only one officer of the General Staff at its disposition, whose duties were of such a manifold nature that his powers must not be expended upon what was unnecessary or useless.

Had he gone, for instance, to reconnoitre towards Alt-Rognitz during the halt at Parschnitz, and the enemy in the meantime had been seen approaching from the west, or in the valley from Raussnitz, he would not have been on the spot during the important period of the commencement of the action.

Only when unnecessary duties are avoided can the Staff officer's powers be fit for arduous employment in case of emergency.

On his return to the Staff after every absence, Major X.'s first duty was to inform himself of what had in the meantime been reported of the enemy, as well as what orders had been given regarding his own troops : also to see where the several portions

of them were at that time, and to assure himself that no necessary details had been overlooked in their disposition.

He could not possibly trouble the divisional commander at such an important time with all these questions, and inquiries in the Staff would only furnish him with incomplete information. If therefore his General does not of his own accord impart to him his knowledge on this subject, the Staff officer easily loses the complete information which is so necessary for him.

Arrangements for procuring waggons for the eventual transport of the wounded, the direction of the train and of the prisoners, the delivery of reports to the superior authorities, and the providing of a guide who knows the ground, belong to necessary details ; the latter may appear superfluous, but is far from being so.

In the first place, even if in possession of the most detailed map, the whole of its sections cannot be carried in the sabretache, and an unexpected course of events may necessitate the use of sections whose employment was only reckoned upon for the following day, and which are consequently not at hand in the moment of need. Thus it happened, that in the Staff of an officer holding a high command, which was richly provided with materials for maps, not a single section relating to that portion of the ground could be found upon entering the battle-field of Königgrätz.

But even when they are on the spot, errors cannot be avoided. During a rapid ride, in which the direction is often changing, and the attention is distracted by passing events, the run of a map may be lost, even when actually in hand. Lastly, with the best maps mistakes are easily made about points some way off, church towers behind woods, and such like.

The old saying, that a messenger tied to a string is better than the finest map, has still its full force, and it is well in every large Staff to commission one officer with the sole duties of reconnoitring the ground.

We may take this opportunity of remarking, that the training

in reading maps is not always undertaken in a sufficiently practical manner. The value of survey maps in war, requires no further proof; but in order to practise oneself in plans for use in action, the looking over and general understanding of them does not suffice. It is much more necessary to be able to devise as it were, a landscape in one's mind, as has been often attempted in these sketches. Let it be supposed that one arrives at any spot, and asks which picture on the map corresponds with the landscape from this position. In this way previous practice will be so much the more useful at a future time, in making judicious dispositions of ground.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVERAL PORTIONS OF THE  
DIVISION UP TO 11.30 O'CLOCK.

*1. The 3rd Infantry Brigade.*

We left Major-General B. at 7.40 o'clock, as he returned to the main body of his detachment from reconnoitring the ground in front.

This detachment consisting of—

3 Battalions 2nd Regiment,

2½ Squadrons Hussars,

Pioneer Company,

1 Section Sanitary Detachment,

was at this time on the heights south of Parschnitz; the most advanced part of it had marched as far as the edge of the wood.

The several Battalions had piled arms, taken off their packs, and were resting; the Cavalry and Artillery had dismounted.

The 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment was on the edge at the other side of the road, their arms also piled; without, however, packs being taken off (not far from hill 504), its 5th Company was pushed forward as far as the Raussnitz road, and had placed a picket on the heights in front, and a non-commissioned officer's post in the direction of Raussnitz.

The second Subdivision of the 4th Squadron had advanced towards Kriblitz, the 3rd of the 3rd Squadron towards the middle of Alt-Rognitz. A report soon came in from the former to Major-General B., that it could not cross the ravine, as a superior force of the enemy's Dragoons was on the Hopfenberg.

This report was not forwarded by the brigadier, as it contained nothing new. The presence of the enemy's Dragoons at Trautenau had been known when the Division was at Schömburg.

In order not to alarm the troops, the 2nd Subdivision 4th Squadron was instructed only to watch the enemy's Cavalry.

Time passed without further disturbance until 8.28 o'clock, when a non-commissioned officer, with one trooper, arrived from the 3rd Subdivision of the 3rd Squadron, and reported as follows :—

'A hostile column of all arms is advancing upon the high road to Trautenau; its head was about 1,500 paces south of Hohenbruck at 8.10 o'clock.'

Major-General B. did not wish to communicate such an important piece of intelligence to the divisional commander without further proof; as it would take too much time to convince himself personally of its correctness, he had to be satisfied with examining the non-commissioned officer more closely. By the latter's statement the 3rd Subdivision 3rd Squadron had advanced as far as the next village (Alt-Rognitz), and halted this side of it. Just then large clouds of dust were remarked in the village about a mile from them (Neu-Rognitz), through which the high road led. In consequence of this, the Subdivision passed through the former village, and took up a sheltered position further forward, whilst the officer, accompanied by the non-commissioned officer, rode to the little wooded hill (527) near the road. From there they could observe quite closely the advance of the enemy upon it—the non-commissioned officer said at less than a thousand paces—about 1 Battalion (in white coats) de-



bouched first from the village, followed by a Battery, clouds of dust were visible beyond, when suddenly a Squadron of Uhlans advanced from the side of the village towards the Sub-division.

In consequence of this they had to fall back and had not yet halted, when the officer directed him to ride to Major-General B. as quickly as possible. After this there could be no more doubt of the correctness of the report.

As the horses of the two Hussars were somewhat exhausted from quick riding, the general commissioned an officer of the Regiment to convey the report to the divisional commander, and without turning out the troops, he went to the furthest advanced post where a non-commissioned officer sent from the 4th Subdivision 2nd Squadron met him with the following report :—

‘A hostile column is advancing on the road from Königinhof to Trautenau ; its head reached Hohenbruck at 8.30 o’clock.’

From the heights upon which the post (581) was situated, the point where the houses of Hohenbruck joined the road could be recognised between the hills, by means of a good field-glass, and Infantry could plainly be seen passing there, while the clouds of dust raised by the march began northward of the village, and continued right up to the wood in front of Neu-Rognitz ; the advanced Subdivisions of Hussars were visible before Kribnitz and Alt-Rognitz.

For a closer examination of the enemy’s strength, more Cavalry must be brought up, and it also appeared judicious to the General to occupy the nearest edge of the straggling wood, behind which his main body was placed, for the security of the Division.

Accordingly, at 8.38 o’clock, he sent his aide-de-camp back with an order to bring up the Hussar Regiment, and also to direct the rest of the troops to come up to the edge of the wood. The 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment was at the same time ordered to take up a sheltered position behind the hill in front (531). Notice of his intention to prepare the occupation of the edge of

the wood nearest to him was forwarded to the divisional commander; the General in the meanwhile continued his observations.

At 8.50 o'clock the Hussar Regiment, only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Squadrons, reached him; its commander, having ridden on in front, was informed of the situation, and ordered to advance in the direction between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, and gain intelligence of the enemy's strength.

The 2nd Regiment began to draw up in columns at the edge of the wood, and the Artillery and remaining Battalions to march up. Soon afterwards the 3rd Subdivision 3rd Squadron reported as follows, in writing:—

*First Report of the 3rd Subdivision 3rd Squadron.*

Heights north of Alt-Rognitz,  
27.6.66; 8.54 o'clock.

'As yet only single baggage waggons pass through Neu-Rognitz. The rear of the enemy's troops was a few hundred paces from Hohenbruck at 8.54 o'clock. Hostile Uhlans, apparently 4 Squadrons strong, are behind the woods to the east of the village.'

Just after 9 o'clock one of the enemy's batteries appeared on the Hopfenberg, and opened fire upon the troops in the valley towards Liebau; at the same time the brigadier perceived the rear of the enemy's column march into Hohenbruck. The head of the Hussar Regiment had reached the open ground between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, but receiving Infantry fire from the thickets in front, turned towards the Alt-Rognitz wood.

Major-General B. now went back to the main body (504), in order to direct the posting of it in detail; there he met the divisional commander, and reported to him all that had occurred up to that time (9.15 o'clock).

The latter informed him of his intention to advance against the enemy's flank on the right bank of the Aupa, and gave him the order to march towards Kriblitz (9.23 o'clock). Major-General B. gave his directions accordingly.

To the Commander of the Battery :

'The Brigade will attack Kriblitz north of the heights in front ; you will prepare the attack. The Cavalry this side of the ravine are our Hussars, on the other side are the enemy's Dragoons.'

To the Commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment :

'Direct a Battalion to attack the northern part of Kriblitz, the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment will march along the heights in front abreast of it. You will follow with the other two Battalions of your Regiment, also in the direction of the northern part of Kriblitz as a Reserve at my disposition. A Subdivision of Hussars will continue to observe the enemy in front.'

To the Commander of the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment :

'The Brigade will attack Kriblitz. Advance with your Battalion along the crest of the heights in front. Do not, however, march off until the leading Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, which will move on your right, has arrived on an alignment with you. The 4th Brigade will advance on your left.'

The Pioneer Company, and the Sanitary Detachment were directed to follow the 2nd Regiment. The Light Battery advanced immediately about 1,300 paces, to a small hill (366), and opened fire at 9.30 o'clock on the enemy's Artillery upon the Hopfenberg.

The Infantry formed during the advance. The Fusilier Battalion of the 2nd Regiment was in the first line ; its 11th Company took the Raussnitz hollow way, the 10th Company the parallel road to the north of it ; the remainder of the Battalion, in half Battalion formation, followed 300 paces in rear of the right flank. Three minutes later the two other Battalions of the Regiment marched off, formed in column of company columns in rear of the centre, the first taking the road to the right, the second that to the left.

As soon as the Fusilier Battalion was aligned with the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment, the latter moved off, the 6th Company took the direction towards the small clearing north of the heights, followed by the 5th and 8th Companies in half Battalion for-

mation, the 7th Company was thrown out to cover the left flank, and kept close along the crest of the heights, without however being actually upon it.

The skirmishing subdivisions were sent forward along the whole front, but they were not yet extended, as the Hussar subdivision in front covered the advance with its skirmishers.

At 9.40 the first line of the Infantry was advancing on either side of the Light Battery, the rear of the Brigade was leaving the wood at hill 504. The heads of the 4th Brigade could be seen appearing at the edge of the wood further to the rear.

The enemy's Artillery had only answered by a few shots, and had then drawn off as well as his Infantry<sup>1</sup> and Dragoons on the Hopfenberg.

The 2nd Subdivision 4th Squadron, advancing by the northern extremity of Kriblitz, endeavoured to gain information of the position of the enemy; it had to act cautiously, however, as single Dragoons were still to be seen behind the hills in front, and moreover, Trautenau was to be reconnoitred. At this time the skirmishing subdivisions of the Fusilier Battalion were nearing the eastern border of Kriblitz, those of the 6th and 7th Companies 1st Regiment had entered the wood situated on the slope to the east of the village and received on its western edge a hot musketry fire from the opposite slope. In the first excitement the extended skirmishers rushed down the ravine to attack the enemy followed by the two companies. The order of the latter was entirely destroyed by the difficulties of the ground, but they still formed a compact mass, upon which, however, the enemy's fire told so effectually that it very soon turned about again. The greater part of the skirmishers of both companies reached the ravine, but could then neither advance nor retire, and had to seek cover in the hollow way and the buildings about there. Their companies extended on the edge of the wood took up

<sup>1</sup> Reconnoitred by the Staff officer of the Division, and therefore not further reported upon.



the fire, and were soon reinforced by the extension of the 8th Company.

The casualties were not inconsiderable, and a temporary place for dressing wounds was established behind the wood, at which some of the surgeons of the 2nd Regiment assisted by order of the brigadier; the employment of the Sanitary Detachment did not yet appear necessary.

Major-General B. ordered the Battalion to abstain from a further offensive, but to maintain the heights before Kriblitz. The Reserve of the Brigade (the two other battalions of the 2nd Regiment) were directed to follow their Fusilier Battalion, which was traversing the northern part of Kriblitz. The two Light Batteries took the same direction, as it did not appear practicable for them to come into action on the Kriblitz heights under the enemy's most effective fire.

After crossing the ravine the Fusilier Battalion detached the 10th Company to cover the right flank towards Trautenau, and the other companies, the 11th leading, turned towards the road occupied by the enemy, in order to join in the engagement of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment. The Brigadier allowed this movement, as it fell in with his intentions, and he went to the other two Battalions of the 2nd Regiment which were entering Kriblitz. Whilst riding down, he observed that Colonel D.'s detachment was also in motion on the Liebau high road towards Trautenau. At Kriblitz the report of the 2nd Subdivision 4th Squadron, that Trautenau was evacuated, but the bridges blocked up by strong barricades, reached the General. In consequence of this, he ordered the Pioneer company to Trautenau for the purpose of clearing the passage over the Aupa and of occupying and examining the southern and western extremities of the town, as a preliminary measure, in combination with the Fusilier Company (10th) which had already gone on there. Just then (after 10 o'clock) the order arrived from the divisional commander, to occupy Trautenau and the heights to the south of it, and to recall Colonel D.'s detachment.



The former was already carried out ; as the aide-de-camp who had brought the order had to go on to the 1st Cavalry Brigade, he was directed to communicate at the same time to Colonel D. the instructions relating to him.

As the Fusilier Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, neared the wood occupied by the enemy, the latter evacuated the edge, and only two subdivisions of the 11th Company were involved in a slight skirmishing engagement. On penetrating the wood it came upon portions of the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment, which, remarking the retreat of the enemy, had immediately followed him up.

These two bodies were the more certain to become mixed up as the 9th and 12th Companies were also entering the wood at full distance apart.

Major-General B. at this time approached the deeply cut hollow way, on the north-eastern slope of the Hopfenberg, with the two Battalions 2nd Regiment, and the Battery. The subdivision of Hussars, which, deducting the patrols sent beyond Trautenau and two orderlies attached to the brigadier, was only sixteen horses strong, examined the hills to the west of the Hopfenberg. Suddenly Colonel D.'s column in the valley halted, whilst the Cavalry Brigade trotted past it; this delay was put down to the passage of the Aupa being blocked up.

Major-General B. now ordered the two engaged Battalions not to follow the retreating enemy any further, but to join the main body of the Brigade south of the Hopfenberg. The execution of this order required some time, for the portions of the two Battalions, which had become mixed up in the wood, had followed the enemy beyond the edge of it, without having first re-formed.

The commander led the main body of the Brigade to hill 504; the Battery was obliged to go round on account of the deep hollow way in front, and turning first towards Trautenau, through this hollow way and along the western edge of the Kribnitz wood, seek a junction again.

Even before this hill was ascended the Hussars reported that Infantry columns of the enemy were retreating upon the high road, whose rear had already reached Hohenbruck, and further that a Battalion and some Squadrons had retired through the western part of this village.

This report was forwarded to the divisional commander, with the additional information that the Brigade, while holding the town, was concentrating south of the Hopfenberg, ready to follow the enemy.

At 10.30 o'clock the main body of the Brigade was arriving at hill 504; from this spot the most advanced divisions of the 4th Brigade could be seen approaching Alt-Rognitz; the remainder of the 2nd Subdivision 4th Squadron examined the hollow way leading from this village to Hohenbruck. The 2nd Light Battery, on account of the difficulty of the ground and the circuit caused by it, was not able to arrive in sufficient time to fire on the enemy, as he retreated on the road.

In this situation the following report arrived suddenly from the patrols, which had advanced further to the west, as well as from Colonel D. directly afterwards:—

‘A column composed of all arms is approaching Trautenau along the upper Aupa, and its head is only 1,500 paces from the town.’

This news was extremely surprising; nothing was known of the presence of friendly forces in that direction: they must therefore belong to the enemy. The position of the Brigade was unpleasant, in so far as whilst holding Trautenau and the heights, it must change its front towards the south and west.

However, before giving the necessary instructions for this, Major-General B. went personally in the direction mentioned, in order to make certain of the correctness of the report with his own eyes.

Before he reached this point, his mind was set at rest by a second report from Colonel D., according to which the advancing column belonged to a flank detachment of the 1st Infantry

Division, and that his Hussars had already communicated with its Dragoons.

The general turned back to his Brigade, where the orderly officer who had been sent to the divisional commander found him again at 10.50, and brought instructions for him to remain upon the heights until further orders. The Battalions which had been engaged in the Kriblitz wood arrived gradually with the main body, only the 10th Company was still at Trautenau ; the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment placed itself on the right of the 2nd Regiment, and next the head of Colonel D.'s detachment passing through Trautenau approached the place of assembly.

This detachment had moved off from the farm-houses on the Liebau road as the Brigade reached Kriblitz ; the two advanced subdivisions 4th Squadron cleared away the barricades from the bridges before the arrival of the Pioneer company.

As the Infantry, instead of marching on the high road, advanced south of it, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was able to trot forward upon it, and utilise a wooden bridge to the west of that on the high road.

At 11 o'clock the head of Colonel D.'s detachment joined the Brigade, and began to draw up on the right of the 2nd Regiment, which had formed in mass of Battalion columns; the Cavalry marched to the high road leading to Arnau, and sent one Squadron to reconnoitre the road to this place.

At 11.9 an order arrived from the divisional commander to advance as far as the hollow way leading from Alt-Rognitz to Hohenbruck, maintaining its hold of the high road, and to occupy the hills to the south of it.

The Brigade marched off by wings, the Regiments side by side, the Fusilier Battalions leading, the Batteries moving on their right, where the ground was better suited to them.

Soon afterwards the columns of march of the 1st Infantry Division could be seen in rear, approaching Trautenau upon the Liebau road.

At 11.20 the General commanding arrived with the Brigade.

Major-General B. reported to him what had happened up to that time, and the object of the movement which was being carried out; at the same time sending to acquaint Lieutenant-General A. with the arrival of the commander of the Corps.

At 11.30 the Fusilier Battalion 2nd Regiment, minus the 11th Company which was towards Raussnitz, occupied the portion of Hohenbruck situated on the road with two companies (one extended and the other in close order in reserve). The 10th Company was on the edge of a small wood to the eastward.

The Fusilier Battalion 2nd Regiment, only three companies strong, formed to the left, stretching beyond the hollow way from Hohenbruck to Alt-Rognitz, with two companies in the first line, and the remaining one in rear of it as a Reserve.

Further back, at the bend of the hollow way turning to the north, were the other Battalions, to the right those of the 1st Regiment, to the left those of the 2nd Regiment drawn up in mass of Battalion columns, the Batteries on the right flank near the high road; whilst to the left of them the commander of the 4th Squadron endeavoured to make it as strong as possible by calling in the 2nd Subdivision and various patrols.

The General commanding allowed the Fusilier and Pioneer Companies, which were still in Trautenau, to be withdrawn.

The Cavalry Brigade took up a sheltered position behind a gentle slope to the north of Hohenbruck.

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The events of the 3rd Brigade sketched here may well lead to a more minute investigation.

The 4 Battalions sent to the right bank of the Aupa had to cover the Division which was in the Parschnitz valley. The dispositions of the detachment, therefore, must be made in such a manner that, if necessary, it should be in a position to carry out its task by means of an action. But at first it could not be foreseen whether this was likely to take place in the direction of Kriblitz or Raussnitz, or perhaps in that of both.

Nothing, therefore, was left for Major-General B. but to hold the mass of his troops ready to oppose the enemy, wherever he might approach. For this purpose the ground in front had to be observed, so that the advance of the enemy could be known sufficiently early to allow of forming up in a suitable position for the action, and moreover these positions must be reconnoitred beforehand.

The General's first movement was limited by these considerations. He decided that, in case of an action, the Brigade must be formed somewhere along the southern edge of the long straggling wood in front.

To facilitate arriving there at the right moment and at the same time to reconnoitre, a Battalion was pushed forward beyond the edge of this wood, a subdivision of Hussars being sent in a westerly and another in a southerly direction, to examine the ground in front (pages 58, 59).

Even under these simple circumstances it was not a matter of indifference which Battalion should be brought to the front to provide the measures of security. The General decided upon the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment; by this means he kept the whole of the 2nd Regiment together under its commander, and it was of moment to separate the organic bonds as little as possible.

Had a second Battalion of the 1st Regiment been on the spot, it would have been more advisable to send a Battalion of the 2nd Regiment. The two commanders of Regiments would then have been left with two Battalions each, belonging to their own Regiments, to form the main body of the Brigade.

It is difficult to dispense with subordinate authorities in the conduct of an action; in any case they lighten the leader's duties essentially. Every commander, when troops are detached, should belong to that part where the greater portion of his force is kept together. Thus Colonel D. was where at least seven companies of his Regiment were assembled; and Major-General B. also had four Battalions of his Brigade under him. If, on the other



hand, the Battalions of a Regiment are detached in different directions, nothing is left to its commander but to play the part of a spectator. This he will certainly not wish to do, and will prefer to join a Battalion, thus giving it two leaders, which can benefit nobody.

The views enjoined here must, therefore, be borne carefully in mind whenever troops are detached.

Why Major-General B. satisfied himself with sending only two subdivisions of Hussars to examine the ground, and the roads in front, must be another question. The Cavalry Regiment belonging to the Division was there for the purpose of undertaking these duties within the sphere of the Division, and even beyond it, if no other Cavalry was at hand. In the present case, moreover, Major-General B. had still two-and-a-half Squadrons at his disposal.

The only answer is that, on account of the number of situations, the aim must frequently change; that one scheme cannot be employed for all these cases, and that the leader has continually to ask himself with how little means he can attain the object before him.

Had it not been known that the enemy's Cavalry was in the vicinity, and had the extent of ground to be watched from the Kribnitz valley to that of Raussnitz been less, it would have been sufficient to send only an officer escorted by a few picked horsemen in each direction.

The mistake is often made of sending the whole of the divisional Cavalry straight to the front at every opportunity, even in situations where a couple of active and bold riders could see more; for they would not be at once discovered. By such means the divisional Cavalry is ruined at the beginning of the campaign, possibly before the first engagement; and moreover it is not at hand at the right time, if it suddenly becomes necessary to reconnoitre in other directions. Besides, it must not be forgotten that Cavalry belonging to an Infantry Division has other duties as well.

On the other hand, too much should not be demanded from the small patrols mentioned above. *In the enemy's territory, and when he is in the vicinity*, they must not be expected to move by themselves to any distance ; for they will be annihilated unless they are strongly supported by Cavalry, which alone can push forward patrols upon all the roads and in every direction, and by sending out supports, and by their own position, can offer the necessary security. In such situations the work can only be performed by a strong body of Cavalry, provided with horse Artillery ; and even then the extent of ground occupied must depend upon its strength. Large divisions of this arm, at a great distance from the Army, need not even avoid an engagement, for the purpose of attaining the object of the reconnaissance.

Major-General B. therefore satisfied himself with sending only the necessary number of horses, especially as it was early in the forenoon, and it could not be foreseen what demands might be made upon the Cavalry in the course of the day. In fact, the situation very soon did change, when the 2nd Subdivision 4th Squadron reported that the presence of the enemy's Dragoons hindered it from crossing the Kriblitz ravine.

It was most desirable to obtain further information as soon as possible about affairs at Trautenau, but in order to make a closer examination of them the General would have to send forward the rest of the Hussar Regiment ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  Squadrons), and this would probably involve a Cavalry engagement, and such a description of combat carried on near troops which are resting disturbs them under any circumstances. Bringing up the Battery could hardly have been avoided, and sending out the foremost Battalion in support of the Hussars, filling its place by another ; besides, the divisional commander would have ordered the Hussar Regiment to the front at the beginning, if such had been his intention ; and lastly, the situation was not novel, for the presence of the enemy's Cavalry at Trautenau had already been known some time.

Major-General B. therefore forbore from making any further

dispositions on receiving this report ; but when the 3rd Sub-division 3rd Squadron reported at 8.28 o'clock the advance of a hostile column of all arms, the whole state of affairs was altered, and it was important to acquaint the divisional General with it as soon as possible.

However desirable it might have appeared for the General first to convince himself personally of the correctness of the report, still no time could be lost. In order, however, not to spread anything false, and so alarm the troops unnecessarily, he examined the non-commissioned officer minutely, after which he sent an officer to the divisional commander, whilst he himself went forward to reconnoitre.

As superior Cavalry had driven in the subdivision of the 3rd Squadron, and forbid a closer inspection of the enemy's movements, every means must be employed in order nevertheless to attain this as far as possible. Although the ground in front was broken, and covered with patches of wood, this could only be quickly managed by Cavalry.

Under these circumstances, the Cavalry must in the first place throw back that of the enemy, employing its whole force if necessary for this purpose ; this required the leader to dispose the entire Cavalry at his disposition at the place concerned, and if the decision of the momentary object lay to the front, not to keep back any portion for eventual employment. On these grounds the entire Hussar Regiment was now sent forward.

On such occasions it frequently happens that the commander concerned receives insufficient instructions, insufficient in so far that he is given a definite order, but not enough information about the whole situation, as far as he can be influenced by it. The latter however is very necessary, for only imagine the commander of a Regiment who has hitherto been unacquainted with the reports which have arrived, and whose position allowed of no view. Thus he stands suddenly before an entirely new picture and an altogether new situation ; he does not even know whether the horsemen, whose outline he sees against the horizon

about a mile before him on the flank, are his own Hussars, or whether they belong to the enemy's Cavalry. His advance will be conducted very differently if he has friendly troops so far to his front, to what it would be were he to expect to come into contact with the enemy at any moment.

The order therefore must not be limited to the following :—

‘The advance of a hostile column of all arms, on the road from Königinhof to Trautenau, is reported ; its head has just reached Hohenbruck. Advance with your Regiment in the direction of the north end of Alt-Rognitz, for the purpose of making a nearer reconnaissance.’

But to this must be added :—

‘The horsemen visible yonder belong to a Subdivision of your Regiment previously sent in that direction.’

But even this is not enough ; the enemy's Dragoons, whose presence had been reported on the other side of the Kriblitz ravine, and whose strength was not known, might incommode the Hussars during their advance towards Alt-Rognitz, and, under some circumstances, be very dangerous.

Consequently Major-General B. would do well to frame his instructions in the following way :—

‘You see the enemy's column yonder, marching on the main road, and just entering the village, which is Hohenbruck. One Subdivision of your Regiment away there to the left front by the next village, Alt-Rognitz, has been observing the march, but was driven back by the enemy's Uhlans. The flanking party belongs to this Subdivision, advance in the same direction and reconnoitre the enemy ; it is important for me to be quickly informed of his strength. The other Subdivision of your Regiment is over there, where you see the sharp cut Kriblitz ravine ; it has not been able to advance any further, as a superior force of the enemy's Dragoons are on the other side. A Battalion will occupy this hill for your support in case of necessity.’

More time is certainly required for such instructions than for a short order, but if the commander goes on in front of his

Regiment, opportunity can be found for this. In any case it is better to lose a few minutes than to lead troops suddenly into unknown ground, and a situation where they cannot themselves gain quick and correct information.

This fault is most frequently committed in calling up the Reserves. The reinforcements successively brought up from the Reserves of the 1st and 2nd Prussian Corps, to Ligny on the 16th June 1815, almost all received the order: 'to throw back the enemy.'

These Battalions rushed into the village, often quite unnecessarily, and advanced still further beyond its opposite side, 'in order to throw back the enemy.' Each time it resulted in their turning again, and the enemy, pressing upon the heels of the retiring Prussian Battalions, entered with them into the village.

Had these leaders had any idea of the preceding course of the action before they entered it, they would probably have made other dispositions. It would have been better to give them the order:—

'March to Ligny, and place yourself under General X., who is commanding there.'

Then the latter would have instructed the commanders, and a leading of the whole force in accordance with the general intention would have been feasible.

In case of an unsuccessful action, the support of routed Cavalry is always more necessary than that of Infantry, therefore a support of the latter arm should always be provided for the Cavalry when possible. On this account Major-General B. pushed his most advanced Battalion forward to the nearest hill which offered cover (531). As is already known, Major-General B., on receiving the report of the enemy's advance, rode forward to reconnoitre personally. Before placing troops for action, the leader must previously reconnoitre for himself, if practicable; this of course is not always possible with large masses, otherwise half the day would be gone before the several bodies received their instructions.



At the same time that the Hussars advanced, the General brought the rest of his force up to the southern edge of the wood ; he did not now hesitate a moment to disturb the rest of his troops, for as there was a possibility that the enemy, being close at hand, would advance very shortly to attack the Brigade, the latter must be prepared for his reception. There was a prospect of such an attack from the direction of Kriblitz or Hohenbruck. As he was situated the ground did not offer a favourable position on account of its great breadth, its broken nature in front, and the difficulty of retreat ; but in this, as in many cases, the General had to be contented with the ground as he found it, for the whole situation required the Brigade to receive the enemy's attack there.

Had the General intended to dispose his Brigade along the southern edge of the wood (504, 509), the position would not appear altogether happily chosen. The Brigade could not occupy the long straggling line of the wood in its whole extent ; there was nothing for the flanks to rest upon, nor any favourable position for Artillery which would facilitate the conduct of an action ; and moreover, there was a range of commanding heights in front of the centre (554, 531), from which the whole position could be brought under fire.

Perhaps it would have been more judicious, under these circumstances, if hill 531 had in the first place been occupied with the Battery and from one to two Battalions, whilst the rest of the Brigade remained massed in rear as a Reserve. Then the General would have been in a position to support directly the defence of the not unfavourably situated hill, as well as to take in flank any advance made by the enemy from Kriblitz between the range 554, 531, and the Aupa.

It was not in the power of the Brigadier to take the offensive independently, as this far exceeded the object for which he was detached. His dispositions for the defensive therefore were justified by his position, and could not but be approved by the

divisional commander, although the latter immediately decided upon an opposite course.

On the order for the attack of Kriblitz, which was now to be executed by the Brigade, the directions given by Major-General B. appear judicious. He left full independence to the several bodies under him, since his orders were directed to the commander of the 2nd Regiment, of the isolated 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment, as well as to the Pioneer Company, the Battery, and the Sanitary Detachment. At the same time he communicated to each its task, and the direction to be taken by it, provided for the conformity of the movement, and informed each what body was next to it, as well as that the Hussars were still in front. It was not necessary to tell the 2nd Battery 1st Regiment of the latter fact, as the advance had been made under its eyes.

As regards the dispositions for the attack, it was left to the commander of the Battery to choose the most suitable position ; it sufficed to acquaint him with the task to be carried out. Two Battalions were placed in the first line ; the real attack was to be against Kriblitz, but still the heights on the left flank could not be left destitute of troops ; the 2 other Battalions remained disposable in reserve, ready to be employed against Kriblitz, as well as on the heights if necessary.

On the advance the brigadier had to consider the enemy as well as his own troops. In respect of the latter he must see that the two foremost Battalions act in concert, as well as in the right direction. Nextly that the Battery is ready for further employment, as soon as its object is attained in the position which it has temporarily taken up. And, lastly, he must see that the two reserve Battalions are kept for their destined purpose. He must be specially careful not to overlook that the Battalions follow their own Fusilier Battalion ; that as soon as the latter comes into small-arm fire it can only advance slowly, and the distance between it and the following Battalions will become less and less, and so the latter may be easily tempted

to press into the first line also. In any case, this is an occurrence which frequently happened in the actions in our last war, and many commanders of regiments, letting themselves be carried away as soon as the advance of the first line was at all checked, wished to remedy it by bringing up the second and third lines. Such a proceeding appears only justifiable with decisive attacks after a long engagement, but not during its introduction or early stages. Therefore the addition in the commander of the 2nd Regiment's orders—'To follow with the 2 Battalions as a Reserve at the disposition of the Brigadier'—was not superfluous, and nevertheless the watchfulness over the execution of this order had to be constantly maintained.

Which Battalion of the 2nd Regiment should be sent forward by the commander of the Regiment, and in what formation the 2 Battalions of the first line should march off, was a matter for the leader immediately concerned; the brigadier has only to interfere as soon as he discovers anything actually faulty; as, for example, had a Battalion of the first line advanced in close column, or the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment marched along the crest of the heights with all its companies. Major-General B. interfered in the first place on the somewhat inconsiderate advance of the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment. As at the place where it came upon the enemy, it could only be at first a matter of a stationary action, until the working on the flanks began to take effect, the Battalion received the order to abstain from the attack for the present. But this order must proceed from the brigadier, as otherwise the Battalion commander from his station could, and must, only pursue the object of throwing back the enemy's Infantry opposed to him, and for this purpose must have employed his whole force, to the last man.

As the enemy did not defend Kriblitz itself, the right flank Battalion of the first line turned of its own accord, after crossing the ravine against the wood, which was still occupied by the enemy. This movement was in accordance with the intentions of the brigadier, and he therefore did not interfere with it.

This kind of movement, even when executed by a subordinate body of troops, may be decisive for a phase of an action, and afterwards controversy frequently arises as to whom the credit of having given the impulse is due. Without mentioning that there is no merit in the fulfilment of a duty, and that the greater or lesser merit cannot be measured by the inch, it must be maintained that the superior officer, even if he has not given the order, remains answerable for all that he allows his subordinates to do under his eyes.

Upon the advance of the right wing against the Hopfenberg, it was necessary to be informed of what was going on in Trautenu. If this was not done by the subdivision of Hussars, or the right flank Battalion of their own accord, the brigadier must give an order to that effect. The despatch of the Pioneer company to the town was certainly a measure in accordance with the general circumstances, which could only be seen by Major-General B., from whom the requisite order must proceed.

A report of the enemy's retreat was sent to the divisional commander, and his order to reunite the whole Brigade was carried out.

In conclusion, it is still to be remarked how the uncertainty which was produced by the news of the advance of one of the enemy's columns along the Aupa, points anew to the advisability of giving the commander of the larger bodies of troops a sufficient insight into the movements of every column with which they may come in contact.

(2.) *The 4th Infantry Brigade.*

The 4th Brigade was completely assembled upon the place of rendezvous at Parschnitz at 8.15 o'clock, and there joined by the two Heavy Batteries.

In consequence of the enemy's approach, the Brigade got under arms about 8.45 o'clock, and received the order to cross the Aupa at Parschnitz with the two Heavy Batteries.

Its commander, hastening on in front, arrived with the divi-

sional commander at hill 504 at 9.35 o'clock, and was directed by him, as a preliminary measure, to continue to march in the open ground between Kriblitz and Alt-Rognitz, whilst the 3rd Brigade advanced to the attack of Kriblitz on his right.

The march of the Brigade was in two columns, the 3rd Regiment on the right, the 4th on the left. The Battalions in columns of sections, right and left in front respectively.

When their heads reached hill 504, the two Fusilier Battalions, which were in front, formed up into column of company columns, in rear of the centre, and opened out to full distance; the other two Battalions remained in column of march as already remarked, but halted some time to regain their order, and to open out to proper intervals; the Heavy Batteries followed the Fusiliers.

At 9.50 the hill 531, where the commander stood, was passed over, and a south-westerly direction taken, whilst the left flank Battalion of the 3rd Brigade was already engaged in the Kriblitz ravine. Major-General C. was here informed that the enemy was on the point of evacuating the position of Trautenau, and he must now endeavour to inflict as much damage upon him as possible with his Brigade and the Hussars during his retreat, whilst the 3rd Brigade assembled again on the heights south of Trautenau.

As columns of the enemy's Infantry could now be seen retiring south of the Kriblitz wood, the two Heavy Batteries advanced beyond the foremost line of skirmishers. Here they were received, though at long range, by small-arm fire from the wood, and one Battery was forced to fire at the edge of it, whilst the other followed the retiring enemy with a few rounds.

The right wing of the Fusilier Battalion, 3rd Regiment—the 9th Company—now also turned towards the wood. Two subdivisions extended in skirmishing order, the 3rd in close order in rear, were obliged to carefully utilise the various inequalities of the ground. The enemy, however, soon evacuated the edge of the wood, so that the company penetrated it without difficulty, and there came upon skirmishers of the 3rd Brigade.



Single prisoners were made; those portions of the Company which pressed forward right into the open beyond the southern edge, were received with such a heavy fire that they rushed back precipitately into the wood.

In the meantime the enemy had occupied strongly the isolated and wooded hill (425), at the northern entrance of Alt-Rognitz. The whole of the 9th and 12th Companies of the Fusilier Battalion, 4th Regiment, extended in skirmishing order on the side nearest to the heights in front; the 11th Company was brought up from the left of the second line, to prolong the line to the left. It formed a line of skirmishers out of two subdivisions, whilst the third, in close order, followed the extreme left to cover the flank; the 10th Company remained in reserve.

As the first shots fell, the remaining Battalions of the Brigade were formed up in column of company columns, in rear of the centre, and opened out, so that the Regiments were side by side; the Brigade, drawn up in this way by wings, now formed four lines.

The attempt of the advanced Fusilier Companies to cross the crest of the heights (500) without further preparation, miscarried; the enemy only evacuated his position, and fell back upon some Squadrons further in rear, when the 11th Company 4th Regiment had turned his right flank, and the 12th Company 3rd Regiment, followed by its 10th and 11th Companies at full distance apart, had cleared the little wood on the hollow way from the Hopfenberg to Alt-Rognitz.

The Fusilier Companies in the first and second lines immediately followed upon the retreating enemy. The greater portion of the 11th Company 4th Regiment turned into Alt-Rognitz; the 10th Company of the same Regiment was directed to the wooded hill which had just been taken.

The rest of the Brigade crossed the heights 500, but nearing the engaged line, which only advanced slowly, too closely, it had to be halted by the brigadier at the foot of the hill, and seek

shelter on the plain from the fire of the three Batteries, which were in position between the two clearings before Neu-Rognitz.

The Heavy Batteries were unlimbered on hill 500, and fired upon the enemy's retreating Divisions.

In this situation Major-General C. received the divisional commander's order to call in the advanced Battalions, and to take up a position with the Brigade on either side of hill 425, securing his left flank. In consequence of this, Major-General C. sent aides-de-camp to the commanders of the Fusilier Battalions with the following orders :—

For the Battalion of the 4th Regiment :—

'The Battalion will discontinue the forward movement, and occupy the northern entrance of Alt-Rognitz, as well as the hill to the north of it.'

For the Battalion of the 3rd Regiment :—

'The Battalion will discontinue the pursuit, and occupy the little wood on the hollow way taken by it.'

These instructions were carried out. In order not to give the enemy's Artillery, which was directed upon the retiring Fusilier Battalions, too favourable an object to aim at, the most advanced companies remained in loose order, whilst the 10th and 11th Companies of the 3rd Regiment doubled the distance between the several subdivisions of their column.

At 11.10 o'clock the Brigade was in the following positions: the 11th Company 4th Regiment had occupied the nearest farm-houses at the northern entrance of Alt-Rognitz, and covered itself by pushing forward two sections both on the road and the western edge of the village; the 10th Company was on the isolated hill, the rest of the Battalion was assembled behind it.

The 10th and 11th Companies 3rd Regiment were in the wood west of the hollow way, which connected Alt-Rognitz with the Hopfenberg; the 12th Company was in reserve in rear, and was joined by the 9th Company only a little over 2 Subdivisions strong, as a part of its men had joined the 3rd Brigade in the Kriblitz wood.

The other Battalions of both Regiments placed themselves on either side of the wood situated to the east of the hollow way.

In the course of the action hitherto, the Brigade had been advancing in a formation in which the Regiments moved by wings side by side, the Battalions following in rear of one another. The normal formation of a Brigade makes each line to consist of the Battalions of one Regiment, so that the one Regiment follows the other, but still the regulations allow the form adopted above to be employed. How far the advantages and disadvantages of the latter are observable in the execution of an action, will be treated of on another occasion; for the march of the Brigade across country, the old formation must be preferred. In any case two Battalions moving with one front can be more easily led than three, difficult places be better avoided, and a change of direction can be effected more quickly. In an advance by Regiments formed in rear of each other, three columns are formed, if not more, of which the movements of the central one is limited now on one side, and now on the other, and each column is composed of Battalions belonging to different Regiments. It is said to be better to march in three columns than in two, but this is only applicable to roads; in other ground the fewer columns troops are in, the more easily can they be kept together. Besides, with the wing formation, each commander of a Regiment keeps his Battalions together in one column.

It appears necessary to leave the several bodies in the order of march as long as possible, for each Battalion can more easily get over the ground, and with proportionately less exertion, in this formation than in column of attack. It may often, as in the case before us, be practicable only to form the leading divisions on approaching the enemy, and to draw up those in rear as the former comes into action.

In such an advance, the commanders of Brigades and Regiments must direct their unremitting attention to seeing that the original order is properly maintained. If it should be disturbed

by the circumstances of the ground, it is better to halt for a few minutes for the purpose of re-establishing it. This will be especially necessary after passing through a wood, for a Brigade entering it in proper formation comes out completely disordered and mixed up, on account of the thick wood in many places, the hills and strips of meadow, and the want of any view.

In the present case, also, the brigadier had to see that the leading Battalions retained their communication, and that the distance of those following in rear was maintained. He was therefore certainly right in halting his main body, as it advanced too close to the first line, and also in his position he was right in following on the heels of the retreating enemy, though this movement was changed by the divisional commander from other considerations.

(3.) *The Regiment of Divisional Cavalry.*

The Hussars' work during the movements hitherto consisted in reconnoitring, orderly, and requisitioning duties. Notwithstanding the economy practised in the present case, it is apparent that a vast number of men are necessarily absorbed by these duties, therefore proceeding about them with the greatest caution cannot be too strongly recommended.

When the Regiment was called up to reconnoitre the enemy's march, it was required to be as strong as possible, as perhaps its object could only be attained by an action. The commander, however, had at the moment only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Squadrons in hand. Also the commander of the 4th Squadron, with the Advanced Guard, found himself on the approach of the enemy reduced to half his strength. In practice, whole Subdivisions, and even Squadrons, are only too frequently employed instead of small patrols; and so the Regiment appears upon the battle-field more scattered and reduced, if possible, than happened in the case in point.

If it is considered that 600 horses are every day demanded in the same way, too great expectations of the efficacy of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment in action will not be entertained.

Its principal use should consist in reconnoitring and providing for the security of the Division, and in these respects, the commander of the Regiment can relieve his General of many details, and be of great value to him by personally taking the initiative and acting on his own responsibility. Although the mass of the Regiment must not be led away by its commander without the order of the Division, he may carry out without instructions the reconnoitring duties in all directions, as well as communications with the parallel columns, by means of small patrols. For these purposes it is certainly requisite that the commander of the Regiment should be kept informed of the general situation by his General.

Should these small patrols be driven in by the enemy, or be brought to a stand, the rest of the Regiment must, as a rule, be sent up to them. It is therefore a matter for the divisional commander to bring the Regiment into such a position, that at the right time it will be available.

On these grounds during the advance of the Division on a road in the early morning, the Regiment was attached to the advanced guard; but as the ground opened out on the left flank towards the enemy, only a Squadron was left with it, and the rest sent to Major-General B.'s left flank detachment (of the 3rd Brigade). As soon as the further advance of the 4th Brigade on the left took place, and circumstances required a reconnaissance on that flank to a considerable distance, the divisional commander again had the Hussar Regiment directly at his disposition for this purpose, and only one Subdivision remained in front of the 3rd Brigade.

As a rule, the Cavalry Regiment is led directly by the divisional commander, and is only specially placed under the orders of a detachment when it is acting in connection with it. It then frequently happens that when another destination must be suddenly given to the Regiment, it is taken away without acquainting the commander of the detachment with the altered circumstances. This must not be; the commander who issues the new order



should acquaint the leader of the detachment, and the commander of the Regiment also, if the order has not been received, though the latter is bound to report his departure to him.

It must be further remarked, that a sufficient reconnoitring in front of the Infantry allows it to remain up to the last moment in the convenient formation of the order of march, and may even protect it from unexpected Artillery fire. It would therefore be judicious when circumstances, as in the case before us, require a great extension of the troops for manœuvring, to send a subdivision to each Brigade to clear the way in front, where it does not appear practicable to employ the whole Regiment for this purpose. It must not be omitted to attach a few orderlies to the brigadiers, or leaders of detachments; the one aide-de-camp of the Brigade is not in a position to carry all the orders and reports at the right times, and must be given some assistance. The commanders of Regiments, and even of Battalions, are situated in the same way.

#### (4.) *The Artillery.*

The situation described only shows us the two Heavy Batteries in mutual action; the 1st and 2nd Light Batteries were following separate aims.

Such a proceeding can be required by the circumstances, but should only be followed when there is a pressing necessity for it. In this case it was caused only by the great extension of the Division, and by the independent tasks which devolved upon the two Brigades in the first line, and the advanced guard.

As a rule, however, in action it should be sought to keep the Batteries together in the first line, under the commander of the Artillery. The General commanding must employ the whole, as far as possible, as a compact body of troops, and understand how to treat it in that sense. In action the Division requires mostly the concentrated effect of Artillery, and, even when there is only room for single Batteries, these must not be employed according to the ideas of their respective leaders. The divisional

commander, therefore, must not leave the Artillery to act at its own discretion, but must employ it, and give it the necessary orders ; the same refers to other commanders to whom Artillery may be attached.

The presence of the commander of the Artillery with the divisional Staff has been found advisable, but in action he belongs to the place where more than one of his Batteries have come into operation.

If it is required to attack the enemy at any particular place, it will generally be found advisable to bring all the Batteries to bear which are available. When the enemy's Artillery opened fire upon the 1st Light Battery, the Mounted Battery did not wait to see if the latter would succeed in its encounter, but hastened forward immediately into the engaged line ; the 2nd Light Battery also joined in later against the same object.

If the Infantry is advancing, and objects are visible for the Artillery to fire upon, it must hasten forward, as far as its safety will admit, in order to prepare the attack as long before as possible, as the two Heavy Batteries did on the first advance of the 4th Brigade. With this view, the Batteries should march in the vicinity of the first line.

As soon as the enemy draws off, the Artillery must at once rejoin the troops to which it belongs ; in the opposite case it should remain as long as requisite in the position taken up, unless it finds a nearer or more favourable one for encountering the enemy. The 2nd Light and two Heavy Batteries acted in this manner.

Although an Artillery combat must generally be carried out at distances under 2,000 paces, the introductory fire will nevertheless be opened, as a rule, at greater distances.

APPENDIX II.

Ordre de bataille  
of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division & the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Brigade.

2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division.

Officer: Commanding. *Lieut. General A.*

Officer of the Staff. *Major X.*

4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade

*Major, General C.*

3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Reg<sup>t</sup> *Colonel F.*

3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade

*Major, General B.*

1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Reg<sup>t</sup> *Colonel D.*

*Fusilier Batt<sup>n</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> Batt<sup>n</sup> 3<sup>rd</sup> Batt<sup>n</sup> 2 Batt<sup>n</sup> 1 Batt<sup>n</sup> Fusilier Batt<sup>n</sup>*

1<sup>st</sup> Hussars.

*Lieut. Colonel H.*

1<sup>st</sup> Foot Division of the 1<sup>st</sup> Artillery Regiment.

*2<sup>nd</sup> heavy batt<sup>y</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> heavy batt<sup>y</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> light batt<sup>y</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> light batt<sup>y</sup>*

1<sup>st</sup> Company 1<sup>st</sup> Engineer Battalion.

*Captain K.*

Sanitary Detachment.

1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Brigade.

*Major General L.*

1<sup>st</sup> Uhlans *Colonel N.*


1<sup>st</sup> Cuirassiers *Lieut. Col. M.*

*1<sup>st</sup> mounted battery 1<sup>st</sup> artillery Reg<sup>t</sup>*


*Detached: 2<sup>nd</sup> Uhlans to the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division.*

*Temporarily attached to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division.*

2<sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital.



## APPENDIX III.



Henry S. King & Co. 65 Cornhill, London.

E. Weller, lith.



356.1			
Call No. VER			
Accession No. 13630			
Title Studies in Troop Leading.			
Author Vernois, I. Von Verdy.			
BORROWER'S NO.	DATE LOANED	BORROWER'S NO.	DATE LOANED

FOR CONSULTATION  
ONLY

CK'd  
9/11/57

